APPENDIX F. PRIMARY SOURCES - BRITISH SOURCES
Primary Sources Battle of Bennington

Unit: British Army Officers at Bennington

These British Army officers fought in the Battle of Bennington:

1) Captain Alexander Fraser, 34th Regiment of Foot (serving with Fraser's Rangers; he escaped)
2) Lieutenant James Wright, 9th Regiment of Foot (serving with Fraser's Rangers; he was killed)
3) Ensign Alexandre, Baron de Salans, 9th Regiment of Foot (serving with Fraser's Rangers; he was captured and exchanged on 24 October 1777.)
4) Sub Engineer/Lieutenant Desmarets Durnford, Corps of Engineers (he was captured)
5) Ensign William Johnson, 29th Regiment of Foot (serving with the Quebec Indian Department; he was captured)

Baron de Salans was French nobleman whose family Laborey de Salans originates in the Franche-Conté and was ennobled by Charles V in 1521. The Service Historique de la défense in Vincennes, France does not have any information on him. Salans remained in the British Army throughout the war: He was exchanged on 24 October 1777 in Albany and in 1782 he served as a captain with the 85th Regt of Foot in Jamaica. See http://www.jamaicanfamilysearch.com/Members/a1782_04.htm

There was another French nobleman in Burgoyne's army, the Chevalier D'Anterroches, whose biography can be found here: http://www.62ndregiment.org/dAnterroches.htm

This information is courtesy of Eric Schnitzer, Acting Chief of Interpretation at Saratoga National Historical Park (2016)
Primary Sources Battle of Bennington

Unit: 62d Regiment of Foot
Lieutenant Thomas Anbury

p. 346:

LETTER XXXVII.

Camp at Batten Kill, August 24, 1777.

MY DEAR FRIEND,

IT is with the utmost concern I tell you the expedition to Bennington has failed, and great numbers made prisoners. This, no doubt, will be a matter of great exultation to the Americans, and divest them of those fears they had entertained of the German troops, especially as they have been defeated by a set of raw militia. In this enterprize the General left nothing for chance to do, but planned every thing his wisdom could suggest to effect it, and the project would have answered many desirable ends, had the execution of it proved as fortunate as the plan was judicious.

p. 348:

Whatever was the cause of the failure of the expedition to Bennington, of which many appear, the principal one seems to have been the delay of the reinforcement
that was sent to support the first detachment, which was from eight o’clock in the morning to four o’clock in the afternoon of next day, marching two and twenty miles; the advanced corps, not only at the time the Germans were sent, but at the failure of it, felt themselves much hurt, thinking it was a duty they ought to have been employed on, and it was not till after its failure, that impression was erased from their minds, by being informed they were reserved for more important services; for in case that expedition had proved successful, the advanced corps were to have pushed forward to the heights of Still-Water, and intrenched there till the army and provisions could have joined; by this means the whole country on the west side of the river to the banks of the Mohawk, would have been in our possession.

August 18th
The Advanced Corps recrossed Hudsons River, and took up their former post at Batten Kill.

The Bridge of Communication had been carried away by a Flood, which occasioned a great delay in the recrossing of the Troops.

I must here beg leave to mention a circumstance, respecting an unexpected reinforcement received by the Rebels at Bennington near the Time of the Action of the 16th Augst. as mentioned by an Officer of Rank in the British Army, who was taken prisoner by the Enemy in the Action of the 7th of October. His words were as follows –

A few days after I was prisoner in the Rebel Camp, some of their officers told me, that it was a providential circumstance, that General Stark was coming through Bennington with 1200 Militia of the New Hampshire Grants, to join their main Army near Albany, for the Guard on the provision at Bennington did not amount to more than 400 Men, and that on his hearing of a Detachment of our Army being only four or five Miles from him, he, with the Guard, and what Militia could be assembled in the Neighbourhood, attacked and defeated the detachment, as well as the reinforcement, that were on their March to join them. The Rebel officers also informed me, and I have seen Accounts, that agree with what I have heard, that during the Action, General Starks was luckily joined by Col. Warner and a considerable Body of Men. I have frequently heard our officers say, that were in this Action, that had Col. Baume retreated four miles, and recrossed the River he passed the Day before, and taken post there, when he found by information that he could not proceed, and had ‘wrote for reinforcements, he would have met Col. Breymen coming to his Assistance, and would not have risqued the loss of his Corps, which by his Instructions, were so strongly recommended, as not even to risk a considerable Loss.”


Stanley is “convinced ... that the author was a member of Brigadier-General Simon Fraser's Brigade.” (p. 3) Of the two British officers serving with Fraser's Rangers who also fought at Bennington Lt. James Wright of the 9th Regiment of Foot was killed but Captain Alexander Fraser of the 34th Regiment of Foot escaped, making him the most likely informant.
Mrs Casparus Bain tells me (Oct 22d 1852) that her father Neil Gillespie and his neighbor Bapt. Beaty were one day at Fort Miler, when Burgoyne’s army was encamped there, and saw a Dutchman shot, who had deserted from the army & been re-captured. The execution took place upon the camp ground, in the big meadow east of the Duer house. The prisoner was marched out of the house, all dressed in white; a clergyman on each side of him robed in their black gowns. The music played the death march as they slowly walked to his grave. In the middle of the meadow the grave had been dug. The turf was neatly arranged along one side of the grave, and the loose earth formed a little heap on either side. The gentle calm demeanor of the man, as he walked to the spot & went through the sad ceremonies, excited the sympathies of the spectators strongly in his behalf. They came with slow & solemn step to the grave, and passed around it, to the side where the turf was piled up; he quietly knelt down upon this turf, his opened grave before him; the cap was drawn down over his eyes; a file of soldiers, seven in number, were drawn up a short distance in front of him; they aimed their muskets, and on a given signal, simultaneously fired; the man dropped dead. It was the most affecting, the most awful scene, my father used to say, of anything he had ever witnesses. The deserter had been taken in Salem the day before. Who it was that took him & brought him to the camp, I do not know. [This is obviously the same deserter, of whose capture in Salem Mrs Vance gave me an account. See § 740]


The “Hessian Deserter shot” was George Hundertmark. Hundertmark was a German so-called “von Scheiter” recruit serving in the 9th Regiment of Foot. A transcript of his trial at William Duer’s house near Fort Miller, on 24 August 1777, in British National Archives, WO 71, made by Eric Schnitzer is here:
http://www.62ndregiment.org/Private_Georg_Hundertmark_CM_9th%20Regt.pdf
General Burgoyne’s Orders to the Inhabitants of Castleton, &c.

By Lieut. Genl John Burgoyne, Commanding an Army & Fleet of Great Britain, against the Revoluted Provinces in America:
To the Inhabitants of Castleton, Hubberton, Rutland, Tenmouth, Powlet, Wells, Granville, with the neighboring districts;—also the districts bordering on White-creek, Cramden, Cambridge, &c. :
You are hereby directed to send from your several Townships, Deputies consisting of Ten persons or more from each Township to meet Col Skeene at Castleton on Wens’day, July 15th at Ten in the morning, who will have Instructions, not only to give further Incouragement to those who complied with the terms of my late manifesto, but also to communicate conditions upon which the persons and properties of the disobedient may yet be spared.
This fail not to obey under pain of Military Execution.

Head Quarters at Skeensborough House, July 10th, 1777.
J. Burgoyne
By order of his Excellency
R1 Kimpton, Secy.

Primary Sources Battle of Bennington

Unit: Headquarters
Lieutenant-General John Burgoyne

INSTRUCTIONS for Lieutenant Colonel Baume, on a secret expedition to the Connecticut River.

The object of your expedition is to try the affections of the country, to disconcert the councils of the enemy, to mount the Riedesel’s dragoons, to compleat Peter’s corps, and to obtain large supplies of cattle, horses and carriages. The several corps, of which the inclosed is a list, are to be under your command.

The troops must take no tents, and what little baggage is carried by officers must be on their own bat-horses. You are to proceed from Batten Kill to Arlington & to take post there, till the detachment of Provincials under ye command of Capt. Sherwood shall join yon from the Southward. Yon are then to proceed to Manchester, where you will again take port, so as to secure the passes of the mountains on the road from Manchester to Rockingham; from thence you will detach the Indians and light troops to the northward toward Otter Creek; on their return and also receiving intelligence that no enemy is in force upon the Connecticut river, you will proceed by the road over the mountains to Rockingham, where you will take post.

This will be the most distant part on the expedition, and must be proceeded upon with caution as you will have the defile of the mountains behind you which might make a retreat difficult: You must therefore endeavour to be well informed of the force of the enemy’s militia in the neighbouring country. Should you find it may be effected you are to remain there while the Indians and light troops are detached up the river, and you are afterwards to descend the river to Brattleburg, and from that place by the quickest march you are to return by the great road to Albany.

During your whole progress, your detachments are to have orders to bring in to you all horses fit to mount the dragoons under your command, or to serve as bat-horses to the troops, together with as many saddles and bridles as can be found. The number of horses requisite besides those necessary for mounting the regiment of dragoons, ought to be thirteen hundred. If you can bring more for the use of the Army, it will be so much the better. Your parties are likewise to bring in waggon and other convenient carriages with as many draught oxen as will be necessary to draw them, and all cattle fit for slaughter (milch cows excepted) which are to be left for the use of the inhabitants. Regular receipts in the form hereto subjoined are to be given in all places where any of the above mention’d
articles are taken, to such persons as have remained in their habitations and otherwise complied with the terms of Gen'l Burgoyne's manifesto: but no receipt to be given to such as are known to be acting in the service of the rebels. As you will have persons with you perfectly acquainted with the abilities of the country, it may perhaps be advisable to tax the several districts with the proportions of the several articles and limit the hours of the delivery: and should you find it necessary to move before such delivery can be made, hostages of the most respectable people should be taken to secure their following you the ensuing day. All possible means are to be used to prevent plundering.

As it is probable that Capt. Sherwood who is already detached to the southward, and will join you at Arlington, will drive in a considerable quantity of cattle and horses to you, you will therefore send in his cattle to the army with a proper detachment from Peters' corps to cover them, in order to disencumber yourself; but you must always keep the regiment of dragoons compact. The dragoons themselves must aid, and take care of the horses of the regiment. Those horses which are destined for the use of the army must be tyed together by Strings of ten each in order that one man may lead ten of them. You will give the unarmed men of Peter's corps to conduct them and inhabitants whom you can trust. You must always take your camps in good positions, but at the same time where there is pasture; and you must have a chain of centinels around your cattle and horses when grazing. Colonel Skene will be with you as much as possible, in order to assist you with his advice, to help you to distinguish the good Subject from the bad, to procure you the best intelligence of the Enemy, and to choose those people who are to bring me the accounts of your progress and success.

When you find it necessary to halt for a day or two you must always intrench the camp of the regiment of dragoons, in order never to risque an attack or affront from the enemy. As you will return with the regiment of dragoons mounted, you must always have a detachment of Capt. Fraser's or Peter's Corps in front of the column, and the same in the rear, in order to prevent falling into an ambuscade when you march through the woods. You will use all possible means to make the country believe that the troops under your command are the advanced corps of the army, and that it is intended to pass the Connecticut river on the road to Boston. You will likewise insinuate that the main army from Albany is to be join'd at Springfield by a corps of troops from Rhode Island. It is highly probable that the corps under Mr. Warner now supposed to be at Manchester will retreat before you; but should they, contrary to expectation, be able to collect in great force and post themselves advantageously, it is left to your discretion to attack them or not, always bearing in mind that your corps is too valuable to let any considerable loss be hazarded on this occasion.
Should any corps be moved from Mr. Arnold’s main army in order to interrupt your retreat you are to take as strong a post as the country will afford and send the quickest intelligence to me, and you may depend on my making such a movement as shall put the enemy between two fires, or otherwise effectually sustain you.

It is imagined the progress of the whole of this expedition may be effected in about a fortnight, but every movement of it must depend upon your success in obtaining such supply of provisions as will enable you to subsist, for your return to the army, in case you can get no more, and should not the army be able to reach Albany before your expedition should be compleated, I will find means to send you notice of it, and give your route another direction.

All persons acting in Committees or any officers under the direction of the Congress either civil or military are to be made prisoners.

I heartily wish you success, and have the honor to be, Sir, your most obed' Serv’.

J. Burgoyne, Lt. Genl.

Head Qr. Aug’. 9th, ‘77.

On 9 August 1777 Burgoyne was headquartered at Fort Edward.

A version with amendments and changes by Burgoyne is printed in John Burgoyne, *A State of the Expedition from Canada: as laid before the House of Commons, by Lieutenant-General Burgoyne, and verified by Evidence, With a collection of authentic Documents, ... Written and collected by himself, and dedicated to the Officers of the Army he commanded 2d ed.*, (London: J. Almon, 1780), pp. lxiii-lxviii.

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<th><strong>INSTRUCTIONS for Lieutenant Colonel Baume.</strong></th>
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<td>on a secret expedition to the Connecticut River.</td>
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*The erasures were made by Gen. Burgoyne.*

| THE object of your expedition is to try the affections of the country, to disconcert the councils of the enemy, to mount the Reidesel's dragoons, to compleat Peters's corps, and to obtain large supplies of cattle, horses, and carriages. |
|---|---|
| The several corps, of which the inclosed is a list, are to be under your command. |
| The troops must take no tents, and what little baggage is carried by officers must be on their own bat horses. |
| You are to proceed by the route from Batten Kill to Arlington, and take post there, so as to secure the pass from Manchester. You are to remain at Arlington till the detachment of the provincials, under the command of Captain Sherwood, shall join you from the southward. |
| You are then to proceed to Manchester, where you will take post so as to secure the pass of the mountains on the road from Manchester to Rockingham; from hence you will detach the Indians and light troops to the northward, toward Otter Creek. On their return, and also receiving intelligence that no enemy is in force in the neighbourhood of Rockingham (1) you will proceed by the road over the mountains to Rockingham, where you will take post. This will be the most distant part on the expedition. (2) |

(1) upon the Connecticut River,

(2) And must be proceeded upon with caution, as you will have the defile of the mountains behind you, which might make a retreat difficult; you must therefore endeavour to be well informed of the force of the enemy's militia in the neighbouring country.

Should you find it may with prudence be effected.
You are to remain there as long as necessary to fulfil the intention of the expedition from thence (3) and you are afterwards to descend by the Connecticut River to Brattlebury, and from that place, by the quickest march, you are to return by the great road to Albany.

(3) while the Indians and light troops are detached up the river.

During your whole progress your detachments are to have orders to bring in to you all horses fit to mount the dragoons under your command, or to serve as bat horses to the troops, they are likewise to bring in (4) saddles and bridles as can be found. (5)

(4) together with as many.

(5) The number of horses requisite, besides those necessary for mounting the regiment of dragoons, ought to be 1300. If you can bring more for the use of the army it will be so much the better.

Your parties are likewise to bring in waggons and other convenient carriages, with as many draft oxen as will be necessary to draw them and all cattle sit for slaughter (milch cows excepted) which are to be left for the use of the inhabitants. Regular receipts, in the form hereto subjoined, are to be given in all places where any of the abovementioned articles are taken, to such persons as have remained in their habitations, and otherwise complied with the terms of General Burgoyne's manifesto; but no receipts to be given to such as are known to be acting in the service of the rebels. (6).

(6) As you will have with you persons perfectly acquainted with the abilities of the country, it may perhaps be adviseable to tax the several districts with the portions of the several articles, and limit the hours for their delivery; and should you find it necessary to move before such delivery can be made, hostages of the most respectable people should be taken, to secure their following you the ensuing day. All possible means are to be used to prevent plundering.

As it is probable that Captain Sherwood, who is already detached to the southward, and will join you at Arlington, will drive in a considerable quantity of cattle and horses to you, you will therefore send in this cattle to the army, with a proper detachment from Peters's corps, to cover them, in order to disencumber yourself; but you must always keep the regiments of dragoons compact.

The dragoons themselves must ride, and take care of the horses of the regiment. Those horses which are destined for the use of the army must
be tied together by strings of ten each, in order that one man may lead ten horses. You will give the unarmed men of Peters's corps to conduct them, and inhabitants whom you can trust. You must always take your camps in good position; but at the same time where there is pasture, and you must have a chain of sentinels round your cattle and horses when grazing.

Colonel Skeene will be with you as much as possible, in order to assist you with his advice, to help you to distinguish the good subjects from the bad, to procure you the best intelligence of the enemy, and to choose those people who are to bring me the accounts of your progress and success.

When you find it necessary to halt for a day or two, you must always entrench the camp of the regiment of dragoons, in order never to risk an attack or affront from the enemy.

As you will return with the regiment of dragoons mounted, you must always have a detachment of Captain Fraser's or Peters's corps in front of the column, and the same in the rear, in order to prevent your falling into an ambuscade when you march through the woods.

You will use all possible means to make the country believe that the troops under your command are the advanced corps of the army, and that it is intended to pass the Connecticut on the road to Boston. You will likewise have it insinuated (7) that the main army from Albany is to be joined at Springfield by a corps of troops from Rhode Island.

(7) insinuate
You will send off occasionally cattle or carriages, to prevent being too much incumbered; and will give me as frequent intelligence of your situation as possible.

It is highly probable that the corps under Mr. Warner, now supposed to be at Manchester, will retreat before you; but should they, contrary to expectation, be able to collect in great force, and post themselves advantageously, it is left to your discretion to attack them or not, always bearing in mind that your corps is too valuable to let any considerable loss be hazarded on this occasion.

Should any corps be moved from Mr. Arnold's main army, in order to intercept your retreat, you are to take as strong a post as the country will afford, and send the quickest intelligence to me, and you may depend on my making such a movement as shall put the enemy between two fires, or otherwise effectually sustain you.

It is imagined the progress of the whole of this expedition may be effected in about a fortnight, but every movement of it must depend upon your success in obtaining such supply of provisions as will enable you to subsist for your return to the army, in case you can get no more.  

And should not the (◊) be able to reach Albany before your expedition should be compleated, I will find means to send you notice of it, and give your route another direction.

All persons acting in committees, or any officers acting under the directions of Congress, either civil or military, are to be made prisoners.
Camp at Duer’s House, 17th Aug. 1777.

Parole, St. Ferdinand. Countersign, Madrid.

Field Officer British Picquet, Major Forbes.

It was endeavoured among other objects of the Expedition which marched to the Left, to provide such a supply of Cattle as might have enabled the Army to proceed without waiting the arrival of the Magazines. That attempt having failed of success through the chances of War, the Troops must necessarily halt some days for bringing forward the Transport; and the several Corps will employ that time to collect their sick and convalescents, and such other scattered parties as are merely on Regimental Duty. [...]


“Duer’s House” was the home of William Duer (1743-1799) in Fort Miller just south of Fort Edward. Duer was a member of the New York Provincial Congress in 1775; the New York State Senate in 1777–78, and a member of the Continental Congress in 1778 and 1779.

The anonymous author of the *Specht Journal* described the location thus:

[On 14 August] “We moved into a camp at Fort Miller, actually to the left (east) of it onto two heights close together near Duer’s House, in which General Burgoyne had his headquarters. This was the first house built in good taste that we had seen for a long time. It consisted of two stories and was covered with an Italian roof; a pavilion was built on each side of it in which were the kitchen and pantries; by means of a covered gallery, they were connected with the main building. This house was considerable damaged as to its doors and windows and devoid of all its furniture. Its owner is a member of Congress and holds the office of commissary of the enemy army.

The Lieut. General having received the report from Lt. Col. Breymann, relative to the affair at Saintwick Mills, and also having obtained every collateral information possible, thinks it justice to declare publicly, that he has no reason to be dissatisfied with the personal Spirit of the Officers and Troops in the Action; that on the contrary the Officers who commanded the different Corps acted with intrepidity.

The failure of the Enterprize seems in the first Instance to have been owing to the Credulity of those who managed the Department of intelligence, suffered great numbers of the Rebel Soldiers to pass and repass, and perhaps count the numbers of the Detachment, and upon ill-founded confidence induced Lieut. Col. Baume to advance too far to have a secure retreat. The next cause was the slow movement of Lieut. Col. Breymann's Corps, which from bad weather, bad Roads, tired horses and other impediments stated by Lieut. Col° Breymann, could not reach 24 miles from eight in the morning of the 15th to four in the afternoon of the 16th. The Succour therefore arrived too late. The failure of Ammunition, in the management of which there appears to have been improvidence, was another misfortune. The rest seem common Accidents of War. Upon the whole the Enemy have severely felt their little success, and there is no circumstance to affect the Army with further regret or melancholly, than that which arises from the loss of some gallant men. But let the Affair of the Mill at Saintwick remain henceforward as a lesson against the impositions of a treacherous Enemy, many of whom in the very hour of swearing allegiance to the King, fought against his Troops, and against expending Ammunition too fast, by which conquering Troops were obliged to retire with loss. The Reflection upon this Affair will moreover excite Alertness and Exertion in every Corps marching for the support of another, by shewing in whatever degree those qualities may be possessed by the Commanding Officer (and they are not doubted in the present instance), yet unless they are general, common accidents may become fatal, and the loss of two hours may decide the turn of an enterprize, and it might happen in some cases, the fate of a Campaign.

A Proclamation by John Burgoyne, Esq. Lieutenant General of his Majesty's Armies in America, Colonel of the Queen's regiment of light dragoons, Governor of Fort William in North Britain, one of the Representatives of the Commons of Great Britain in Parliament, and commanding an army and fleet on an expedition from Canada, &c. &c. &c.

The forces entrusted to my command are designed to act in concert and upon a common principle, with the numerous armies and fleets which already display in every quarter of America, the power, the justice, and, when properly sought, the mercy of the king.

The cause, in which the British arms are thus exerted, applies to the most affecting interests of the human heart; and the military servants of the crown, at first called forth for the sole purpose of restoring the rights of the constitution, now combine with love of their country, and duty to their sovereign, the other extensive incitements which spring from a due sense of the General privileges of mankind. To the eyes and ears of the temperate part of the public, and to the hearts of suffering thousands in the provinces, be the melancholy appeal, whether the present unnatural rebellion has not been made a foundation for the completest system of tyranny that ever God, in his displeasure, suffered for a time to be exercised over a forward and stubborn generation.

Arbitrary imprisonment, confiscation of property, persecution and torture, unprecedented in the inquisitions of the Romish Church, are among the palpable enormities that verify the affirmative. These are inflicted by assemblies and committees, who dare to profess themselves friends to liberty, upon the most quiet subjects, without distinction of age or sex, for the sole crime, often for the sole suspicion, of having adhered in principle to the government under which they were born, and to which, by every tie, divine and human, they owe allegiance. To consummate these shocking proceedings, the profanation of religion is added to the most profligate prostitution of common reason; the consciences of men are set at naught; and multitudes are compelled not only to bear arms, but also to swear subjection to an usurpation they abhor.

Animated by these considerations, at the head of troops in the full powers of health discipline and valor; determined to strike where necessary, and anxious to spare where possible, I by these presents, invite and exhort all persons, in all places where the progress of this army may point, — and by the blessing of God, I will extend it far,—to maintain such a conduct as may justify me in protecting their lands, habitations and families. The
intention of this address is to hold forth security, not depredation to the country. To those whom spirit and principle may induce to partake of the glorious task of redeeming their countrymen from dungeons, and re-establishing the blessings of legal government, I offer encouragement and employment; and upon the first intelligence of their associations, I will find means to assist their undertakings. The domestic, the industrious, the infirm and even the timid inhabitants, I am desirous to protect, provided they remain quietly at their houses; that they do not suffer their cattle to be removed, nor their corn or forage to be secreted or destroyed; that they do not break up their bridges or roads; nor by any other act, directly or indirectly, endeavour to obstruct the operation of the king’s troops, or supply or assist those of the enemy. Every species of provision brought to my camp, will be paid for at an equitable rate, in solid coin.

In consciousness of Christianity, my royal master’s clemency, and the honor of soldiership, I have dwelt upon this invitation, and wished for more persuasive terms to give it impression: And let not people be led to disregard it, by considering their distance from the immediate situation of my camp, I have but to give stretch to the Indian forces under my direction, and they amount to thousands, to overtake the hardened enemies of G. Britain and America: I consider them the same wherever they may lurk.

If, notwithstanding these endeavors, and sincere inclinations to effect them, the phrensy of hostility should remain, I trust I shall stand acquitted in the eyes of God and men, in denouncing and executing the vengeance of the State against the wilful outcasts. The messengers of justice and of wrath await them in the field; and devastation, famine, and every concomitant horror that a reluctant but indispensable prosecution of military duty must occasion, will bar the way to their return.

J. BURGOYNE.

By order of his Excellency the Lieut. General.
Rob‘. Kingston, Sec’y.
Camp near Ticonderoga, 4th July, 1777.

New Hampshire State Papers vol. VIII, pp. 660-662;

Footnote on page 660 reads: “The date of this instrument seems not to be exactly ascertained. It is given by Williams, in his history of Vermont, July 4; by others July 2, and others still June, 29, 1777. The latter appears most probable — "Camp at Putnam Creek, June 29, 1777."—Ed. The first known version was issued on 20 June 1777 from Camp at Bouquet Ferry but the dates on surviving copies vary from 20 June to 20 July 1777. A contemporary printed copy can be found in Gentleman’s Magazine, 47 (1777), pp. 359–60.
General Burgoyne's Orders to the Inhabitants of Castleton, &c.

By Lieut. Genl John Burgoyne, Commanding an Army & Fleet of Great Britain, against the Revolted Provinces in America: To the Inhabitants of Castleton, Hubberton, Rutland, Tenmouth, Powlet, Wells, Granville, with the neighboring districts; — also the districts bordering on White-creek, Cramden, Cambridge, &c.:

You are hereby directed to send from your several Townships, Deputies consisting of Ten persons or more from each Township to meet Col Skeene at Castleton on Wens'day, July 15th at Ten in the morning, who will have Instructions, not only to give further Incouragement to those who complied with the terms of my late manifesto, but also to communicate conditions upon which the persons and properties of the disobedient may yet be spared.

This fail not to obey under pain of Military Execution.

Head Quarters at Skeensborough House, July 10th, 1777.

J. Burgoyne.

By order of his Excellency

R'l Kimpton, Sec'y.

It was well known that the enemy’s supplies in live cattle, from a large tract of country, passed by the route of Manchester, Arlington, and other parts of the Hampshire Grants, to Bennington, in order to be occasionally conveyed from thence to the main army. A large deposit of corn and of wheel carriages was also formed at the same place, and the usual guard was militia, though it varied in numbers from day to day. A scheme was formed to surprise Bennington. The possession of the cattle and carriages would certainly have enabled the army to leave their distant magazines, and to have acted with energy and dispatch: success would also have answered many secondary purposes.

Lieut. Col. Baume, an officer well qualified for the undertaking, was fixed upon to command. He had under him 200 dismounted dragoons of the regiment of Riedesel. Captain Fraser’s marksmen, which were the only British, all the Canadian volunteers, a party of the provincials who perfectly knew the country, 100 Indians, and two light pieces of cannon; the whole detachment amounted to about 500 men. The instructions were positive to keep the regular corps posted while the light troops felt their way, and not to incur the danger of being surrounded, or having a retreat cut off.

In order to facilitate this operation, and to be ready to take advantage of its success, the army moved up the call shore of Hudson’s River. On the 14th, a bridge was formed of rafts, over which the advanced corps passed and encamped at Saratoga. Lieutenant Colonel Breyman’s corps were poised near Batten Kill, and upon intelligence from Colonel Baume, that the enemy were stronger at Bennington than expected, and were aware of his attack, that corps, consisting of the Brunswick grenadiers, light infantry and chasseurs, were sent forward to sustain him. It since appears that Lieutenant Colonel Baume, not having been able to complete his march undiscovered, was joined at a place called Sancoix Mills, about four miles short of Bennington, by many people professing themselves to be Loyalists. A provincial gentleman of confidence who had been sent with the detachment, as knowing the country and the character of the inhabitants, was so incautious as to leave at liberty such as took the oath of allegiance. His credulity and their profligacy caused the first misfortune. Colonel Baume was induced to proceed without sufficient knowledge of the
ground. His design was betrayed; the men who had taken the oaths were the first to fire upon him; he was attacked on all sides. He showed great personal courage, but was overpowered by numbers.

During this time Lieutenant Colonel Breyman was upon the march through a heavy rain; and such were the other impediments stated in that officer's report, of bad roads, tired horses, difficulties in passing artillery, carriages, &c. that he was from eight in the morning of the 15th to four in the afternoon of the following day making about twenty-four miles. He engaged, fought gallantly, and drove the enemy from three several heights; but was too late to succour Colonel Baume, who was made prisoner, and a considerable part of his dragoons were killed or taken. The failure of ammunition, from the accidental breaking to pieces of a tumbril, unfortunately obliged Lieutenant Colonel Breyman to retire conquering troops, and to leave behind two pieces of cannon, besides two which had been lost by Lieutenant Colonel Baume. The Indians made good their retreat from the first affair, as did Captain Fraser, with part of his company, and many of the Provincials and Canadians. The loss, as at present appears, amounts to about 400 men, killed and taken in both, actions, and twenty-fix officers, mostly prisoners; but men who were dispersed in the woods drop in daily. A correct return shall be transmitted to your Lordship the first opportunity. This, my Lord, is a true slate of the event. I have not dwelt upon errors, because in many instances they were counterbalanced by spirit. The enemy will of course find matter of parade in the acquisition of four pieces of cannon; but that apart, they have small cause of exultation; their loss in killed and wounded being more than double to ours, by the concession of their prisoners and deserters, and of many inhabitants who were witnesses to the burial of their dead.

The chief subject of regret on our side, after that which any loss of gallant men naturally occasions, is the disappointment of not obtaining live cattle, and the loss of time in bringing forward the magazines.

John Burgoyne, A State of the Expedition from Canada: as laid before the House of Commons, by Lieutenant-General Burgoyne, and verified by Evidence, With a collection of authentic Documents, ... Written and collected by himself; and dedicated to the Officers of the Army he commanded 2d ed., (London: J. Almon, 1780)
Instructions for Major General Riedesel

Sir

The Intention of the Movement of the left Wing is to prevent the communication between Number 4 & Albany by the Road of Castletown; to give Protection & Encouragement to the well affected part of the Country; to awe the disaffected; and to cover the Hospital at Huberton.

You will therefore please, Sir, to take a Position upon Castletown River, throwing Col Breymann’s Corps on the other Side upon the Junction of the Roads to Pulteney and Rupert. The Regimt: of Hesse Hanau will take post at the landing place at the head of East Creek to secure that Communication.

When settled in your Position I beg the Favour of you to employ all possible means to encourage the Inhabitants in receiving the King’s Protection, by placing safe Guards upon the Houses and properties of those whose good principles are known and sparing even deserted Houses till you shall receive further directions, as I intend to proclaim a limited time for the guilty to return before Military Execution shall be put in force; & further to effect these purposes I must entreat you to punish publicly any Soldier or other person under your Command who may be found guilty of Plunder or any other Enormity towards the Inhabitants.

I have the honour to be Sir
Your most obedient Humble Servant

J. BURGOYNE

Head Quarters
Skeenesborough House
July 10th 1777

The New York Public Library, Rare Books and Manuscripts Division, Bancroft Collection, Hessian Manuscripts, No. 46, Riedesel Letters, 1776-1783, Folder 1777.

NOTE: The above is an original document provided courtesy of Todd W. Braisted.
MY LORD [Germaine],

IN my last dispatch (a duplicate of which will be inclosed herewith) I had the honour to inform your Lordship of the proceedings of the army under my command to the 30th of July.

From that period to the 15th of August every possible measure was employed to bring forward bateaux, provisions, and ammunition from Fort George to the first navigable part of Hudson's River, a distance of eighteen miles, the roads in some parts steep, and in others wanting great repair. [...] 

It was well known that the enemy's supplies in live cattle, from a large tract of country, passed by the route of Manchester, Arlington, and other parts of the Hampshire Grants, to Bennington, in order to be occasionally conveyed from thence to the main army. A large deposit of corn and of wheel carriages was also formed at the same place, and the usual guard was militia, though it varied in numbers from day to day. A scheme was formed to surprise Bennington. The possession of the cattle and carriages would certainly have enabled the army to leave their distant magazines, and to have acted with energy and dispatch: success would also have answered many secondary purposes.

Lieut. Col. Baume, an officer well qualified for the undertaking, was fixed upon to command. He had under him 200 dismounted dragoons of the regiment of Riedesel, Captain Fraser's marksmen, which were the only British, all the Canadian volunteers, a party of the Provincials who perfectly knew the country, 100 Indians, and two light pieces of cannon; the whole detachment amounted to about 500 men. The instructions were positive to keep the regular corps posted while the light troops felt their way, and not to incur the danger of being surrounded, or having a retreat cut off.

In order to facilitate this operation, and to be ready to take advantage of its success, the army moved up the east shore of Hudson's River. On the 14th, a bridge was formed of rafts, over which the advanced corps passed and encamped at
Saratoga. Lieutenant Colonel Breyman’s corps were posted near Batten Kill, and upon intelligence from Colonel Baume, that the enemy were stronger at Bennington than expected, and were aware of his attack, that corps, consisting of the Brunswick grenadiers, light infantry and chasseurs, were sent forward to sustain him.

It since appears that Lieutenant Colonel Baume, not having been able to complete his march undiscovered, was joined at a place called Sancoix Mills, about four miles short of Bennington, by many people professing themselves to be Loyalists. A provincial gentleman of confidence who had been sent with the detachment, as knowing the country and the character of the inhabitants, was so incautious as to leave at liberty such as took the oath of allegiance.

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find matter of parade in the acquisition of four pieces of cannon: but that apart, they have small cause of exultation; their loss in killed and wounded being more than double to ours, by the confession of their prisoners and deserters, and of many inhabitants who were witnesses to the burial of their dead.

The chief subject of regret on our side, after that which any loss of gallant men naturally occasions, is the disappointment of not obtaining live cattle, and the loss of time in bringing forward the magazines.

This heavy work is now nearly completed, and a new bridge of boats is thrown over the Hudson’s River, opposite to Saratoga, the former one of rafts having been carried away by the swell of water after the late continual rains. When enabled to move, nothing within my scale of talent shall be left unattempted to fulfil his Majesty's orders, and I hope circumstances will be such, that my endeavours may be in some degree assisted by a co-operation of the army under Sir William Howe.

I have the honour to be, with great respect,

Your Lordship's most obedient

And most humble servant,

(Signed.) J. BURGOYNE.

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Copy of a Letter from Lieutenant-General Burgoyne to Lord George Germaine, dated Can/p, near Saratoga, Augus 20, 1777.

MY LORD, [Private.]

I NEED not enlarge upon the concern I have in communicating any sinister events. I am persuaded your Lordship will give me credit for partaking every sentiment that your Lordship, or any other man warmed with principle and zeal in this contest, can feel.

In regard to the affair of Saintcoick, I have only to add to the public account, that if ever there was a situation to justify enterprize and exertion, out of the beaten track of military service, it was that in which I found myself. Had I succeeded, I should have effected a junction with St. Leger, and been now before Albany. And I flatter myself, I need only mention those views, to shew that in hazarding this expedition I had the soundest principles of military reasoning on my side, viz. that the advantages to be expected from success were in a great degree superior to the evils that could attend miscarriage. The secondary purposes, to which I alluded in the public letter, were to try the affections of the country; to complete the Provincial corps, many recruits for which were unable to escape from their villages without a force to encourage and protect them; and to distract the councils of the enemy, by continuing their jealousy towards New England.

Major General Reidesel has pressed upon me repeatedly the mounting his dragoons, the men were animated with the same desire, and I conceived it a most favourable occasion to give into their ideas and solicitations, because in exerting their zeal to fulfil their favourite purpose, they necessarily would effect the greater purpose of my own. The rest of the troops were selected from such as would least weaken the solid strength of the army, in case of ill success; and I thought it expedient to take a little trial of the Provincials and Canadians before I might have occasion for them in more important actions.

The original detachment could not have been made larger without opening roads, and other preparations of time, nor should I have thought it justifiable to expose the
best troops to loss upon a collateral action. Had my instructions been followed, or
could Mr. Breyman have marked at the rate of two miles an hour any given twelve
hours out of the two and thirty, success would probably have ensued, misfortune
would certainly have been avoided. I did not think it prudent, in the present crisis,
to mark these circumstances to the public so strongly as I do in confidence to your
Lordship; but I rely, and I will venture to say I expect, because I think justice will
warrant the expectation, that while, for the sake of public harmony, that necessary
principle for conducting nice and laborious service, I colour the faults of the
execution, your Lordship will, in your goodness, be my advocate to the King, and to
the world, in vindication of the plan.

The consequences of this affair, my Lord, have little effect upon the strength or
spirits of the army; but the prospect of the campaign in other respects, is far less
prosperous than when I wrote last. In spire of St. Leger’s victory, Fort Stanwix holds
out obstinately. I am afraid the expectations of Sir J. Johnson greatly fail in the rising
of the country. On this side I find daily reason to doubt the sincerity of the
resolution of the professing loyalists. I have about 400, but not half of them armed,
who may be depended upon; the rest are trimmers, merely actuated by interest. The
great bulk of the country is undoubtedly with the Congress, in principle and in zeal;
and their measures are executed with a secrecy and dispatch that are not to be
equalled. Wherever the King’s forces point, militia, to the amount of three or four
thousand assemble in twenty-four hours; they bring with them their subsistence,
&c. and, the alarm over, they return to their farms. The Hampshire Grants in
particular, a country unpeopled and almost unknown in the last war, now abounds
in the most active and most rebellious race of the continent, and hangs like a
gathering storm upon my left. In all parts the industry and management in driving
cattle, and removing corn, are indefatigable and certain; and it becomes
impracticable to move without portable magazines. Another most embarrassing
circumstance, is the want of communication with Sir William Howe; of the
messengers I have sent, I know of two being hanged, and am ignorant whether any
of the rest arrived. The same fate has probably attended those dispatched by Sir
William Howe; for only one letter is come to hand, informing me that his intention is
for Pensylvania; that Washington has detached Sullivan with 2500 men to Albany;
that Putnam is in the Highlands, with 4000 men. That after my arrival at Albany, the
movements of the enemy must guide mine; but that he wished the enemy might be
driven out of the province before any operation took place against the Connecticut;
that Sir Henry Clinton remained in the command in the neighbourhood of New-
York, and would act as occurrences might direct.
No operation, my Lord, has yet been undertaken in my favour: the highlands have not even been threatened. The consequence is, that Putnam has detached two brigades to Mr. Gates, who is now strongly posted near the mouth of the Mohawk-River, with an army superior to mine in troops of the Congress, and as many militia as he pleases. He is likewise far from being deficient in artillery, having received all the pieces that were landed from the French ships which got into Boston.

Had I a latitude in my orders, I should think it my duty to wait in this position, or perhaps as far back as Fort Edward, where my communication with Lake George would be perfectly secure, till some event happened to assist my movement forward; but my orders being positive to "force a junction with Sir William Howe," I apprehend I am not at liberty to remain inactive longer than shall be necessary to collect twenty-five days provision, and to receive the reinforcement of the additional companies, the German drafts and recruits now (and unfortunately only now) on Lake Champlain. The waiting the arrival of this reinforcement is of indispensible necessity, because from the hour I pass the Hudson's River and proceed towards Albany, all safety of communication ceases. I must expect a large body of the enemy from my left will take post behind me. I have put out of the question the waiting longer than the time necessary for the foregoing purposes, because the attempt, then critical, depending on adventure and the fortune that often accompanies it, and hardly justifiable but by orders from the state, would afterwards be consummately desperate. I mean my Lord, that by moving soon, though I should meet with insurmountable difficulties to my progress, I shall at least have the chance of fighting my way back to Ticonderoga, but the season a little further advanced, the distance increased, and the march unavoidably tardy, because surrounded by enemies, a retreat might be shut by impenetrable bars or the elements, and at the same time no possible means of existence remain in the country.

When I wrote more confidently, I little foresaw that I was to be left to pursue my way through such a tract of country, and hosts of foes, without any co-operation from New-York; nor did I then think the garrison of Ticonderoga would fall to my share alone, a dangerous experiment would it be to leave that post in weakness, and too heavy a drain it is upon the life-blood of my force to give it due strength. I yet do not despond.—Should I succeed in forcing my way to Albany, and find that country in a state to subsist my army, I shall think no more of a retreat, but at the worst fortify there and await Sir W. Howe's operations.

Whatever may be my fate, my Lord, I submit my actions to the breast of the King, and to the candid judgment of my profession, when all the motives become public; and I rest in the confidence, that whatever decision may be passed upon my conduct, my good intent will not be questioned.
I cannot close so serious a letter without expressing my fullest satisfaction in the behaviour and countenance of the troops, and my compleat confidence that in all trials they will do whatever can be expected from men devoted to their King and country.

I have the honour to be, &c.                                              

J. BURGOYNE.

P. S. Upon re-perusing this letter, I am apprehensive that the manner in which I have expressed myself, respecting the reinforcement being only upon Lake Champlain, may seem ambiguous.—I do not mean to impute the delay to any thing but accidents, nor do I mean to contest Sir Guy Carleton’s reasoning upon not complying with my requisitions to garrison Ticonderoga, I only lament it.

John Burgoyne, A State of the Expedition from Canada: as laid before the House of Commons, by Lieutenant-General Burgoyne, and verified by Evidence, With a collection of authentic Documents, ... Written and collected by himself, and dedicated to the Officers of the Army he commanded 2d ed., (London: J. Almon, 1780), pp. xliv-xl.

http://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/ecco/004877784.0001.000/1:40?rgn=div1;view=fulltext
[1777 August] 11th. A large detachment of German troops consisting of Gen Reidzels dragoons who came dismounted from Germany, a body of Rangers, Indians & voluntiers, with 4 pieces of cannon, went from our camp on a secret expedition; their route was not publicly known, but supposed for to take a large store of provisions belonging to the enemy at Bennington, and also horses to mount the dragoons. During the night there was a most violent storm of Thunder, Lightening, wind & rain. It succeeded a very hot day, and was so severe that the men could not remain in their tents, as the rain poured quite through them. Ours stood it better; our horses tore down the small sheds formed to keep the heat of the sun from them, being so much frightened. About day break it cleared up, and a great heat followed, which soon dried all our cloths &c.

[16 August ...]

Nothing extraordinary passed during the night, every thing quiet about our post, and on going to return in the morning received orders, — the 17th — to remain, as the corps was not to move that day, and to keep a very sharp look out; on which we naturally supposed something extraordinary had happened. Soon after an engineer came out to us with a number of men to throw up a breast work. Still it looked suspicious; but we were soon made acquainted with the melancholy report, that the detachment, which marched from us on the 11th were all cut to pieces by the enemy at Bennington, their force being much superior. Our 4 pieces of cannon were taken, two 6 pounders & two 3 pounders. I fear the officer who commanded, a German, took post in a bad situation, and was surrounded by the enemy after expending all his amunition. Our Albany voluntiers behaved with great bravery; but were not seconded by the Germans and Savages; and it was much regretted British were not sent in their place. The express also informed [us] that the enemy was greatly elated in consequence of the above, and were upon the move; but where he could not tell. Our situation was not the best, as from the great fall of rain our bridge was near giving way by the flood, which almost totally cut off our communication with Genl Burgoyne and the line.

the flying Army mov'd after the rebels to Bennington 24 m through the woods with the Reg of Horse hannovarians and Germans on foot; [and] there they engaged the Enemy and, surrounded, the whole fine Reg of Germans were kill'd and took prisoners 5 or 6 escaping. the flying army suffer'd very much a great many kill'd and wounded and the rest took. some made their escape to the main army.