CULTURAL RESOURCES SURVEY
OF THE BENNINGTON BATTLEFIELD
WALLOOMSAC, NEW YORK

ABPP Grant GA-2287-14-013
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Prepared for:
New York State Office of Parks, Recreation, and Historic Preservation
Albany, New York

Prepared by:
Commonwealth Heritage Group, Inc.
West Chester, Pennsylvania

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COMMONWEALTH HERITAGE GROUP
Cultural Resources Survey of the Bennington Battlefield, Walloomsac, New York

Prepared for:

New York State Office of Parks, Recreation, and Historic Preservation
625 Broadway, 2nd Floor
Albany, New York 12207

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This material is based upon work assisted by a grant from the Department of the Interior, National Park Service. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of the Interior.

For distribution copies:
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ABSTRACT

The metal detector survey recovered battle-related artifacts from many areas of state property and private lands. Of the 397 metal detector finds, at least 221 are battle-related, including dropped and impacted lead balls, buckshot, coins, and period buttons. The GPR prospection discovered two anomalies consistent with the potato pits that received battle dead, and another two anomalies that may represent expedient, single graves. The GPR also may have discovered a faint trace from the former Tory Redoubt. The archeological results indicate that much of the battlefield remains relatively intact, despite limited development and past relic hunting.

The public involvement component of the project was highly successful. The general public, school groups, and avocational detectorists were engaged through public meetings and park events with the Commonwealth team. Local detectorists and private land-owners were cooperative, providing information and access that allowed the project to reach well beyond the state lands.

Overall, the historical and archeological research has significantly supplemented and refined the results of earlier studies of the battlefield. The research has generated a significant sample of battle-related artifacts, and has energized the public regarding the important Battle of Bennington.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This research was sponsored by the American Battlefield Protection Program of the National Park Service. Kristen McMasters provided valuable guidance throughout.

The grant recipient was the New York State Office of Parks, Recreation, and Historic Preservation. Melissa Miller, Alane Chinian, Michael Roets, and David Pitlyk of New York Parks assisted throughout the project, and David contributed two of his weekends to assist with volunteer days. Park intern Shelby Roback assisted during the school visit day.

The research benefited greatly from the cooperation of many organizations and individuals. A school visit day was conceived and managed by Patrick Dailey, Director of Curriculum for the Hoosick Falls Central School District. Over the course of one day, 240 students visited the park and learned of our work. The school day was enhanced by the musket demonstrations by Peter Schaaphok, president of the Friends of the Bennington Battlefield. We thank the students for their interest and excellent behavior on a drizzly day.

Callie Stewart, Collections Manager of the Bennington Museum pulled items in their collection that were attributed to the Battle of Bennington, and provided copies of the curation records for those items. Tyler Resch of the museum facilitated the archival research of Dr. Selig. At Saratoga National Historical Park our research was supported by Eric Schnitzer and Christine Valosin. Important historical information was also provided by Donald Londahl-Smidt and Todd Braisted. We are particularly grateful to Henry Retzer for granting permission to quote from the unpublished journals of Corporal Johann Jakob Schmidt on General Riedesel's staff and an unidentified bat-man of Stabs-Capitain Friedrich Wilhelm von Geismar of the Hessen-Hanau Regiment Erbprinz. At the David Library of the American Revolution we were assisted in our research by librarian Katherine Ludwig, and by Hope College librarian Michelle Kelley who assisted Dr. Selig with the team's interlibrary loan needs. At the Hoosick Township Historical Society we were greatly helped by Charles Filkin, President, and Leonard Phillip, Town Historian.

Local landowners were amazingly supportive of our efforts. Every landowner who we approached gave us permission to survey on their property. The data from these properties allowed us to learn more of the battle outside the park property. Bennington Battle historian Michael Gabriel generously reviewed the historical context and provided important comments and edits.

Avocational detectorists contributed their efforts on four weekend days, and the derived data have been important in refining our understanding of the battle landscape.
The Commonwealth team included Wade Catts, RPA, as Project Manager, Dr. Robert Selig as Military Historian, and Chris Espenshade, RPA, as Principal Investigator. Chris was joined in the field by Elisabeth LaVigne, RPA, our geophysicist, and by archaeologists Kevin Bradley, RPA, and Mark Ludlow. Kevin assisted Juliette Gerhardt with the artifact analysis, and James Montney prepared the GIS and graphics. Dr. Ted Yeshion, Professor of Forensic Science at Edinboro University, provided his expertise and the Luminol screening services as a free trial study. Our Landscape Architect, Laura Knott, participated in the public meetings and is currently writing the interpretive plan.

All are thanked for their enthusiastic assistance with this project.
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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 SYNOPSIS OF THE BATTLE

On August 14-16, 1777, the Battle of Bennington (also known as the Battle of Walloomscoick) pitted General John Stark's approximately 2,000 American militia from Vermont, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts against Lt. Colonel Friedrich Baum's multi-national force of approximately 1,400 soldiers, including German jaegers and dragoons, British marksmen, Loyalist volunteers, Canadian volunteers, and Mohawk Indians.1 The Royal Army's force was detached from the main invasion column under the command of Lieutenant General Sir John Burgoyne to procure provisions from the town of Bennington, Vermont five miles east of the battlefield.2

When the two forces first came together, Baum recognized that he was significantly outnumbered and ordered his troops into a defensive position centered on a high knoll (a topographic feature located within the current State Historic Site). Rain provided a battle-free day (15 August) that allowed Baum's force to construct breastworks in several locations to strengthen their defensive positions until requested reinforcements could arrive. The first phase of the battle began in the middle afternoon of 16 August when, despite the breastworks, the Americans were able to surround and overwhelm Baum's detachment.3

A second phase of the battle took place after the collapse of Baum's defenses. A relief column under Lt. Colonel Breymann, numbering approximately 700 men, approached the battlefield along the road corridor of modern Route 67. This force, composed of Brunswick grenadiers, jaegers, and two 6-pound cannon, encountered elements of Stark's command, now much disorganized due to the success of overwhelming Baum's force. Stark's command initially gave way, then was supported by Colonel Seth Warner's Continental regiment. Stiffened by Warner and additional militia that Stark was able to assemble, Breymann's relief column was driven back along its route of approach, losing both cannons in the process before nightfall ended the engagement.4

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4 Pancake, 1777, 134-139; Michael R. Gadue, “'Fatal Pique': The Failure of LTC Breymann to Relieve LTC Baum at Bennington, August 16, 1777: A Case of Braunschweig Dishonor?” The Hessians: Journal of the
Losses for the multi-national Royal forces were staggering - nearly 1,000 men killed, wounded and captured. American losses were reported at less than 200. American forces also captured four cannons, muskets, and supplies.\(^5\)

Nobody expected a major battle that would change the balance of the Saratoga Campaign. However, the Americans thoroughly routed the Royal forces with the positive outcomes of significantly reducing the fighting force of the Royal Army, denying the British much needed provisions, and undermining the Mohawk support of the British. To many military historians, the American victory at Bennington doomed the British to eventual surrender at Saratoga.

1.2 Need for the Project

In the 2007 *Report to Congress on the Historic Preservation of Revolutionary War and War of 1812 Sites in the United States*, Tanya Gossett and H. Bryan Mitchell identified Bennington (NY 219) as a Priority I, Class A battlefield (Figure 1). They identified the battlefield as being nationally significant. Both the long-term and short-term threats to the battlefield were considered medium. Gossett and Mitchell further noted a Mohawk tribal linkage with the battle, and a lack of a “Friends of the Battlefield” organization (there is now a friends group).\(^6\)

Prior to the project, the Bennington Battlefield offered a significant preservation and interpretation challenge. Although the focus of the battle is encompassed by the state historic site, major elements of the battlefield are in private ownership and face risks such as logging, plowing, erosion, and development (Figure 1). Furthermore, it is difficult to interpret a complete landscape when the public only has access to limited portions of the battlefield. Before determining how best to interpret and preserve the battlefield, it was important to know where the events of the battle occurred on the local topography and what archeological signature may have survived. Thus, a detailed KOCOA analysis and archeological survey were required.

Prior to the present project, there was a great discrepancy between the archeological research potential of the battlefield – a landscape that saw significant action focused on defensive positions and breastworks – and the paucity of archeology actually undertaken. In *The Great Warpath*, archeologist David Starbuck reported:

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\(^5\) Luzader, *Saratoga*, 111.

Figure 1. Bennington Battlefield Project Area.
This is, after all, a book about how archeology aided research at certain military sites, not a summary of the military history of the waterway that runs between New York and Vermont. Thus a site like the Bennington Battlefield is difficult to describe archeologically when little digging has been done, and when the artifacts recovered there by the New York State Museum over ten years ago numbered a grand total of one musket ball. Significant, yes, but not exactly a chapter of a book.  

1.3 THE GRANT

In 2014, the New York State Office of Parks, Recreation, and Historic Preservation (NY Parks) was awarded Grant GA-2287-14-013 from the American Battlefield Protection Program (ABPP) of the National Park Service (NPS). NY Parks issued a request for proposals, and the project was awarded to Commonwealth Cultural Resources Group, Inc. (now Commonwealth Heritage Group, Inc.; hereafter Commonwealth). The tasks to be completed were:

- Creation of a Research Design, to include a preliminary KOCOA/military terrain analysis;
- Archival research, especially focusing on the previously underutilized German maps and accounts;
- Archeological research on state and private land (as feasible) to help refine the battle narrative and KOCOA study;
- Public engagement through meetings, demonstrations, participation opportunities, and interviews with local detectorists and landowners;
- Artifact analysis, GIS analysis of recovered finds, and preparation of a curation package;
- Completion of a technical report, and;
- Completion of an interpretive plan.

The first public meeting was held on 22 September 2015 at the Hoosick Falls High School. A Research Design was prepared and archival research began immediately following the public meeting. Archeological field work, public day at the park, volunteer detectorist days, and school visits days occurred during the two weeks, 19 October to 1 November 2015. Refinement of the KOCOA study, artifact analysis, and draft reporting spanned November 2015 to February 2016.

1.4 REPORT FORMAT

Chapters 3-8 address the archival record of the battle and the broader campaign, including the general context (Chapter 3), Prelude to the Battle (Chapter 4), the First Battle of Bennington (Chapter 5), the Second Battle (Chapter 6), the aftermath (Chapter 7), and commemoration (Chapter 8). A summary and recommendations are offered in Chapter 9.

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The archeological methods, findings, and interpretations are offered in Appendix A. Appendix B presents the artifact inventory, and Appendix C presents a series of appendices include all of the first-person accounts compiled for this study, including American, British, German, civilians, Loyalists and Indian sources.
2. METHODS

2.1 ARCHIVAL RESEARCH

2.1.1 American Sources (Appendices D and E)

The historical narrative in this report is based principally on published and unpublished primary sources. The most important and richest body of primary sources from the American viewpoint for the Battle of Bennington are the pension applications of veterans filed in the 1830s pursuant to federal legislation. These pension applications are available on-line at Fold3 (https://www.fold3.com/). No attempt has been made to list and transcribe every pension application that mentions participation in the Battle of Bennington. There are two reasons for this: 1) the very large number of applications goes well beyond the scope of this study and b) to avoid too much duplication with the compilation of primary sources collected by Michael P. Gabriel in his excellent The Battle of Bennington: Soldiers and Civilians. A second source of primary sources also used extensively by Gabriel are the Hall Park McCullough Collection at the Bennington Museum in Bennington, Vermont. Gabriel also prints a number of excerpts from the Asa Fitch Papers, a collection of oral history interviews conducted by Asa Fitch in the early nineteenth century deposited in the New York Public Library under the title “Notes for a history of Washington County, N.Y.” A small section of these interviews are edited and published in the edited volume of first-person accounts by Jeanne Adler. Lastly the Asa Fitch Letterbook at Saratoga National Historical Park provides valuable primary-source information on the Battle of Bennington. The Asa Fitch Letterbook is only one of the many sources collected by Eric Schnitzer, Acting Chief of Interpretation, during his long career with the National Park Service at Saratoga. These primary sources are collected in Appendix D.8

Regarding official papers and legislation, most of these have been printed and published during the nineteenth century, viz. Vermont State Papers.... compiled by William Slade, Eliakim Walton’s Records of the Council of Safety and Governor and Council of the State of Vermont, and the multi-volume series State Papers. Documents and Records relating to the State of New Hampshire during the Period of the American Revolution from 1776 TO 1783, especially volume eight published in 1874. These collections are readily available on-line. A representative collection of these official correspondences sources can be found in Appendix E.9

9 Nathaniel Bouton, compiler and editor, State Papers. Documents and Records relating to the State of New Hampshire during the Period of the American Revolution from 1776 TO 1783; Including the Constitution of New-Hampshire, 1776; New-Hampshire Declaration for Independence; the "Association Test," with names of Signers, &c.; Declaration of American Independence, July 4, 1776; the Articles of Confederation, 1778. 40 volumes. Concord, NH: Edward A. Jenks, 1867-1943); William Slade, compiler, Vermont State Papers; being a collection of Records and Documents connected with the assumption and establishment of Government by the People of Vermont; Together with the Journal of the Council of Safety, the First Constitution, the early Journals of the General Assembly, and the Laws from the year 1779 to 1786, inclusive (Middlebury, VT: J.W. Copeland, printer, 1823); Eliakim Walton, editor, Records of the Council of Safety and Governor and Council of the State of Vermont to which are
2. METHODS

2.1.2 British Sources (Appendix F)

None of the British officers who fought at Bennington left any account of his experiences; the only written source is the battlefield map drawn by Desmaretz Durnford, “Position of the detachment under Lieut' Col. Baum & attacks of the enemy on the 16th August at Walmscock near Benington, 1777.” This map formed the basis for Phillip Lord’s *War over Walloomscoick: Land Use and Settlement Pattern on the Bennington Battlefield, 1777* (Lord 1989), an early landscape analysis of a battlefield and an indispensable resource for the study of the Battle of Bennington.10

Most of the other primary sources indispensable for researching the British side of the battle were published and include Burgoyne's own *A State of the Expedition from Canada*, the *Orderly Book of Lieut. Gen. John Burgoyne*, and most recently Douglas R. Cubbison's *Burgoyne and the Saratoga Campaign: His Papers*. Every effort was made to include every known contemporary British source in the Appendix F.11

2.1.3 Brunswick and Hesse-Hanau Sources (Appendix G)

The starting point for any research on the participation by Brunswick forces in the Battle of Bennington is Marion Dexter Learned, *Guide to the Manuscript Materials Relating to American History in the German State Archives*. Also indispensable is *Americana in deutschen Sammlungen (ADS): Ein Verzeichnis von Materialien zur Geschichte der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika in Archiven und Bibliotheken der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und West-Berlin* (Köln 1967), Section 4, Part 2 covers Braunschweig-Wolfenbüttel on pp. 163-224. Lastly there is the *Supplements, corrections and new inventory-lists to be added to M.D. Learned's Guide to the manuscript materials relating to American History in the German State Archives* (Learned 1929-1932). Volume II has much more detailed descriptions of the contents of Acta Militaria than is found in Learned's original guide.12

Brunswick sources relating to the Battle of Bennington are collected and accessible in the so-called “Lidgerwood Collection” at Morristown National Historical Park in Morristown, New Jersey; both the Library of Congress and Saratoga National Historical Park also own sets (Table 1). The collection consists of 362 micro-fiche whose contents is described in Lion G. Miles and James L. Kochan, *Guide to Hessian Documents of the American Revolution, 1776-1783*.13

prefixed the Records of the General Conventions from July 1775 to December 1777, volume 1 (Montpelier, VT: Steam Press, 1873).

10 Lord, Walloomscoick.
Table 1. Lidgerwood Collection fiche with information on the Battle of Bennington

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiche Number</th>
<th>Documents</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fiche 111-129, Letter HZ-1 (Part 2)</td>
<td>Correspondence of General Riedesel, 1776-87</td>
<td>Includes instructions to Baum before Bennington</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiche 194-204, Letter HZ-6 (Parts 1 and 2)</td>
<td>Sundry Journals of Brunswick Troops, 1776-1783</td>
<td>1,225 pages German and 534 pages translation. Includes a report on the Bennington Expedition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiche 355-359, Tome VIII</td>
<td>Letters and reports from Hesse-Hanau officers, 1776-1780</td>
<td>395 pages German – translation done in 1993</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Almost all of these documents have now been translated, but a number of them still await publication in English, viz. Hanauer Journale und Briefe aus dem Amerikanischen Unabhängigkeitskrieg 1776-1783 der Offiziere Wilhelm Rudolph von Gall, Friedrich Wilhelm von Geismar, dessen Burschen (anonym), Jakob Heerewagen, Georg Paeusch sowie anderer Beteiligter, edited by Manfred von Gall. Every effort was made to collect every known Brunswick and Hesse-Hanau primary source in Appendix G.¹⁴

A number of primary sources were published by the indefatigable Helga Doblin and Bruce Burgoyne. Significant and indispensable among these are Doblin's and Mary C. Lynn's An Eyewitness Account of the American Revolution and New England Life. The Journal of J. F. Wasmus, German Company Surgeon, 1776-1783, and The Specht Journal: A Military Journal of the Burgoyne Campaign. Bruce Burgoyne translated the Hesse-Hanau Order Books a Diary and Rosters. Somewhat older but still indispensable is William L. Stone, Memoirs, and Letters and Journals of Major General Riedesel, during his Residence in America. Translated from the original German.¹⁵


2. Methods

2.1.4 Civilian Accounts (Appendix H)

There is no separate body of primary sources generated by “civilians”; the sources presented in this report have instead been drawn from a variety of (mostly published) sources. The most easily accessible sources on how women, older men or children experienced the Battle of Bennington are found in Gabriel’s volume on the battle of Bennington, which draws heavily on the American sources described in Point 2.1.1., and Jeanne Adler’s Their Own Voices. Many of the sources in Appendix H are drawn from these two compilations but since many of the Revolutionary War pension applications contain affidavits by wives, widows or children (or sometimes were filed by the widows themselves), these applications provide a wealth of information from the point of view of non-combatants.16

2.1.5 Loyalists and Indian Sources (Appendix I)

Sources on the participation of Loyalists in the Battle of Bennington are few and no research in libraries or archives was conducted in person for this report. Most of the quotes in Appendix I are from published sources; unpublished sources were generously provided by Todd W. Braisted. No research was conducted in the “Papers of the American Loyalist Claims Commission, 1780-1835”, Audit Office 13, in the British National Archives. The same holds true for the very few primary sources that survive from Canadians and Indians fighting on the British side at Bennington on 16 August 1777.

2.2 Field Methods

2.2.1 Metal Detecting

The Commonwealth metal detectorists included professional archeologists Chris Espenshade, Kevin Bradley, and Mark Ludlow. All three had prior experience metal detecting on battlefield sites. Espenshade is the co-founder and instructor for Advanced Metal Detecting for the Archaeologist (AMDA), a continuing education class that is certified by the Register of Professional Archaeologists. Bradley and Ludlow are graduates of AMDA.

Espenshade detected with a Fisher Labs Gold Bug Pro with double-D coil. Bradley detected with a Minelab E-trac, and Ludlow detected with an XP Deus 3.2. All three detectors allow ground-balancing to cancel out signals from the soil, and all surpass the minimum recommended standards of the AMDA. All three detectorists used Garrett pin-pointers. The field crew used a Trimble GPS unit with sub-meter accuracy to record the boundaries of surveyed areas and all metal detector finds (MDFs).

Commonwealth and NY Parks publicized four weekend days when avocational metal detectorists could contribute to the field investigations. On these days, the volunteers were first given a briefing on the methods to follow for the detecting. All volunteers signed liability waivers and permission for NY Parks and Commonwealth to use photographs taken on volunteer days. The volunteers were then placed in lanes approximately 1.5-meters apart defined by masons’ twine, in corn rows, or in positions in wooded areas.

16 Gabriel, Bennington; Adler, Voices.
Lanes varied in length. The volunteers were supervised at all times by the three or four Commonwealth archeologists and David Pitlyk of NY Parks. Volunteers were provided with certificates of appreciation.

For all metal detection, discovered artifacts that were possibly battle-related were assigned a MDF number, flagged, and bagged. The field director maintained a running tally of MDF numbers and recorded the artifact description and data on GPS plotting. The crew was encouraged to use hand-held pin-pointers to help limit the necessary size of the excavations. Sod, tree litter, and topsoil will be excavated onto tarps, to allow the easy backfilling of the excavations. No targets were left unexcavated at the end of the day and all MDF flags were GPS plotted and removed at the end of the day.

2.2.2 Ground-Penetrating Radar (GPR)

One component of the field work for this project was to conduct a ground-penetrating radar (GPR) prospection survey. GPR is a nondestructive geophysical method that used high frequency radio waves (microwave electromagnetic energy) to record various changes in subsurface materials without drilling, probing, or digging. The signal is reflected off these changes and its intensity and travel time is recorded as the system is moved over the landscape. The data are presented on the data collector screen as a continuous cross-sectional profile called a vertical time/depth section that reveals subsurface anomalies in the form of any deviation of the signal from the natural pattern. The geophysical specialist can use these profiles to identify the location and depth of anomalies that may be related to subsurface cultural features and/or objects.

Commonwealth used the ground penetrating radar in a prospection mode in several areas across the battlefield in order to identify the locations of any earthwork/trench remnants, structural remnants, and potential burial areas. This method was chosen as a relatively fast survey method in comparison to a more intensive, gridded GPR survey which yields data in 3D which must then be post-processed and analyzed following field work. GPR prospection provides two-dimensional results in the field which the geophysical specialist can analyze and use to flag potential anomalies. Commonwealth uses a GSSI UtilityScan™ survey cart GPR system with a distance encoder wheel using a GSSI SIR-3000 Data Acquisition System with a 400MHz antenna. This system is registered with the FCC under CFR 47, Part 15. The maximum depth window for this system is 4 meters (approximately 13 feet).

Four separate areas were examined utilizing GPR between October 21st and October 25th, 2015 (Figure 2). The first area surveyed was [redacted]; historic maps show that there were potato pits in this general area which may have been used for mass burials following the battle.
Figure 2. Areas surveyed with Ground Penetrating Radar.

Figure removed in accordance with the Archaeological Resources Protection Act.
was run back and forth across the yard, in between the river and the extant buildings along lines spaced approximately one meter apart. Any anomalies interpreted to have archeological potential were flagged and further investigated using the GPR to tighten the boundary of the anomaly. All anomalies were recorded using a Trimble GeoXT GPS unit.

The second area of investigation was the Tory Redoubt area. The GPR was used to look for evidence of a trench which may have accompanied the breastwork, as well as a cellar hole which could contain burials. Lines were run back and forth across the hilltop in a NW-SE direction in order to collect data perpendicular to the supposed alignment of the breastwork. Lines were spaced approximately 2 meters apart, focusing primarily on the NW portion of the field. Other areas adjacent to this location were prospected randomly based on the landform and suggestions of investigators and locals. Anomalies were flagged in the field. A cluster of potential anomalies was identified in the field, and it was determined to be beneficial to collect some gridded data in order to see if any subtle linear pattern could be identified. Four grids were collected in a cross-pattern (see Appendix A) at a 50 cm (1.6 ft) spacing. The data was then brought into the GSSI RADAN 6.6 software package for analysis. The grid corners were recorded using a sub-meter Trimble GeoXT GPS unit.

The third area examined was within the Bennington Battlefield State Historic Site. The GPR was run across the majority of the hilltop in the vicinity of the current monument. Lines were run at variable intervals in a direction perpendicular to the supposed alignment of historically mapped breastworks. Linear anomalies were flagged in the field and further investigated using the GPR to follow the alignment. The location of linear anomalies was recorded using the Trimble GeoXT GPS unit.

The final area examined was within the agricultural field. Historic maps show several structures or outbuildings within this area. Investigations focused on rises within the floodplain, as well as areas with concentrations of nails ("nail clouds") identified during the metal detection survey. Areas with a concentration of anomalies that could be indicative of anthropological ground disturbance were flagged.

2.2.3 Ground-Truth Excavations

Limited archeological excavations were undertaken to examine the two GPR anomalies that were consistent with the burial-laden potato pits in location and size.

2.3 Analysis

Artifacts recovered in the course of the field investigations were cleaned and inventoried following curatorial guidelines and standards established by the New York State Office of Parks, Recreation, and Historic Preservation. To the extent possible, the recovered artifacts were identified as to material, temporal or cultural/chronological association, style, and function. Analysis sought patterns in the relative composition of the recovered artifact assemblages, particularly to the extent that such patterns are indicative of the functional nature of the assemblages and/or the site formation processes associated with their deposition. These attributes are particularly relevant for the evaluation of the site's potential archeological significance and interpretation.
Artifacts associated, or potentially associated, with military/conflict activities or of the correct time period were given careful consideration. In particular, these types of artifacts are lead shot, buckles, buttons, period coins. Smoothbore firearms of the colonial period typically fired a cast soft lead ball that measured approximately .05” to .10” less than the barrel bore caliber, or size. The difference in size allowed the ball to be more easily loaded down the barrel (as opposed to a breech-loaded weapon), but also allowed for gas leakage around the circumference during firing. The difference between the lead shot diameter and the weapon’s bore caliber is referred to as windage. For rifled weapons, the windage was considerably less. Paper cartridges containing a lead bullet (or shot) and a charge of gunpowder were the standard ammunition of the period. Due to the windage, the paper cartridge was necessary to prevent the lead shot from rolling out of the barrel. From many American Revolutionary War battlefields, archeologically recovered lead shot with diameters measuring .69-inches are associated with the .75-inches British muskets (“Brown Bess”) and shot with diameters measuring .64-inches are ascribed to .69-inches French and/or American muskets. Large numbers of French “Charleville” muskets began arriving in Portsmouth, New Hampshire in April of 1777, so it is highly likely that some of the American soldiers may have been armed with these weapons. However, the character of the American forces - consisting nearly completely of militia - suggests that there was little standardization of long arms among these companies, so a broad range of lead shot size is highly likely. 

German muskets of the Revolutionary period are poorly documented. At Bennington, the standard infantry long arm for the Brunswick soldiers was a 0.72-caliber musket modeled on a Prussian musket. The caliber of the German musket allowed the use of standard British musket cartridges. The pattern of one musket taken at Bennington and now at the Massachusetts State Archives is nearly identical to a Prussian model 1740 musket. Musket parts matching this archived model have been excavated at the Brunswick camp at Saratoga. The Brunswick jaegers were armed with German manufactured short-barreled rifles with a large bore measuring 0.65-caliber. The Brunswick dismounted dragoons were armed with carbines (according to Wasmus, see Appendix G), and weapons of this size were similar to the jaeger rifles, with a 0.65-caliber bore that fired a 0.615-inch ball.

For lead shot that was misshapen or impacted, measurement of the diameter is difficult. For such lead shot we applied the Sivilich formula, initially developed by Daniel Sivilich in his work at Monmouth Battlefield in

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New Jersey, widely used on American Revolutionary War sites and recently revised. The formula is used to estimate the original diameter of lead shot:

\[
\text{Diameter in inches} = 0.223204 \times (\text{weight in grams})^{1/3}
\]

We applied the formula to both the misshapen and round lead shot recovered from the project area, and the correlation between the calculated diameter and the actual diameters were quite close.

The Baum Foraging Expedition included two 3-pound cannon, and the Breymann relief column brought two 6-pound cannon. All four guns were captured by the American forces at Bennington. Ammunition for both guns would have included round and case shot. Jared Sparks reported in 1826 that General Stark did have one iron cannon with his forces, but that it never came into action during the battle.

The artifact analysis was primarily based on surface distributions, a standard method of analysis for potential battlefield sites and/or military encampment sites. The archeological study of battlefields is proving that the physical evidence of such fields of conflict is often remarkably resilient, and still present beneath the ground, and often recovered from near surface contexts. Archeologists attempt to identify patterns of human behavior through the material remains that survive. Of all the types of organizations or groups of people that can be studied, perhaps no group is more organized or more patterned than military organizations. Military formations of any size, from armies to companies, can be studied as social units operating in a closed cultural system created with strict rules. The ways that various formations were organized for battle or for camp were highly structured and patterned, and may be observable in the archeological record.

2.3.1 Presumptive Testing for Presence of Blood Residue

Recent battlefield studies have included analyses to determine the presence of blood on fired balls. These methods are highly refined, expensive, and time-intensive.

As a pilot study, Commonwealth decided to examine the efficacy of Luminol presumptive screening on our site. Luminol is a relatively inexpensive method that allows the relatively rapid screening of a large sample of artifacts. Our Luminol screening was provided at no cost by Dr. Ted Yashion, Professor of Forensic Archeology.

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23 Cubbison, Burgoyne, 33; Jared Sparks, Journal, visit to Bennington 13-14 October. Ms Sparks 141e, Houghton Reading Room, Harvard University Library, Cambridge, Massachusetts.


Sciences at Edinboro University. Luminol is a solution consisting of water, sodium carbonate, sodium perborate, and Luminol (3-aminophthalhydrazide). When this solution comes into contact with the hemoglobin found in red blood cells, a chemiluminescent reaction occurs. Unlike other presumptive blood tests that provide a color change, this reaction appears as a blue-white luminescence that can be seen by the unaided human eye in a darkened environment. Although Luminol spray is available for purchase, this is a method best pursued by an experienced forensic scientist.

A concern with Luminol is that contamination from site soils may cause a false positive result. To address this concern, we submitted both dropped and fired balls for screening. The premise is that dropped balls would not have been exposed to blood, and any positives among the dropped balls would serve as a warning that local soils were possibly causing false positives. Once the control group – dropped balls – had yielded no positive signals, it was safe to screen the fired balls. By following this protocol, there was a high likelihood that any positives among the fired balls were due to the presence of blood residue rather than contamination.

Dr. Yeshion was not provided locational data for the balls. Once the positives had been identified among the fired balls, Commonwealth plotted the positive items to see if their locations made sense relative to the battle narratives. The six fired balls that tested positive for the presumptive presence of blood residue were tightly clustered from two areas of the battlefield that saw intensive action.

Luminol testing will not necessarily work on every battlefield. However, our pilot study suggests that it is a fast, cost-effective means to screen large samples of projectiles. The patterning of positives may help refine our reconstructions of military terrain. On very large battlefields, the screening may also allow us to begin addressing the efficacy of various weapons and load types. It must be remembered that Luminol is not as sensitive as other blood residue tests and Luminol does not prove the presence of blood or provide the identity of the source species. A comprehensive battlefield study would be wise to use Luminol for large-sample screening in conjunction with more refined analysis of the artifacts with positive results.

**Shot Diameter**

For each shot, diameter was estimated using the Sivilich formula that relates weight to diameter. The formula allows estimation of diameter even for impacted balls. It was hoped that there would be a clearly bimodal distribution of diameters that might allow assignment of balls to the two forces. Table 2 presents the data for the entire assemblage. Unfortunately, the distribution is unimodal, suggesting there may not be any useful distinctions based on ball diameter.
In an attempt to further address possible differences in weaponry, diameters of dropped and fired balls were considered for instances where armies could be inferred from position on the battlefield. There was considerable overlap in the diameters of the balls attributed to the Rebels and British/Germans (Table 3). Recognizing that the attribution based solely on recovery location was unlikely to be perfect, the three outliers were removed from each sample, and means and ranges were recalculated.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2. Counts of Ball Diameters, Full Assemblage.</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><img src="chart.png" alt="Bar Chart of Ball Diameters" /></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. Tentative Attribution of Lead Shot.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Attributed to Rebels</th>
<th>Attributed to British/Germans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Full sample count</td>
<td>18 balls</td>
<td>29 balls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full sample mean</td>
<td>0.606 inches</td>
<td>0.618 inches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full sample range</td>
<td>0.56 to 0.65 inches</td>
<td>0.54 to 0.69 inches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample without 3 outliers count</td>
<td>15 balls</td>
<td>26 balls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample without 3 outliers mean</td>
<td>0.599 inches</td>
<td>0.623 inches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample without 3 outliers range</td>
<td>0.56 to 0.63 inches</td>
<td>0.59 to 0.69 inches</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These data suggest that we can be reasonably confident assigning balls 0.56 to 0.59 inches to the Rebels, and assigning balls 0.64 to 0.69 inches to the British/Germans. Unfortunately, those balls between 0.60 and 0.63 inches cannot be confidently attributed to either side, and this size range is heavily populated.
2. METHODS

2.4 PUBLIC OUTREACH

On 24 October 2015, the public was invited to visit the park at 9:00, 11:00, and 2:00. Preregistration was encouraged, but unscheduled visitors also arrived during the course of the day. A number of interpretive stations were established, and presentations were offered. The public was able to speak with park personnel, the GPR Specialist, the Principal Investigator (overseeing metal detecting), Project Manager Wade Catts, and Historian Robert Selig. It is estimated that 50 members of the public attended.

On 24, 25, and 31 October, and on 1 November 2015, avocational detectorists were invited to assist in the research. Volunteers were required to register in advance, and 10-20 detectorists participated each day. The volunteers worked under the supervision of the Commonwealth team and park personnel. Each day began with a briefing on why the research was important and what methodology was being followed. Participants were generally limited to one day of volunteering each, and public demand for detecting spaces was quite high. All volunteer work was conducted on state lands.

On 22 October, Dr. Selig met with Hoosick Falls Central School District teachers and distributed a handout for their use in classes. The handout was intended for study prior to the field trips to the battlefield slated for 28 October.

A series of school groups visited the park on 28 October 2015. The event was attended by 240 students from the Fourth, Seventh, and Eleventh grades of the Hoosick Falls Central School District. Each busload of students was subdivided into groups of 10-15 students each, and they spent 15 minutes at each of four stations. The four stations included: David Pitlyk describing the park and future changes to interpretation; Wade Catts describing our approaches to battlefield studies; Chris Espenshade demonstrating metal detecting; and Peter Schaaphok demonstrating the loading and firing of an eighteenth-century musket.

The project team also reached out to private landowners in the battlefield, seeking permission to explore their property. We received positive responses from all landowners we approached, and the study of their properties increased our understanding of the battle.

The Commonwealth team cooperated with a video crew, led by Andy Heinze and Debbie Stack, from WCNY Public Media in Syracuse, who are producing a documentary on the Saratoga campaign. This work is being completed under a separate ABPP grant. Commonwealth personnel and volunteers were recorded.
3. HISTORICAL CONTEXT

3.1 THE VERMONT-NEW YORK-NEW HAMPSHIRE CONFLICT IN 1777

The historical context of the Battle of Bennington is the British invasion of New York State and American resistance to the invasion from Canada, generally known as the Saratoga Campaign. The Saratoga Campaign occurs, however, within the larger context of more than a decade of open and sometimes bloody hostilities between the settlers in the Hampshire Grants and the Colony/State of New York over land claims and the validity of land titles. This conflict hampered political and military cooperation in the defense against a Royal Army commanded by General John Burgoyne. The Battle of Bennington holds a unique place in this resistance as the only battle fought, and won, with minimal participation by Continental Army troops. American units at Bennington consisted almost exclusively of militia forces and volunteers from the surrounding states who often constituted themselves into units only on their way to the battlefield. Since militia laws prior to the Federal Militia Act of 1792 were passed separately by each colony, and after 1776 by each state, any discussion of the role of militias at the Battle of Bennington has to be conducted on a state-by-state basis.

In the summer of 1777, militias from five different states as well as the self-proclaimed Republic of Vermont (since 4 June), in cooperation with Continental Army forces under General Horatio Gates, tried to prevent British forces under Burgoyne from reaching Albany. New Hampshire, Connecticut, Massachusetts, New York and Rhode Island had long-established institutions of militia service within a clearly defined legal framework, but in Vermont that was not the case: at the time of the Battle of Bennington the state was barely six weeks old. The first town Committees of Safety in what would join the United States in 1791 as the State of Vermont had established themselves in 1774 to protect against what they considered unwarranted and increasingly violent incursions by authorities of the Colony of New York into the New Hampshire Grants. The dispute had begun on 3 January 1749, when Governor Benning Wentworth of New Hampshire issued a land grant for the town of Bennington located in an area between Lake Champlain and the Connecticut River disputed between New Hampshire and New York. As both colonies issued competing land grants these titles became increasingly tenuous. Settlers vehemently objected to challenges to their titles by New York and that colony’s attempts to collect taxes and quit-rents.

As these conflicts escalated in 1774, Committees of Safety from some twenty towns in the Grants met in Manchester in January 1775, to discuss the need for local self-governance independent from New York. Following the so-called “Westminster Massacre” of 13 March 1775, in which officials from New York killed two men, another General Convention of Committees on 11 April 1775 voted to renounce all legal bonds with the colony of New York and to resist, if necessary by force, all attempts by the governor of New York to enforce his authority until they could submit an appeal “to the royal wisdom and clemency, and till

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such time as his Majesty shall settle this controversy.” The royal decision never came: it was overtaken four days later by the blood-shed at Lexington and Concord on 19 April 1775, and at Ticonderoga and at Crown Point on 10 May 1775. On 23 June 1775, the Continental Congress “recommended to the Convention of New York that they, consulting with Gen. Schuyler, employ in the army to be raised for the defense of America, those called Green Mountain Boys, under such officers as the said Green Mountain Boys shall chose.”

Vermonters had no intention of “consulting with Gen. Schuyler” or any New Yorker for that matter. The Convention of Town Committees did, however, formally establish a military unit called the Green Mountain Boys “in compliance with the orders of Congress” in the hope that the military contribution of the New Hampshire Grants to the invasion of Canada would be rewarded with the acknowledgement of their existence as a separate state by Congress. To further this goal, settlers gathered at yet another convention at Dorset on 25 June 1776 which called upon the settlers in the Grants to organize themselves into a separate polity. That same day the convention pledged itself “to defend by arms the United American States against the hostile attempts of the British fleet and armies until the present unhappy controversy between the two countries shall be settled.”

When the delegates concurrently petitioned the Continental Congress to recognize them as a state and seat its delegates, they had tied the struggle of Vermont for its independence from New York to the struggle of the United States from England. The New York delegation convinced the Continental Congress to deny the petition. In response delegates from 28 Vermont towns met in Westminster in January 1777, and decided that the time had come to officially break all ties with New York. On 15 January 1777, the representatives gathered at Westminster Court-House, declared themselves a separate state and named it “Republic of New Connecticut.” That same day the Manchester meeting created a "civil and political Body," as a self-proclaimed government for the purposes of self-administration and that the "district of land commonly called and known by the name New-Hampshire grants, be a new and separate state; and for the future conduct themselves as such." They based the legal justification for this revolutionary step on "the sole and exclusive and inherent right of ruling and governing themselves in such manner and form as in their own Wisdom they shall think proper.”

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28 The address to George III is quoted from Eliakim Persons Walton, Records of the Council of Safety and Governor and Council of the State of Vermont to which are prefixed the Records of the General Conventions from July 1775 to December 1777 vol. 1 (Montpelier: Steam Press, 1873), pp. 1-103, p. 4.
29 The first convention in the New Hampshire Grants convened on 26 July 1775, the second on 16 January 1776, the third on 26 July 1776 &c up to the 8th and last on 24 December 1777. Based on a warrant issued from Arlington on 10 December 1775, the second General Convention of Committees of Safety met in Dorset on 16 and 17 January 1776. Item 3 on the agenda was “To see if the Law of New York shall have free circulation where it doth [not?] infringe on our properties, or Title of Lands, or Riots (so called) in defense of the same.” Ibid. p. 11.
Another convention meeting in Windsor on 4 June 1777, changed the name of the state to Vermont and called for the election of delegates to a constitutional convention. On 2 July 1777, the delegates of the Constitutional Convention assembled for their first meeting, in Windsor. When news of the fall of Fort Ticonderoga on 6 July and the Battle of Hubbardton on 7 July reached the assembly the delegates wanted to end their meeting prematurely without having adopted a constitution. A violent thunder-storm however kept the men indoors and the constitution was agreed on as the delegates waited for the storm to abate. The successes of General Burgoyne showed delegates not only the deteriorating military situation but also the urgent need to create a state militia as a defensive force.

3.2 MILITIA LAWS

The term militia derives comes from Latin milit-, or miles meaning soldier, from where it entered Old English as milite (i.e., soldiers) and has been used in the plural ever since. By 1590 at the latest, the term militia had come to mean "the body of soldiers in the service of a sovereign or a state." By the middle of the seventeenth century the term had been narrowed down to describe a military force raised from the civilian population of a country or region, especially to supplement a regular army in an emergency. The qualifiers “raised from the civilian population” and “to supplement a regular army” are of the utmost importance since they do both of the following: 1) distinguish a militiaman from a professional soldier; and 2) define the role of the militia within a country’s military establishment.

Militia as a force “raised from the civilian population” in the broadest meaning of the word means “the people in arms,” a definition also used by Samuel Johnson in 1766 in his famous dictionary. Under the specific political and social conditions of the New World, (i.e. the attempt of 13 colonies trying to unite in a single nation), this meant that in 1775 there were 13 “nations” with 13 different militia laws. A fourteenth entity, Vermont, was trying to join the nation about to become reality. These 14 political entities’ mostly voluntary manpower contributions to the war effort determined the composition and structure of the armed forces (Continental Army and the militia) fighting Great Britain. This means:

1. None of the colonies (other than Pennsylvania which does not have a militia before 17 March 1777) ever questioned the right of state authorities to compulsion: one can join the Continental Army, but one does not “join” a militia.

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31 The text of the Windsor Convention of 4 June 1777 in Walton, Records, pp. 52-61; the text for the 2 July convention in Windsor ibid. on pp. 62-75.
32 On the Battle of Hubbardton see most recently Bruce M. Venter, The Battle of Hubbardton. The Rear Guard Action that saved America (Charleston: The History Press, 2015)
34 Samuel Johnson, A dictionary of the English language in which the words are deduced from their originals, explained in their different meanings and authorized by the names of the writers in whose works they are found. 3rd ed., corr. 2 vols., (London, 1766), vol. 2, p. 123.
3. Membership in a militia of any of the colonies (except Pennsylvania) is therefore not voluntary. It is required of all who fall within the parameters of the law establishing the militia. These parameters can be any or all of the following: gender, color, age, occupation, legal status, and religion.\textsuperscript{36}

3. There is a Continental Army as a “national” organization and militias as “state” organizations. There is a “national army” but no “national militia.” Responsibility for providing pay, food, shelter, clothing, and arms to specific Continental Army units was assigned to states as part of the establishment of these units. The same holds true for the militias.

4. Enlistment terms in the Continental Army are clearly defined - “three years”, “for the war” - just as they are in the militia: “from age 16 to 50” etc.

5. There is no enlistment bonus or reward for service for militiamen on “regular” militia duty.\textsuperscript{37}

6. There are no substitutes for enrollment on the militia list though men when called up for service could in some states send substitutes in their stead.\textsuperscript{38}

7. Militiamen on “regular” militia duty do not wear uniforms.

8. As a rule, militiamen serve only within their own state.\textsuperscript{39}

9. Militiamen are required to provide their own weapons, though occasionally states provide subsidies for those who cannot afford them.

\textsuperscript{36} As the war progressed most states also excluded prisoners and deserters from Crown Forces from their militias (e.g., Maryland in “An ACT relating to prisoners and deserters from the British army and navy” of 23 June 1778: “Deserters to be exempt from all militia duty, during the war; and they, as well as prisoners, are disqualified from acting as substitutes; and every contract they may enter into, to oblige themselves to act as such, shall be void”).\textsuperscript{36} \url{http://aomol.net/000001/000203/html/am203--197.html}

\textsuperscript{37} Sometimes states resorted to forced recruitment. Maryland in “An ACT to raise two battalions of militia for reinforcing the continental army, and to complete the number of select militia” of May 1781 required: “These battalions are to act in conjunction with the continental army, until the 10th of December. The number of men to form these battalions is apportioned amongst the counties; the militia is to be classed, and each class is, within five days, to furnish a man, or two men shall be draughted, either of whom may, by the lieutenant or eldest field officer, be appointed to serve. But to ease the good people from the draught, every free male idle person, above 16 years of age, who is able bodied, and hath no visible means of an honest livelihood, may be adjudged a vagrant by the lieutenant, and by such adjudication he is to be considered as an enlisted soldier, with a choice of serving till the 10th of December only, or for three years, or the duration of the war, &c. and the taker up of a vagrant is exempted from the draught.”

\textsuperscript{38} e.g., The New Jersey Militia Act of 23 September 1777 expressly allowed and regulated the use of substitutes for men called up for service. The act is published in \textit{Backgrounds of Selective Service} Vol. II, Part 8, p. 54.

\textsuperscript{39} “AN ACT for regulating the Militia of the State of New-York” of 3 April 1778 gave the commander-in-chief authority to order up to one third of the militia to serve out of state for up to three months. The act is published in \textit{Backgrounds of Selective Service} Vol. II, Part 9, p. 285.
10. Militia does not get paid unless they were called to "actual service" (usually by draft or levy) or responding to alarm lasting more than a pre-set number of days (e.g., six days in Virginia).

11. Militia companies usually elect their company-grade officers (i.e., lieutenants and captains) who, in turn, elect field-grade officers (i.e., majors and up).\(^{40}\)

12. Especially in New England the militia is often divided into a “training-band” and an “alarm-list.”\(^{41}\)

13. Occasionally even groups exempt from service were required to have the weapons specified in the militia laws.\(^{42}\)

14. Militia Laws apply specifically to militia and are independent of/run parallel to other legislation passed to raise troops for the Continental Establishment during the war. In that specific legislation eligibility for military service, with or without arms, may be different from that spelled out in the Militia Laws.

15. The boundaries between the militia and the Continental Army is often porous: when the need arose “Militia Levies,” sometimes also called “Select Militia,” were drafted or recruited for a short term, usually less than a year, to augment the Continental Army when states could not, or did not, meet their Continental quotas while long term enlistees were sought. The men drafted or recruited could be members of the militia, but frequently those segments of the population exempt from or barred from militia duty such as African-Americans were made eligible for those levies.

16. Once they were drafted as Levies, these men were no longer militia, just as all other Continentals were no longer militia even though they remained enrolled in the militia rolls even during their term of enlistment in the Continental Army. Levies were part of the Continental Army and (with some exceptions) subject to Continental Army manuals and Articles of War.\(^{43}\) Though service in the Continental Army sometimes freed these men from future militia service upon their discharge, enrollment in the militia only ends when an age limit is reached. Soon after the Continental Army had been established these levies did not have to provide their own arms and equipment anymore;

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\(^{40}\) In Pennsylvania the men in each battalion even elected their own field officers with the rank of colonel, lieutenant colonel and major. These officers were then commissioned by the state and expected to serve for three years. In Virginia the County Lieutenant, upon the recommendation and advice of his field officers and perhaps a justice of the peace or two, selected the company officers and with the captains commanding companies, selected the company subalterns. Captains commanding companies in turn selected the sergeants, corporals, musicians and company clerks.

\(^{41}\) As a rule the “Training-Band” consists of younger men called up regularly for militia training, everyone else was on the “Alarm List”.

\(^{42}\) e.g., In the Delaware law of 5 November 1757, where only "minister of the Gospel and Quaker Preachers" were exempt from this requirement. The law is published in Backgrounds of Selective Service Vol. II Part 3, p. 23.

\(^{43}\) “except in cases, where, by the said Continental Articles of War, Corporal Punishment, of any nature is ordered to be inflicted”. Georgia Militia Act of 29 September 1773, in Backgrounds of Selective Service Vol. II, Part 4, p. 129.
they were, or were supposed to be, supplied by the Continent which in turn received its resources from the States.

The existence of, and need for, state militias was explicitly confirmed a year after Bunker Hill, on 12 June 1776, when the Second Continental Congress appointed a committee to draft a constitution for a union of the states which was approved for ratification by the states on 15 November 1777. Article VI of the Articles of Confederation specifies:

"Every State shall always keep up a well-regulated and disciplined militia, sufficiently armed and accoutered, and shall provide and constantly have ready for use, in public stores, a due number of field pieces and tents, and a proper quantity of arms, ammunition and camp equipage."

Article VI also squarely places the responsibility for militia laws with the states, which brings us to the next parameter, the stipulations defining the duty of a person, or deny its right, for service in the militia (such as gender, color, age, occupation, legal status and religion). If Article VI circumvented the issue of both free as well as enslaved blacks and Indians, the individual states had to address the question in their militia laws. In this context we need take a brief look (in alphabetical order) at the militia laws in force in the states whose men fought at Bennington.

3.2.1 Connecticut

The law in force in Connecticut in the summer of 1777 was entitled An Act in further Addition to an Act entitled An Act for forming and regulating the Militia, and for the Encouragement of military Skill, and for the better Defence of this State (18 December 1776). It stipulated:

"All male person from sixteen years of age to sixty, not included in that part of the militia called the train-band, or exempted from common and ordinary training, shall constitute an alarm list in this State (except) negroes, indians and molattoes."

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44 This overview only lists regular militia bills, not emergency legislation establishing Minuteman Companies, Flying Camps or similar ad-hoc organizations created in New England during the turbulent months of April 1775 to the establishment of the Continental Army on 14 June 1776.

45 The law of 1754 is quoted from Backgrounds of Selective Service Vol. II, Part 2, p. 150. The upper age limit was reduced to 45 in October 1772. Ibid., p. 171.

46 Backgrounds of Selective Service Vol. II, Part 2, p. 209. On 14 December 1775 the legislature ordered that "one fourth part of the militia of this colony be forthwith selected by voluntary enlistment, with as many other able bodied men not included in any militia rolls as are inclined to enlist, to stand in readiness as Minute Men for the defence of this and the rest of the United Colonies." Ibid., p. 204.

In most cases where legislation only spoke of "able-bodied, effective men" that criterion was qualified by the addition of "liable by law to do military duty out of this state". Congress allowed the recruitment of African-Americans only to fill up the line regiments the various states were required to provide for the Continental Army. See the law of 8 January 1778, ibid., p. 224.

"An Act for raising and compleating the Quota of the Continental Army to be raised in this State" of May 1777, often used as proof that African-Americans were allowed to serve in the militia with the promise of freedom after three years, again only speaks of able-bodied men to be drafted from the already existing militia. African-
3.2.2 Massachusetts

In Massachusetts, the Militia Law in effect at the outbreak of the American War of Independence was *An Act for regulating of the Militia* first passed in 1693 and amended repeatedly over the decades. It exempted Quakers and similar groups for religious reasons as well as blacks. The version in effect during the summer of 1777 was entitled *An Act For Forming and Regulating the Militia within the Colony of the Massachusetts Bay, In New England, and for repealing all the Laws heretofore made for that Purpose* (22 January 1776). It defined the militia of the state as follows:

"all the male persons from sixteen years of age to sixty-five, not included in that part of the militia called the training-band, and exempted by the first section of this act from common and ordinary training, shall constitute an alarm list in the colony (excepting ...) negroes, Indians and molatoes. . . . that part of the militia of this colony, commonly called the training-band, shall be constituted of all the able-bodied male persons therein, from sixteen years old to fifty excepting (...) negroes, Indians and molatoes".

On 20 May 1775, the Massachusetts Committee of Safety directed that only free blacks could serve in the militia, as follows:

"That it is the opinion of this Committee, as the contest now between Great Britain and the Colonies respects the liberties and privileges of the latter, which the Colonies are determined to maintain, that the admission of any persons as Soldiers into the Army now raising, but only such as are Freemen, will be inconsistent with the principles that are to be supported, and reflect dishonour on this Colony; and that no Slaves be admitted into this Army upon any consideration whatever."

3.2.3 New Hampshire

The law in force in New Hampshire at the time of the Battle of Bennington was entitled *An Act for forming and regulating the Militia within the State of New Hampshire in New England, and for repealing all the Laws heretofore made for that Purpose* (19 September 1776). It stipulated:

"That that part of the Militia of this State commonly called the Training Band, shall be constituted of all the able-bodied Male persons therein, from sixteen Years old to fifty excepting (...) Negroes, Indians and Mulattoes."


48 Ibid., p. 226.
50 Backgrounds of Selective Service Vol. II, Part 7, p. 80. "Indians and Negroes" were excluded from militia duty for the first time on 14 May 1718. Ibid., Vol. II, Part 7, p. 54. The original text of the law is available on Google Books. On 12 April 1776, the New Hampshire Committee of Safety required all males over the age of 21 with the exception of men of African ancestry to sign a declaration pledging allegiance.
3. Historic Context

3.2.4 New York

The law entitled *AN ACT for the better regulating the Militia of the Colony of New York of 1 April 1775* stipulated that “every Person from Sixteen to Fifty Years of Age ... shall inlist himself”.

There are no exceptions in the act set to expire on 30 April 1778. It was replaced with *AN ACT for regulating the Militia of the State of New-York* (3 April 1778), which stipulated “every able bodied male Person Indians and slaves excepted residing within this State from sixteen years of age to Fifty (...) shall immediately (...) tender himself to be enrolled”.

3.2.5 Rhode Island

The law entitled *An Act, regulating the Militia in the Colony* (March 1762) required enlistment “all male Persons, who have resided for the Space of Three Months in this Colony, from the Age of Sixteen to Fifty.”

Free Africans are not listed in the exception but an amendment to the militia law dated of 23 October 1775 excluded all Blacks from militia service. All laws regarding military service per se passed between 1775 and 1778, including the Rhode Island Slave Enlistment Act of 14 February 1778, are emergency laws encouraging enlistment in the Continental Army, and/or establishing Minuteman companies etc. They are not Militia Laws per se and the service criteria are (usually) based on the law of March 1762.

3.2.6 Vermont

The Green Mountain Boys, a self-proclaimed, semi-legal military force under Ethan Allen and Seth Warner, had initially constituted themselves on 24 October 1764 as a defense force against colonists trying to settle in the New Hampshire Grants – over which “Vermonters” had by then acquired de jure control from New Hampshire - with land warrants issued by the governor of New York.

As the Vermont and American struggles for independence merged, the Green Mountain Boys joined Continental troops under Benedict Arnold on their march along Lake Champlain and helped capture British posts at Crown Point, Fort Ticonderoga and Fort George on 10 May 1775. On 23 June 1775, the Continental Congress recommended to the convention of New York that "consulting General Schuyler" they raise "for the defence [sic] of America, those called Green Mountain Boys" commanded by officer chosen by the Green Mountain Boys.

The next day John Hancock wrote to the New York Provincial Congress that

“By Order of the Congress I inclose you certain Resolves passed Yesterday, respecting those who were concerned in taking and garrisoning Crown Point and Ticonderoga.”

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54 John E. Goodrich, *Rolls of the Soldiers in the Revolutionary War, 1775 to 1783.* (Rutland, Vt., 1904): The Tuttle Company. "Muster Roll of the first Company of Militia in the town of Bennington, organized October 24, 1764".
As the Congress are of Opinion that the Employing the Green Mountain Boys in the American Army would be advantageous to the common Cause, as well on account of their Situation as of their Disposition and alertness, they are Desirous you should embody them among the Troops you shall raise. As it is Represented to the Congress that they will not Serve under any Officers but such as they themselves Chuse, you are Desired to consult with General Schuyler, in whom the Congress are informed those People place a great Confidence, about the Field Officers to be Set over them.\(^{56}\)

Placing the Green Mountain Boys as a ranger unit into the Continental Army under the authority of General Schuyler may have placated the New Yorker but must have been difficult to accept for men who had learned the art of soldiering fighting New York. At the General Convention at Dorset on 26 July 1775, the township committees chose 33-year-old Seth Warner as Colonel of the regiment. This led to a split between the partisans of Warner and Allen, but the capture of Allen and most of his men at Montreal in September 1775 solved that issue at least temporarily. The disaster did however require re-organizing the unit for the 1776 campaign as the Green Mountain Continental Rangers under Warner, which succeeded despite the ongoing conflict with New York and the refusal of the Continental Congress to recognize the existence of the New Hampshire Grants as an independent entity separate from New York.\(^{57}\) Since militias constituted an outward sign of a polity’s independence and determination to defend itself, a “Report (as opinion) of a Sub-Committee” at the Adjourned Session at Dorset on 25 September 1776 also recommended that “A Covenant or Compact ought to be entered into by the Members of this Convention for themselves and their Constituents” to address issues such as “To regulate the Militia: To furnish troops according to our ability, for the defense of the Liberties of the United States of America.” This was an attempt to create a military force under the command of Vermont authorities separate from the Green Mountain Boys and not under Schuyler. In view of the ongoing conflict with New York the “Adjourned Session” also voted “That the Militia officers on each side of the Mountains continue in their stations and after executing the orders to them heretofore received from the State of New York, to be under the direction of this Convention.”\(^{58}\)

This last-mentioned vote of 25 September 1776 is consistent with the decision of 11 April 1775 to sever all bonds with New York and indicates that until 25 September 1776, the militia officers in the Grants had received their orders - and presumably also their commissions - from the Colony/State of New York, which clearly must have put them at odds not only with the Green Mountain Boys but frequently with their own personal convictions and political leanings. Concurrently this vote, which put militia officers under Vermont/Hampshire Grant authorities, confirmed the already existing practice ignoring New York authority as much as possible. On 24 October 1775, Captain Elijah Dewey called out his company for service on 1 November 1775 and ordered Sergeant Daniel Harmon

"...to warn the men whose names are hereunto annexed belonging to my Company, to appear at the parade ground, at the Meeting House, in Bennington, on the first day of

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\(^{57}\) See the minutes of the conventions at Dorset of 16 January and 24 July 1776 in Eric P. Walton, Records of the Council of Safety and Governor and Council of the State of Vermont to which are prefixed the Records of the General Conventions from July 1775 to December 1777 vol. 1 (Montpelier, 1873), pp. 11-13 and 14-26. The Green Mountain Boys regiment was officially disbanded in 1779.

\(^{58}\) Walton, Records, p. 28.
November next at one o'clock in the afternoon; with Arms complete for Exercising-Given under my hand at Bennington this 24th day of Oct. 1775."\(^{59}\)

Similarly, on 29 October 1784, the Vermont legislature discussed

"A petition, signed William Fitch, setting forth, that in the year 1775, he raised a company of men by order of the Convention of the New-Hampshire Grants, agreeable to a recommendation of Congress, and was promised by said Convention, a certain bounty for the men he should raise; and likewise, pay for fire-arms, blankets, and for enlisting, which has never been allowed; and praying that this Assembly would allow and order the same to be adjusted and paid to him for the benefit of said company."\(^{60}\)

Throughout the year 1776, local Committees of Safety called out militia to reinforce Benedict Arnold at Montreal and Quebec and to serve at Fort Ticonderoga in October of that year.\(^{61}\) Local authorities considered them to be “in the Service of the United Colonies” as part of the Continental Army. The legal framework of militia duty viz., age limits, exempted groups of the population, selection of officers, equipment and training requirements of these units is unknown, but presumable were those valid in the State of New York since that state had issued officer commissions until 25 September 1776.

When a constitutional convention met in Windsor, Vermont, at Elijah West's tavern on 2 July 1777, the question of militia duty in the newly-proclaimed state of Vermont was one of the more pressing issues the convention needed to address. This was less urgent from a practical point of view since militia had regularly been called out after 25 September 1776, or after the creation of the “Republic of New Connecticut” on 15 January 1777, possibly on the basis of the New York Militia Law of 1 April 1775. From a legal point of view such an arrangement could only be temporary and with the creation of a constitution had to be turned into one of the fundamental laws of the state. As mentioned above, news of the British victories at Fort Ticonderoga and Hubbardton caused many of the delegates at West's Tavern to want to adjourn and reconvene at a later date. However, a severe thunderstorm prevented the delegates from leaving and thus they passed and signed the Constitution of the State of Vermont on 8 July. Section V of Chapter II, “Plan or Frame of Government,” established a militia. It read:

"The freemen of this Commonwealth, and their sons, shall be trained and armed for its defence, under such regulations, restrictions and exceptions, as the general assembly shall, by law, direct; preserving always to the people, the right of choosing their colonels of militia, and all commissioned officers under that rank, in such manner, and as often, as by the said laws shall be directed."\(^{62}\)

\(^{59}\) Goodrich, *Rolls of Soldiers*, p. 633

\(^{60}\) Goodrich, *Rolls of Soldiers*, p. 777.


\(^{62}\) The Proceedings of the Council of Safety of 8 July to 15 August 1777 in Walton, *Records*, pp. 130-139. The editor points out, however, that "the minutes of the proceedings of the above period [...] have never come into the possession of the State, nor can they be found elsewhere: they are therefore now to be supplied, imperfectly no doubt, from the statements in Ira Allen's History, with such copies of letters, circulars, and orders of the Council as can be obtained from other sources."
The draft was never submitted to the electorate for ratification; instead the convention ordered that the first election should be held in December 1777 and that the General Assembly should meet at Bennington, in January 1778. Concurrently the convention that had written and passed the constitution was ordered by the Council of Safety to reconvene at Windsor on 24 December 1777. Continuing turmoil in the state even after the surrender of Burgoyne’s forces on 17 October prevented the printing of the text of the constitution, the preparation for an election to a General Assembly and the creation of a militia law: the text of the first Militia Law of Vermont passed in 1778 is unknown.

As Burgoyne was pushing deeper into New York State a wave of refugees preceded him. Eli Griffith remembered in his pension application that “The country being filled with alarm and the British troops...”

Since the constitution also abolished slavery, “freemen” meant ALL men living in Vermont. Chapter 1 of the constitution was "A declaration of the rights of the Inhabitants of the State of Vermont". Point 1 declared “That all men are born equally free and independent, and have certain natural, inherent right, amongst which are the enjoying and defending life and liberty [...] Therefore, no male person, born in this country, or brought from over sea, ought to be holden by law, to serve any person, as a servant, slave or apprentice, after he arrives to the age of twenty-one years, nor female, in like manner, after she arrives to the age of eighteen years unless they are bound by their own consent, after they arrive to such age, or bound by law, for the payment of debts, damages, fines, costs, or the like.” Slade, ed., Vermont State Papers (1823), pp. 241-256, p. 244.

63 Walton, Records, pp. 76-80, followed by a text of the constitution pp. 81-105.

64 The text of the 1778 militia law is unknown. A footnote in “LAWS PASSED AT THE SESSION OF ASSEMBLY HOLDEN AT BENNINGTON, FEBRUARY 11, A. D. 1779”, Vermont State Papers; being a collection of Records and Documents connected with the assumption and establishment of Government by the People of Vermont; Together with the Journal of the Council of Safety, the First Constitution, the early Journals of the General Assembly, and the Laws from the year 1779 to 1786, inclusive. William Slade, comp. (Middlebury: Copeland, 1823), p. 287, fn* states that: “Much exertion has been made to obtain a copy of the laws of 1778, —but without effect. They were published towards the close of that year, in a pamphlet form, but were never recorded in the Secretary’s office. No records appear to have been made in that office until the year 1779; when the Constitution, and the laws of that year were recorded. The laws of 1778, were probably declared to be temporary—as were the laws of several succeeding years — and ceased to have effect before any records were made. Some of them, indeed, were, obviously, designed to answer a temporary purpose only, — such as the acts, enacting certain laws“ as they stood on the Connecticut law book; ”— and all appear, so far as we can learn from the journals of the legislature, to have possessed the character of mere temporary regulations, rather than permanent laws.”

“The militia law of 1779, "AN ACT for forming and regulating the militia; and for encouragement of military skill, for the better defence of this State" is unique in that it does not exclude blacks or Indians from militia service. It reads: "And be it further enacted, by the authority aforesaid, that all male persons, from sixteen years of age to fifty, shall bear arms, and duly at tend all musters, and military exercise of the respective troops and companies, where they are inlisted, or do belong; except ministers of the gospel, councillors, justices of the peace, the secretary, judges of probate, and superior and inferior courts, the president, tutors, and students at collegiate schools, masters of arts, allowed physicians and surgeons, representatives or deputies for the time being, school masters, attornies at law, one miller to each grist-mill, sheriffs and constables for the time being, constant jurymen, tanners who make it their constant business, lamed persons, or others disabled in body, producing a certificate thereof from two able physicians or surgeons, to the acceptance of the two chief officers of the company wheroeto the person seeking dismission appertains, or of the chief officers of the regiment to which such company belongs. That every listed soldier and other householder, shall always be provided with, and have in constant readiness, a well fixed firelock, the barrel not less than three feet and a half long, or other good fire-arms, to the satisfaction of the commissioned officers of the company to which he doth belong, or in the limits of which he dwells: a good sword, cutlass, tomahawk or bayonet; a worm, and priming-wire, fit for each gun; a cartouch-box, or powder-horn and bullet-pouch; one pound of good powder; four pounds of bullets fit for his gun, and six good flints; on penalty of eighteen shillings, for want of such arms and ammunition as is hereby required, and six shillings for each defect; and a like sum for every four weeks he shall remain unprovided.” Ibid. pp. 305 - 312, p. 307
under General Burgoyne being daily expected through Granville, said Eli Griffith took his family and hastily fled to Great White Creek (a place so called)\textsuperscript{65} about twenty-five miles south-westerly from Granville, leaving most of his property behind for which he intended to return but never did and it was destroyed. For in attempting to return he found that the Americans would not let him pass a line they had formed to stop Burgoyne.” Few who had fled the British Army trusted the promises of “encouragement and employment” for loyal subjects expressed in Burgoyne’s proclamations.\textsuperscript{66} Instead, many of them, like Griffith, “about the middle of July 1777 volunteered and entered the ranks at White Creek and continued there in service over three weeks in Captain [Peleg] Mattison’s company of Vermont militia.” On 16 August 1777, Griffith, like thousands of others, fought Baum and his Brunswickers at Bennington.\textsuperscript{67} With Burgoyne \emph{ante portas} the men of military age living in the self-proclaimed State of Vermont were less concerned with legalities than with the need to defend themselves, their families and their property. Pension applications filed in the 1830s provide ample evidence of the ad-hoc nature in which Vermonters and men from adjacent states organized themselves on the eve of the Battle of Bennington. Caleb Olin deposed:

"In the month of June 1776 the militia of Shaftsbury just north of Bennington was called out by orders of the Committee of Safety […] None of the militia officers of Companies received commissions, but were chosen by their companies. He marched with his company to Castleton, in the fore part of June 1776, and joined the Militia at Castleton under the Command of Col. Herrick”.\textsuperscript{68} David Robinson, who served as Orderly Sergeant in Caleb Olin’s militia regiment, testified that he saw Olin “a Number of times in the Militia in the Service of the united States that I was one of the minit min in the forefront of the war that I was Conversent with the officiers [sic] that was then appointed to Command that we all Obeyed them according to their appointments I Never Saw any Commissions in the hands of the officiers & I Presume there was sent few if ani & I beleave none in the forefront of the war or untill the organization of our Government”.\textsuperscript{69} Gideon Seeger, a lieutenant in Olin’s company, deposed that “he thinks in the Summer of 1776 the Militia was called out from Shaftsbury to march to Castleton. […] There was no authority in Vermont then to give Commissions to officers.

Jonas Galusha (1753-1834), later Governor of Vermont and captain of Olin’s company during the Battle of Bennington, testified that “it is his opinion that Officers acted without commissions previous to the organization of the State government of Vermont.” When the Pension Office claimed that “there is abundant evidence in the war department that officers were commissioned by the State of Vermont in 1778 and

\textsuperscript{65} Granville is about 40 miles north of Walloomsac, White Creek is less than 10 miles north of it.

\textsuperscript{66} An exact date of Burgoyne’s broadside proclamation can not be determined; the first known version was issued on 20 June 1777 from Camp at Bouquet Ferry but the dates on surviving copies vary from 20 June to 20 July 1777. A contemporary printed copy can be found in \emph{Gentleman’s Magazine}, 47 (1777), pp. 359–60. For a copy of the proclamation see Appendix E: PRIMARY SOURCES – BRITISH/BRUNSWICK/LOYALIST

\textsuperscript{67} Pension Application of Eli Griffith R 4324. See also Brian S. Barrett, \emph{Burgoyne’s Nemesis: New England Militia} (Charleston: n.p., 2015).

\textsuperscript{68} Pension Application Caleb Olin, S 16997. "Col. Herrick" was Samuel Herrick (1732-1797). Once Allen had been taken prisoner and Warner had joined the Continental Army, command of the Vermont regiment which became known as Herrick's Rangers devolved on Herrick, who was commissioned a lieutenant colonel by the Vermont authorities on 15 July 1777.

\textsuperscript{69} Affidavit in Caleb Olin’s application S 16997.
subsequently, and that previously, it is believed they were commissioned by the State of New Hampshire,” Jonas’ brother Amos (1755-1839) added “That it is his opinion that Commissions were not given to Militia officers by the State of New Hampshire and that the officers served in the Revolutionary War without Commissions before the Organization of the State Government does not know but the Committee of Safety gave commissions, knows nothing to the contrary.”

Levi Hanks, born in Mansfield, Connecticut on 28 May 1761 served in Captain Joseph Peirce’s company of Colonel Joab Stafford’s Massachusetts Militia and deposed that “In the year 1777, when I was sixteen years of age … In the month of August following, an alarm came that the British were coming out to Bennington, and I volunteered again in the militia, and marched to Bennington – We went on without much organization … I arrived there the day after the battle, and was employed in guarding the British prisoners taken in the battle – who were kept a few days in the meeting house and then I was ordered as a guard to conduct them to Pittsfield, Massachusetts.” Amasa Ives of Adams, south-east of Walloomsac but in Vermont, who fought in Capt. Parker’s company, Colonel Symonds Massachusetts Militia Regiment provides another example of how men simply picked up their muskets, marched where they thought they were needed and joined the next available unit: “His next Service was in the year 1777 at the Battle of Bennington Vermont. He then resided at Adams aforesaid at which time the Country was suddenly alarmed at the approach of the enemy towards Bennington, and a general turning out was the immediate consequence of the alarm to arrest the progress of the enemy, that this declarant shouldered his musket & repaired the next day to Bennington and the battle was fought the third day after he left home, that he was in the heat of the action which commenced according to his recollection about 11 Ocloc AM and continued till night.”

Though all militia laws set minimum age requirements usually at age at 16, numerous pension applications show boys as young as twelve in the ranks of the militia. Nathan Franklin deposed that “I was born in the year 1763 (as appeared by a record in my Fathers bible) at a place called ‘Quaker Hill’ [a hamlet within the town of Pawling in Dutchess County, New York] what county I cannot tell,” which means that Franklin was 14 years old when he enlisted in August 1777 and fought in the Battle of Bennington. “We returned soon after the battle to Stillwater.” Thomas Mellen of Newbury, Vermont applied for a pension on 29 July 1819 under the 1818 act (S 41004). He had enlisted 1 March 1776 and was discharged for the first time in December 1776. Born 1760, he died 21 January 1853.

Born on 27 November 1762 in New York City, John Ralston departed on a boat up the Hudson River with his parents a day or two before the Battle of Long Island to Albany; he first served barely 14 ½ years old in June 1777, when he marched with his unit to the “west part of the County of Washington” where “the Indians like Wolves were constantly prowling about murdering the inhabitants & burning their property.” In August 1777 he participated in the Battle of Bennington.

Enos Wood, born in Norwich, Connecticut on 23 February 1761, moved to Bennington with his family later that year and on 10 (or 11) July 1777 enlisted as a 16-year-old “to serve as a private in the said Company

70 David Galusha died 89 years old on 21 June 1854, which gives the year of his birth as 1765.
71 Pension Application of Levi Hanks W 1860.
72 Pension Application of Amasa Ives, S 23277.
till after the battle of Bennington on the 16th of August 1777 and was engaged in that Battle in the said Company and assisted in forcing the Breast work & capturing the Hessians under Col Baum at which time General Stark commanded the American troops.” 74 Born 4 November 1760, Alexander Watson served for the first time as a 15-year-old in Southbury, Connecticut on 1 July 1776, fought in the Battle of White Plains and was three months shy of his 17th birthday at the time of the Battle of Bennington. Watson arrived the day after the battle. 75

Even a brief overview such as this shows the fluidity of the military organization of American forces opposing Colonels Baum and Breymann at Bennington in August 1777. While the original colonies and states in New England had both a tradition and a firmly recognized legal and institutional framework of militia service, the military tradition in the New Hampshire Grants had sprung up independently in opposition to the colony of New York. In the summer of 1777 there was no legal framework in place in the new state of Vermont that could serve as a basis for calling out the men capable of defending New England in general and the stores at Bennington in particular against the forces of Burgoyne. As they arrived near Colonel Baum’s positions, more likely in small groups rather than full militarily organized units, the men either organized themselves into units or joined other units that welcomed them. The only intentional and planned “recruitment,” or maybe calling out for forces by Stark, was based as much on the need to defend against the British invasion and on the well-known personality of Stark as on any legal obligation on the part of the men who joined his army. That this little army of units established on an ad-hoc basis would defeat regular army forces under Baum quickly took on a life of its own in the hagiography of the War of Independence and the struggle between supporters of militia versus regular forces as the preferred military system for the new republic.

3.3 SIR JOHN BURGOYNE’S INVASION OF NEW YORK STATE

The summer of 1777 was the third time that the Champlain Valley had to serve as a theatre of war during the American War of Independence. Setting out from Fort Ticonderoga in August 1775, Irish-born General Richard Montgomery had led an American force to the gates of Fort Saint-Jean (St. Johns) on the Richelieu River which surrendered on 2 November 1775. Montgomery next turned his army toward Montreal which surrendered on 13 November. On 2 December Montgomery joined his troops to those of Benedict Arnold at Pointe aux Trembles, 18 miles upriver from Quebec. British Governor Sir Guy Carleton inside Quebec City refused to surrender. Montgomery was killed during an attack on the city during the night of 30 December and the British captured a large number of his men. Benedict Arnold, now in command of American forces in Canada, was however able to maintain the siege of Quebec once reinforcements and additional supplies had arrived.

Upon hearing the news of American military successes in Canada, the British government in London embarked on an ambitious plan to attack the rebels from Canada along the Lake Champlain- Hudson River route and to carry the war into New England. The 10,000-man expedition stood under the command of Sir John Burgoyne, who arrived in Canada in May 1776. His forces lifted the siege of Quebec and on 8 June 1776 in the Battle of Trois-Rivières routed the American forces attempting to stem the Royal advance.

74 Pension application of Enos Wood S 11863.
75 Pension application of Alexander Watson, S 23472.
Though Carleton allowed the 2,000 or so American survivors to retreat to Montreal, that city too was in British hands by 15 June. Carleton continued to push south into New York State along the Richelieu River towards Lake Champlain. Upon reaching the lake he ordered the construction of a fleet of small vessels which defeated Arnold’s similar fleet in the Battle of Valcour Island on 11 October. In view of the lateness of the season Carleton decided to end his pursuit of the rebels and returned to Canada. Though he had re-established British control over the Lake Champlain area by the end of the year, Fort Ticonderoga was still in American hands and no British soldier had set foot into the Hudson River Valley.  

Burgoyne returned to England where he succeeded not only in convincing King George and his government that it was Carleton’s fault that Ticonderoga was still in American hands but also in getting himself appointed, on 28 February, to lead the 1777 expedition into the Hudson River Valley. Burgoyne arrived in Quebec on 6 May 1777, and when Carleton learned of Burgoyne’s appointment he resigned his governorship in protest on 26 June but had to remain at his post for another year before he could return to Britain in mid-1778. Burgoyne’s plan, which he had devised and developed himself, called for British forces under his command to follow the same avenue of attack taken in 1776, but now capture Ticonderoga and march on to Albany. Here he would meet up with a smaller British force under Barry St. Leger approaching along the Mohawk River valley. As he continued along the Hudson River he would meet up with forces under General Howe marching inland from New York City. Once these columns had merged, New England, considered the center of the rebellion, would be cut off from the rest of the colonies. Burgoyne was convinced that New England could then be reduced to obedience to the crown rather easily. That unified strategy, however, never materialized. Lord George Germain, Secretary of State for the Colonies, was loath to exercise close control over his field commanders from far-away London and instead issued instructions that left much, perhaps too much, of the campaign strategy for 1777 to the generals’ own discretion. Germain had wanted Burgoyne, Clinton and Howe to cooperate but instead each of them followed his own plans and fought his own battles. Historians still argue whether Burgoyne knew of Howe’s campaign plans for 1777 or not when he departed from Quebec on 13 June 1777 on his march south toward the Hudson, the same day Howe moved his forces out of winter quarters at New Brunswick, New Jersey. Rather than move north along the Hudson to meet up with Burgoyne, Howe chose his own campaign and sailed southward, landed his forces near Elkton, Maryland and marched on Philadelphia, the center of American political power, which he occupied on 26 September. Barry St. Leger was forced to raise the siege of Fort Stanwix on 22 August after losing his Indian allies who were dissatisfied with the stationary

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77 See the Thomas S. Wermuth and James M. Johnson, “The American Revolution in the Hudson River Valley – An Overview” The Hudson River Valley Review vol. 20 no. 1 (Summer 2003), 5-14.
warfare forced upon Barry St. Leger as he had to lay siege to Fort Stanwix. Sir Henry Clinton carried out some token movements up the Hudson that turned out to be of little help to Burgoyne.\textsuperscript{79}

Equally important for the eventual failure of Burgoyne was his overconfidence in the abilities of the large force, over 7,000 men under his command, and the belief that large numbers of Canadians, Indians and Loyalists would rally round his flag once he had entered New York State. The New York loyalists never materialized, and of the around 2,000 militia Burgoyne had hoped to find in Quebec Carleton had only been able to raise three small companies. Similarly, Burgoyne was only able to raise barely half of the 1,000 Indians he had hope would accompany his forces.\textsuperscript{80}

On 13 June 1777, Burgoyne and Carleton reviewed their forces at Fort St. John just north of Lake Champlain, and Burgoyne assumed command of about 7,000 regulars and over 130 artillery pieces. For the invasion of New York Burgoyne organized his army into an advance force under Brigadier General Simon Fraser, and two divisions: Major General William Phillips with 3,900 British regulars as the right and Friedrich Adolf Riedesel, Freiherr zu Eisenbach with some 3,100 Brunswickers and Hanauers as the left column. Initially things went well for Burgoyne. His men occupied the deserted fortifications at Crown Point on 30 June. Two days later British advance forces reached Fort Ticonderoga. By 4 July most of the American forces had withdrawn to either Fort Ticonderoga or Mount Independence on the Vermont side of Lake Champlain. In the process they had, unknowingly, opened the way for British artillery to move onto Sugar Loaf Mountain, today’s Mount Defiance. American general Arthur St. Clair had mistakenly considered the mountaintop impassable. Claiming that “Where a goat can go, a man can go. And where a man can go, he can drag a gun,” Phillips’ men had successfully dragged two 18-lb cannon to the mountaintop.\textsuperscript{81} From here British artillery could bombard the fort as well as Mount Independence, making American positions untenable. St. Clair had no choice but to hastily withdraw his forces during the night of 5/6 July, leaving behind large amounts of supplies. In the morning of 6 July British forces occupied Fort Ticonderoga virtually unopposed and hard on the heels of the retreating Continental Army.

The capture of Fort Ticonderoga ended the first phase of Burgoyne campaign. St. Clair retreated to Castleton and on to Fort Edward and left Colonel Seth Warner as a rear-guard at Hubbardton. In the morning


For a different viewpoint on the importance of Saratoga for the outcome of the war see Theodore Corbett, \textit{No Turning Point: The Saratoga Campaign in Perspective} (University of Oklahoma Press; 2012). Corbett argues that Saratoga did not constitute a decisive turning point in the American War of Independence.

Burgoyne’s Orderly Book was published by Edmund Bailey O’Callaghan, \textit{Orderly Book of Lieut. Gen. John Burgoyne: from his entry into the state of New York until his surrender at Saratoga, 16th Oct. 1777; from the original manuscript deposited at Washington’s head quarters, Newburgh, N. Y.} (Albany: J. Munsell, 1860).

of 7 July, General Fraser and elements of Baron Riedesel's troops faced determined resistance at Hubbardton. That same day Colonel Pierce Long, ordered by St. Clair to take the sick and wounded by boat to Skenesboro, skirmished successfully with Burgoyne's vanguard near Skenesboro. Having met up with American forces under Colonel Henry van Rensselaer, Long and Rensselaer's forces mauled a British advance party in the Battle of Fort Anne on 8 July. Upon arrival of the 20th Regiment of Foot and artillery under Phillips, outnumbered and outgunned American forces set Fort Anne on fire and withdrew.

Though Americans forces had suffered about 50 percent more casualties than Royal forces at Hubbardton, the engagements at Skenesboro and Fort Anne had shown Burgoyne that Americans could put up stiff resistance. British successes had done little to increase the flow of Loyalists to his colors. Further, while the influx of militia made up American losses, Burgoyne had no opportunity to replace the 1,500 men he had lost by mid-July. Only about 200 of them were casualties but Burgoyne also had to place a 400-man garrison at Crown Point and another 900 in Ticonderoga. Burgoyne, convinced that all that remained to do was sweep scattered American forces before him on his way to Albany, decided to halt his campaign to gather supplies, re-establish his supply lines with Canada via Lake Champlain, and make Fort Edward his base. The vast majority of his equipment, artillery and ammunition were still on board vessels off Fort Ticonderoga waiting to be transferred to Fort George. Fort George, still held by the Continental Army behind him on Lake George, had to be taken to establish secure lines of communication and supply.

As Burgoyne established his headquarters at Skenesborough on 6 July, he had to choose between two alternative routes to reach Albany (Figure 3). He could backtrack to Fort Ticonderoga where his army's equipment, particularly the heavy artillery, was still on board vessels on Lake Champlain. From there he could portage them to Lake George and sail on the lake to Fort George, where the equipment and supplies could be carried overland to Fort Edward on the Hudson River. If all went well Burgoyne would reach Albany before the onset of winter. Alternatively, he could march directly overland from Skenesborough to Fort Edward. Though historians still debate the merits of Burgoyne's route selection, i.e. to march overland on the longer route to Fort Edward leaving American-held Fort George in his rear, the route had the advantage of easier water transport once the difficult portage to Fort Edward was accomplished. More importantly, Burgoyne could not backtrack to Fort Ticonderoga for political reasons: it would have appeared like a retreat and encourage American resistance. Critics later claimed that Burgoyne had also been swayed by Loyalist Philip Skene, in whose house he was staying and whose property would greatly benefit from a road to Fort Edward.\textsuperscript{82} Having heard the news of the surrender of Fort Ticonderoga, General Philip Schuyler, commanding officer of the Northern Department, hurried to Fort Edward and found it garrisoned by about 700 regulars and 1,400 militia and in a poor state of defense. Arthur St. Clair reached Fort Edward on 12 July with the remnants of his forces. With the fort's defenses beyond repair, Schuyler's only option was to delay Burgoyne's advance by making roads to Fort Edward impassable by felling trees across the roadway and tearing down bridges. Helped by heavy rains, Schuyler succeeded in reducing the British advance to a crawl.\textsuperscript{83}

\textsuperscript{82} Skene owned more than 60,000 acres around Skenesborough, today's Whitehall. Both Skene as well as Franz Joseph Pfister, another proponent of the route via Skenesborough and 55 other Tories were at Fort Edward on 1 August.

\textsuperscript{83} A Congress angry over the loss of Fort Ticonderoga relieved Schuyler of his command on 4 August and replaced with Horatio Gates who assumed command of the Northern Department on 19 August.
But there was another, little-mentioned, reason for the long stay at Skenesborough. The victory at Hubbardton had cost Burgoyne dearly. The 60 British and 10 German troops killed and 134 British and 14 Brunswickers wounded came almost exclusively from the British Light Infantry and Grenadier battalions, Burgoyne’s best, and most difficult to replace, troops. The Americans lost only between 30 and 41 men killed and 96 wounded. However, the presence of more than 230 American prisoners, many of them sick or wounded and in need of care, constituted a mixed blessing for Burgoyne and help explain his long sojourn in Skenesborough from 6/7 to 23 July 1777, when the advanced corps moved to Fort Anne while the rest of the army followed on 25 July (Figure 3).

Preparations for the march to Fort Edward, i.e. road construction, began on 8 July. On 10 July, Burgoyne issued orders for his army to set out on its march to Fort Edward while the heavy artillery would be transported on Lake George to Fort Edward. That same day Burgoyne sent Baron Riedesel to Castleton in Vermont to collect supplies and recruit Loyalists. On 25 July, the same day Burgoyne departed from Skenesborough, modern-day Whitecastle, for Fort Edward, Riedesel began his march to Skenesborough. An exhausted British army reached an abandoned Fort Edward on 29 July. It had taken the men 21 days to build a road in order to advance 23 miles from Skenesborough to Fort Edward. Concurrently General Phillips arrived with his troops off Fort George sixteen miles north of Fort Edward on 28 July only to find out that Schuyler had abandoned the fort four days earlier. Philips immediately embarked on the task of portage of equipment and arms from Fort Ticonderoga but it took him another three weeks before the roads were repaired and the shipment of supplies to Fort Edward could begin. The transfer of British forces to Fort Edward had taken much longer than expected, but that was the least of Burgoyne’s worries. As Crown Forces were struggling through the wilderness of upstate New York and American fortunes seemed to have reached the tipping point, they reaped an unexpected propaganda coup. On 27 July, a group of Indians under the Wyandot Le Loup scalped and killed 25-year-old Jane McCrea outside Fort Edward. McCrea came from a family of split loyalties: two of her brothers fought on the American side while her fiancé David Jones served as a lieutenant in a loyalist militia in Burgoyne’s army. McCrea was on her way to join Jones at Fort Ticonderoga and staying with loyalist friends in the village outside Fort Edward when the Indians attacked the village, killed a number of settlers and took McCrea and her friend Sara McNeil prisoners. What happened next is unclear but when an Indian arrived in Burgoyne’s camp he carried McCrea’s scalp. Burgoyne, fearing that his Indian allies would desert him if he punished the culprit, took no action, antagonizing his loyalist supports while giving the Americans a cause to rally round: “Remember Jenny McCrea!”

That the savages of America should in their warfare mangle and scalp the unhappy prisoners who fall into their hands is neither new nor extraordinary; but that the famous Lieutenant General Burgoyne, in whom the fine gentleman is united with the soldier and

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84 Venter, Hubbardton, p. 112.
85 The dates are based on “Appendix C: Table showing daily positions and movements of Stark, Schuyler, Lincoln, Burgoyne, Baum, Breyman, and St. Leger, in the Campaign preceding Bennington, July-Aug., 1777” in: Proceedings of the New York State Historical Association vol. 5 (1905), pp. 94/95.
86 Gabriel, Bennington, p.17.
87 Davis, Where a Man can go, p. 67.
the scholar, should hire the savages of America to scalp Europeans and the descendants of Europeans, nay more, that he should pay a price for each scalp so barbarously taken, is more than will be believed in England. [...] Miss McCrae, a young lady lovely to the sight, of virtuous character and amiable disposition, engaged to be married to an officer of your army, was [...] carried into the woods, and there scalped and mangled in the most shocking manner.\(^9\)

Stark and Warner could not have wished for a better recruitment tool.

4. **Prelude**

### 4.1 The Decision to Send Baum into New England

Of more immediate concern to Burgoyne, however, were his supply problems. Ever since his departure from Canada he had suffered from a lack of wagons and draft animals. The farther he moved into New York State the longer and more tenuous his supply lines became, further aggravating his lack of means of transportation. By early August, Burgoyne hardly ever had more than a few days’ worth of supplies. To remedy this untenable situation, Burgoyne decided to send a strong force into New England where he hoped he would be able to gather large supplies of foodstuff and draft animals as well as horses for his wagons and for the Brunswick dragoons. To achieve that goal Burgoyne returned to a proposal first made by Riedesel on 22 July: to “detach to the Connecticut [River Valley], the regiment of dragoons, the corps of Peters and Yessop [sic], and an officer and thirty of each regiment, under the command of a good staff officer, I am convinced that this corps would procure the necessary number of horses for the army. The regiment of dragoons would thus be mounted, and do all that your excellency would expect from it.”

On 31 July, Burgoyne expanded and adapted Riedesel’s plan to meet the changed requirements. The reconnaissance in force was to march to Manchester, collect supplies for the army and Loyalists for John Peters’ battalion while relieving the pressure on Burgoyne’s left flank out of the Connecticut River Valley (Figure 3).

The forage and supply expedition into Vermont and western Massachusetts was scheduled to last about two weeks (Figure 4). The yellow line denotes the route originally planned for Baum’s expedition. Burgoyne appointed Lieutenant Colonel Friedrich Baum, aided by Loyalist Philip Skene, to command the expedition. Baum’s force “consisted of approximately 760 men: 434 German dragoons and infantry, 200 Loyalists, 50 British marksmen, 60 Canadians and 14 artillery-men with two three-pounder cannons. Around 150 Indians also accompanied the expedition, and ranged ahead of the main force.”

Interpreting between the English, German, French, and Indian tongues constituted an enormous communications problem further exacerbated by Baum’s unfamiliarity with English and the skills required for the wilderness warfare required for the expedition. The equipment of the dragoons, particularly their heavy boots designed to be worn on horseback, not to march in, further hampered the effectiveness of the detachment.

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91 This as well as the following map outlining Baum's route are taken from [http://i0.wp.com/passageport.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/burgoynes-order.png](http://i0.wp.com/passageport.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/burgoynes-order.png). The geographic data used in this description of Baum's march to Bennington largely follow those in [http://passageport.org/bennington/](http://passageport.org/bennington/).

92 These numbers are taken from Gabriel, *Bennington*, p. 18; other sources provide different numbers.
Figure 3. Detail from Michel Capitaine du Chesnoy, *Carte du théâtre de la guerre dans l'Amérique septentrionale, pendant les années 1775, 76, 77 et 78: où se trouvent les principaux camps avec les différentes places et époques des batailles qui sont données pendant ces campagnes* (Paris, 1779?) Society of the Cincinnati, Washington, DC.
Figure 4. First Order of March for Lt.-Col. Baum. Adapted from http://passageport.org/bennington/
Historians have questioned the selection and appointment of Baum to command the expedition but contemporary sources do not bear out this criticism. Baum had over 20 years of service prior to his deployment to the American theatre and much of the criticism leveled against Baum arose after the Battle of Bennington and his death. Both Burgoyne and Phillips approved Riedesel’s initial plan and defended the expedition after it had failed. Only Brigadier General Simon Fraser raised objections, which Burgoyne attributed to “zeal and impatience for employment … to have conducted the expedition at the head of his distinct corps, rather than envy or disparagement of the German troops.” Riedesel, who is often cited in this context, opposed the changed scope, focus and troop strength of the expedition but not the selection of Baum to command it. Since Burgoyne expected the militia guarding depots along the way to disperse at the approach of Baum’s men he decided to ignore these obstacles.

4.2 THE MARCH TO CAMBRIDGE

At midnight on 8/9 August, Baum and his detachment received orders to depart for Arlington and Manchester at daybreak. They set out from Fort Edward on 9 August going south on today’s US 94. Surgeon Julius Wasmus recorded in his diary for 9 August 1777:

Leaving tents and baggage behind, we set out at 5 o’clock this morning, marched our left through the camp of the Breymann Corps and attached ourselves to the baggage of the Fraser Corps, that had likewise set out on the march; our march continued along the Hudson River. We found both banks of this river settled with rather well-built houses in German style, which were all empty; the families had fled into the wilderness with all their belongings just for fear of the Germans. The beautiful wheat and rye fields were going to ruin; they were all ripe. We passed several bridges and places where the enemy had camped. We also saw grapes, although not ripe, as well as many bilberries, raspberries and blackberries on both sides of the well laid-out military road. It was noon when we entered the camp at Fort Miller. Here, we composed the right wing of the Fraser Corps and, facing Albany, camped close by the Hudson River, which was flowing on our right. On a height on our left, we saw a magnificent building, several respectable houses, as well as various sawmills and gristmills, which were all empty. We made huts with boards which were lying about in large quantities near the sawmill.

As Baum and his forces lay encamped at Fort Miller in the morning of 11 August (Figure 5), Burgoyne personally handed Baum his new orders. Rather than embark on the two-week excursion toward

93 See Michael R. Gadue, “Lieutenant Colonel Friedrich S. Baum, Officer Commanding, the Bennington Expedition: A Figure Little known to History” Journal of the Johannes Schwalm Historical Association vol. 11 (2008), pp. 37-54, the quote ibid. p. 38.
94 North of Fort Miller River Road follows the eighteenth-century road but due to a canal dug parallel to the Hudson River in the nineteenth century access to River Road is no longer possible coming south on US 4. In 1777, Fort Miller already lay in ruins but a small settlement had sprung up there.
Figure removed in accordance with the Archaeological Resources Protection Act.
Manchester and Springfield, Baum was to march directly to Bennington and take the Continental supplies stored there (Figure 6). These stores had been collected there for the use of the Continental Army, represented an enticing target for Burgoyne’s starving army.96

In the morning of 11 August the detachment set out for Bennington, its new destination, anticipating that only militia would be defending the depot. That night of 11/12 August it encamped near the intersection of on the Hudson River “opposite Saratoga” (Figures 7, 8, and 9). In 1777, today’s was a new road having been created in 1776 as a military road for use by the Continental Army. The road, known as the Continental Road, was still studded with stumps and full of rocks. On 13 August, Wasmus wrote that “We had lost [left] the Hudson River, passed through the wilderness on a rough road, which only last year had been cleared by the Rebels.”97

As recorded by Wasmus, the corps had to cross the Batten Kill on near Clarks Mill just north of Schuylerville on the left bank of the Hudson:

We also passed quite a pleasant region, which was cultivated on both sides of the Hudson. We came to a traverse whose river emptied into the Hudson. For lack of a bridge, the corps had to walk up to their waists through the water, which was a most unpleasant and dangerous undertaking; for the current was so fast that one could hardly keep one’s balance.98

In the evening of 11 August, Wasmus recorded in his journal:

This morning, beef and bread were given out. Brigadier Gen. Fraser came a few times this forenoon and talked with our Lieut. Colonel Baum. We set out at noon and our corps, which Lieut. Colonel Baum commanded, consisted of our Dragoon Regiment, not quite 200 men strong; 100 Tories, 100 Savage Mohawks, 100 Canadians and 50 Englishmen from Powell’s brigade, that formed the tete of our regiment and were commanded by Capt. Fraser. The savages were commanded by Capt. Lanaudiere, Adjutant of Gov. Gen. Carleton, the Tories by Colonel Forster, and the Canadians by Canadian officers. The two 3-pound cannon were being drawn along in front of our regiment. This was the corps designated for the expedition.99

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96 The revised plan with Burgoyne’s annotations of 31 July is published in Stone, Memoirs, vol. 2, pp. 260-264. See also Appendix E: PRIMARY SOURCES BRITISH/BRUNSWICK/LOYALIST.
97 Wasmus, p. 69.
98 Wasmus, p.68. A New York State historic marker on River Road at Clarks Mills in Greenwich reads: “From this Place Burgoyne’s German Troops Marched To The Battle Of Bennington”.
99 Wasmus, p. 68.
Figure 6. Second Order of March for Lt.-Col. Baum. Adapted from http://passageport.org/bennington/
Figure removed in accordance with the Archaeological Resources Protection Act.
Figure 9. This marker, located on County Route 113 a quarter-mile south of Route 29, identifies the location of Baum’s encampment on 11/12 August 1777.

Figure removed in accordance with the Archaeological Resources Protection Act.

Figure 10.
The Philip Schuyler House is less than a mile to the north on the right bank of the Hudson. Wasmus recorded that:

the corps had the delight of seeing the first church since Canada, which lay on the opposite side of the Hudson River. Near the church was a large manor with many respectable buildings, which belonged to Gen. Schuyler… We kept the Hudson River on our right and moved into a camp across from the church next to 2 beautiful houses. Some of the corn [grain] had been harvested and stored in the houses, some was overripe and being crushed. They had also started drawing the flax, but had run off. Their enmity against the King of England and the fear of the Germans had driven them away.\footnote{Wasmus, p.68. The church mentioned by Wasmus is St. Stephen Episcopal Church.}

That same day, 12 August 1777, Baum wrote his first letter to Burgoyne:

I had the honor of acquainting your Excellency – by a man sent yesterday evening by Col. Skeene to headquarters – of the several corps under my command being encamped at Saratoga, as well as of my intention to proceed the next morning at 5 o’clock. The corps moved at that time and marched a mile, when I received a letter from Brig. Gen. Fraser signifying your Excellency’s order to post the corps advantageously on Batten Kill till I should receive fresh instructions from your Excellency. The corps is now encamped at that place and wait your Excellency’s orders. I will not trouble you, Sir, with the various reports, which spread, as they seem rather to be founded on the different interests and feelings of the people who occasion them.\footnote{On 12 August, Julius Wasmus entered into his journal: “Last night, another detachment of 50 men came to us; they were from our corps and under the command of Captain Dommes.” Ibid., p. 69. For copies of Baum’s correspondence see Appendix E: PRIMARY SOURCES – BRITISH/BRUNSWICK/LOYALIST}

Concurrently Baum thanked Burgoyne for the reinforcement of 50 chasseurs which had “joined me last night at eleven o’clock.” That day, 12 August,

We set out at 6 o’clock in the morning and marched up a mountain on our left and into the woods. We had hardly covered one mile in the woods when we went back again and made our camp one mile behind [i.e. east of] the place where we camped last night. The reason for this was a false report stating that the enemy, a few thousand men strong, had occupied a post not far from us. This afternoon, Generals Burgoyne and Phillips came to us, talked a long time with our Lieut. Colonel Baum, and returned to the army.\footnote{The reasons for this meeting and what was discussed are unknown.}

Having marched about two miles on the Continental Road, Baum stopped his forces near \_[redacted\_]. Here he received orders from General Fraser to camp along the Batten Kill River and await further orders. Based on these orders he moved his forces ahead a short distance and spent the night of 12/13 August somewhere along today’s \_[redacted\_].
Figure 11. At the intersection of Colonel Baume Road and NY-SR 372 about 1½ miles south of Greenwich a bronze plaque commemorates the march of Baum's forces past this site on the Continental Road in 1777.

Figure 12. Baum took lodging in the so-called "Checkered House" at the intersection of the Turnpike Road and Owlkill Road. The plaque reads: “Site of the Checkered House built by James Cowden 1765. Baum’s Headquarters, Aug. 13, 1777. Continental Hospital, Aug. 18, 1777.” It was erected by the Ondawa-Cambridge Chapter of the Daughters of the American Revolution in 1921. The house burned down in 1907.
August, Franz Joseph Pfister and John Peters, two of the leading local Tories, departed Fort Miller with 452 members of the Queens Loyal Rangers, crossed the Battenkill and headed southeast on a foraging expedition of their own. A few days later they would join Baum on the Walloomsac in the battle against Stark.\(^\text{103}\)

In the morning of 13 August, Baum and his detachment broke camp from south of Greenwich and marched eastward on the Continental Road, i.e. today’s [Street Name]. At the intersection of [Street Name] about 1 ½ miles south of Greenwich a bronze plaque commemorates the march of Baum’s forces past this site on the Continental Road in 1777.

They continued on [Street Name] south for less than 1,000 feet before turning east on [Street Name]. In Cambridge they turned south onto [Street Name]. Having covered 16 miles that day, Baum took lodging in the so-called “Checkered House” at the intersection of [Street Name] about halfway between Cambridge and Center White Creek at around 4:00 p.m. on 13 August (Figures 12, 13 and 14).

Wasmus wrote “at 4 o’clock in the afternoon, we moved our camp into the village near a beautiful house. The house stood empty, the owner had taken to flight with his family this morning.” Baum’s forces camped a good mile further south along [Street Name].

### 4.3 THE ENGAGEMENT ON 13 AUGUST SOUTH OF CAMBRIDGE

By now Vermont authorities were aware of the destination of Baum’s forces. Within hours of his departure from Greenwich on the morning of 13 August the Vermont Council of Safety knew that Baum was marching on Bennington and hurriedly called out additional the militia: Jonas Fay, Vice-President of the Vermont Council of Safety, wrote to Colonel Joseph Marsh\(^\text{104}\) and General Jacob Bailey\(^\text{105}\) from Bennington:

> These are in the most positive terms to requiar you without a moments loss of time to march one half of the Regiment under your command to this place. Whilst I am writing

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\(^{104}\) Joseph Marsh (1726-1811) was born in Lebanon, CT but moved to Hartford, VT in 1772. In 1777 Marsh was a member of the Windsor convention that enacted the Constitution forming the Vermont Republic, and served as the convention’s Vice President. In 1778 he was elected the first Lieutenant Governor of Vermont. Marsh died on 9 February 1811.

\(^{105}\) Jacob Bailey (1726-1815) was named to Vermont’s Council of Safety in 1776 and appointed Brigadier General of the Vermont Militia. Later in 1776 Bayley was also appointed Commissary General of the Continental Army’s Northern Department.
Figure 13. In 1943, folk artist Grandma Moses, aka Anna Mary Robertson Moses (1860-1961) painted this picture of how she remembered the Checkered House.

Figure 14. New York State Historic Marker identifying the location of Baum’s encampment on 13/14 August 1777 on NY-SR 22 about four miles south of Cambridge.
this, we are informed by Express that a large Body of the Enemy's troops were discovered two hours ago in St. Koik\textsuperscript{106} 12 miles from this place and another body at Cambridge about 15 miles from this; that they march boldly in the Road, and there will doubtless be an attack at or near this place within 24 hours. We have the assistance of Maj. General Stark with his Brigade: you will hurry what Rangers forward are recruited with all speed. Now is the time.\textsuperscript{107}

Now was “the time” indeed. By the time Fay wrote the letter to Marsh and Bailey, Baum had already skirmished with small detachments of about forty or fifty militiamen guarding cattle a mile or more ahead of him. Baum detached about eighty of his troops to intercept the militia but the militia abandoned the house in which they were staying as well as the cattle once they became aware of the approaching enemy. Baum’s men pursued them for about a mile down the road, where they encountered another small detachment of about 15 men who retreated hastily after just one volley (Figure 15). Baum’s troops captured five militiamen who warned him of a large American force just a short distance ahead. Wasmus described the brief encounter of 13 August thus:

Here we came upon a detachment of Rebels that were driven back. Thereby, one Tory was shot through his leg, which I bandaged. This evening, we heard the retreat shot of the American army very far away on our right. We gathered a booty of 15 horses today. The village is large and scattered and was first settled 12 years ago. Our herd of cattle has increased because we came upon some oxen at all the houses we passed. They allowed themselves to be tied and came with us.\textsuperscript{108}

In 1832 Dan Kent testified “That myself & two brothers joined the army at Manchester, drew ammunition & kept a kind of outpost in advance of our Army about six miles. There we kept guard, we continued at this post till Bennington was Invaded by Col. Baum.”\textsuperscript{109}

That evening Baum wrote his second letter to Burgoyne:

Sir,

In consequence of your Excellency's orders I moved this morning at 4 o'clock with the corps under my command, and after a march of 16 miles arrived at Cambridge at 4 in the evening. On the road I received intelligence of 40 or 50 of the rebels being left to guard some cattle. I immediately ordered 30 of the provincials and 50 savages to quicken their march in hopes to surprise them. They took 5 prisoners in arms who declared themselves to be in the service of the Congress. Yet the enemy received advice of our approach and abandoned the house they were posted in. The provincials and savages continued their march almost a mile, when they fell in with a party of 15 men

\textsuperscript{106} St. Koik, St. Coick, St. Coix, Sancoick &c denote both the Walloomscoic River as well as the small settlement around Van Rensselaer's mill about seven miles from Bennington and two miles east of Walloomscoick.
\textsuperscript{107} State Papers vol. VIII. p. 41.
\textsuperscript{108} Wasmus, p. 69.
\textsuperscript{109} Pension Application of Dan Kent W 21510.
Figure 15. This marker stands on NY-SR 22 about four miles south of Cambridge. The date is incorrect since the skirmish took place on 13 August.

Figure 16. New York State Historic Marker on South Union Street in Cambridge identifying the Continental Road from Fort Miller to Bennington and the fact that Lt.-Col. Baum passed here on 14 August 1777.
who fired upon our people and immediately took to the woods with the greatest precipitation. The fire was quick on our side but I cannot learn if the enemy sustained any loss. A private of Capt. Sherwood’s company was the only one who was slightly wounded – in the thigh. From the many people who came from Bennington, they agree that the number of the enemy [there] amounted to 1800. I will be particularly careful, on my approach to that place, to be fully informed of their strength and situation and take the precautions necessary . . .

I cannot ascertain the number of cattle, carts, and waggons taken here, as they have not been yet collected. A few horses have also been brought in, but I am sorry to acquaint your Excellency that the savages either destroy or drive away what is not paid for with ready money. If your Excellency would allow me to purchase the horses from the savages, stipulating the price, I think they might be procured cheap. Otherwise they ruin all they meet with, their officers and interpreters not having it in their power to control them. Our Excellency may depend on hearing how I proceed at Bennington, and of my success there. Praying my most respectful compliments to Gen. Reidesel,

I am most respectfully, Sir,

Your most obedient and humble servant,

F. Baume

The next morning, 14 August, Baum continued his march toward Bennington on which he followed going straight south until it turned into an easterly direction running parallel to the Walloomsac River (Figure 16). As he approached the bridge over the Little White Creek near Stephen Van Rensselaer’s Mill (Sancoick Mill) he received fire.

4.4 The Engagement on 14 August at the Van Rensselaer Mill

Having been warned on 13 August of Indians in the vicinity of Cambridge, General John Stark, who had moved with his forces on 9 August from Bennington to an encampment near the home of Colonel Samuel Herrick close to the Vermont/New York state line, dispatched Lieutenant-Colonel William Gregg with a detachment of about 200 men of his New Hampshire militia regiment to Rensselaer Mill in Sancoick.

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110 John Burgoyne, A State of the Expedition from Canada: as laid before the House of Commons, by Lieutenant-General Burgoyne, and verified by Evidence, With a collection of authentic Documents, ... Written and collected by himself, and dedicated to the Officers of the Army he commanded 2d ed., (London: J. Almon, 1780), pp. lxix-lxx.

111 Stephen van Rensselaer, owner of the mill, was born on 1 November 1764 (died 1839) and thus too young to run the mill operation. In 1777 it was probably run by David van Rensselaer (1749-1798). William Boutelle who was stationed there after 23 August described it as “Major Ranclur’s” mill. David van Rensselaer served as a major in the militia. Michael P. Gabriel, “A Revolutionary Relic: Bennington Battle soldier’s diary” Walloomsack Review vol. 17 (Spring 2016), pp. 22-31, p. 26. Gabriel suggests Lt.-Col. John van Rensselaer as being in charge of the mill. Ibid. p. 23.
where they took position in the evening.\textsuperscript{112} Later that day Stark received additional information that 1,500 Hessians and Tories had reached Cambridge about 12 miles northwest of Bennington and prepared to come to the aid of Gregg. When Baum’s forces encountered Gregg’s militia early on 14 August a brief skirmish ensued which ended when the New Hampshire militia withdrew after a single volley. As they retreated the militia broke down the bridge. The need to repair the damage caused a delay in Baum’s advance allowing Gregg’s men to join up with Stark. Stark had left Bennington in the morning of 14 August and had reached the Walloomsac with the rest of his forces. Stark offered battle but Baum declined and took a position overlooking the river. That same night Stark ordered Colonel Seth Warner, encamped in Manchester, to march with his brigade at once to Bennington, a distance of over 20 miles (Figures 17 and 18).

William Gilmore fought in the 14 August skirmish. On 13 August, he “went to Bennington and there volunteered and fell into Captain Isaac Clarks company of that place – that there was not much ceremony about the organization of the volunteers – that he with said company marched that afternoon back to Cambridge and encamped in the woods that night about two miles from the camp of Col Baum – The next day they retreated before the enemy to or near to the Bennington battle ground and there met general Stark with his forces.”\textsuperscript{113}

After the skirmish with Gregg at Sancoick Mill, Baum wrote his third letter to Burgoyne:

\begin{quote}
Sancoick, 14th August, 1777. 9 o’clock.

Sir,

I have the honor to inform your Excellency that I arrived here at 9 in the morning, having had intelligence of a party of the enemy being in possession of a mill, which they abandoned at our approach, but in their usual way fired from the bushes and took their road to Bennington. A savage was slightly wounded. They broke down the bridges which has slightly retarded our march about an hour. They left in the mill about 78 barrels of very fine flour, 1000 bushels of wheat, 20 barrels of salt, and about 1000 heirlooms worth of pot and pearl ashes. I have ordered 30 provincials and an officer to guard the provision and the pass of the bridge. By 4 prisoners taken here, they agree that 1500 to 1800 men are in Bennington, but are supposed to leave it on our approach. I will proceed so far today as to fall on the enemy tomorrow early, and make such disposition as I think necessary from the intelligence I may receive. People are flocking in hourly, but want to be armed. The savages cannot be controuled. They ruin and take everything they please. I am – Your Excellency’s most obedient and humble servant, F. Baume\textsuperscript{114}
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{113} Pension Application of William Gilmore, S 8571.

\textsuperscript{114} Benson J. Lossing, Pictorial Field Book of the American Revolution 2 vols. (New York, 1851), vol. 1, Drawing of Stephen Van Rensselaer’s Mill.
Figure removed in accordance with the Archaeological Resources Protection Act.
Figure 18. Drawing of Stephen Van Rensselaer’s Mill. from Benson J. Lossing, *Pictorial Field Book of the American Revolution* (Lossing 1851:391).
Sancoick “before the dark days of the revolutionary war is said to have contained a grist mill, saw mill, a pot ashery, a tavern, a meeting house and a number of farm houses.”  

Julius Wasmus recorded in his journal for 14 August 1777:

We set out at 5 o’clock this morning, reached the parish of Sancoick at 7 o’clock and made a rendezvous near a beautiful house, which the owner had left this very morning. There was little household furniture left in the house but what there was was being destroyed by Savages. These also discovered a beautiful Engl. Clock, several Portuguese [coins] and guineas in a chest. The owner of this house, son of a Dutchman by birth, is called Van Rensselaer. He had a gristmill with a sluice near his house. The mill was full of flour and the floor full of wheat and rye; we also found several barrels of salt here. Our tetes [advanced parties] had driven off the Rebels detachment that was standing in front of the bridge. Thereby one of the Savages was wounded, whom I had to bandage on orders of our commander. At this house, the enemy had just slaughtered an ox; it had not yet been completely skinned. We set out again and marched across the bridge at the mill; at the houses we were passing, we came across some more horses, which we took along.

Following the encounter at the mill and bridge over the Walloomscoick, Baum placed a small contingent to guard the mill and bridge and continued his march on toward Bennington. Upon reaching the Walloomsac River on today’s he encountered Stark’s New Hampshire troops. Knowing that he was in a difficult situation he chose ground to the left of the road to set up a defensive position and to await reinforcements from Burgoyne. He established a position overlooking the Walloomsac River and sent detachments to occupied the high hill north of the river. His baggage train moved about half-way up the hill (Figure 19). Stark retired about a mile toward Bennington and prepared for battle the next day.

In the evening of 15 August Baum wrote his fourth and final letter to Burgoyne:

Sir,

I had the honour of writing to your excellency, and to General Fraser, this morning at four o’clock acquainting you to the disposition I had made, as well as the situation of the enemy, to which I take the liberty of referring; since when I received intelligence from two men who lived on the spot the enemy occupy, it is a strong post which commands a long defile on the road to Bennington: those men declare to have seen yesterday 300 men, who were retreating as my corps advanced, when they were reinforced by 800 men from Bennington. They likewise report we were not a mile distance from the 300 men, when they met with this reinforcement; they mention that all the militia they could

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115 A. J. Weise, History of the seventeen towns of Rensselaer County (Troy, 1880), p. 79. “The mill in which this letter was written is still standing, it is said, and that on one of the timbers of the structure there is to be seen the inscription ‘A.D. 1776,’ the supposed date of the erection of the building.” Ibid., p. 80.

116 Wasmus, p.69.
Figure removed in accordance with the Archaeological Resources Protection Act.

Figure 19.

Figure 20. Detail showing the misnamed "Hessian" (aka Dragoon or German) Redoubt position, from Desmaretz Durnford, “Position of the detachment under Lieut't Col. Baum & attacks of the enemy on the 16th August at Walmscock near Benington, 1777.” [1777] Library of Congress https://lccn.loc.gov/gm71000658
get together were at Bennington, and that they expected more to come in, having sent about an hundred miles round for that purpose; many refuse to take arms, wishing to reap their corn and secure their harvest; the inhabitants come in very fast, but want arms. Those accounts have been confirmed by faithful inhabitants sent by Colonel Skene, who he sent to Bennington, and who fortunately returned.

Your excellency desires to know whether the road is practicable for a large corps with cannon? In consequence I have the satisfaction to inform your excellency that it is good, excepting two or three places which might be rendered equally so by felling a few trees and filling up some holes, which from the constant rain probably have been made worse.

I should be happy to fulfill your excellency’s wish as it is a desirable circumstance to be in possession of Bennington; but as the enemy have collected their force, and from their countenance must have had intelligence of ours, would not think it advisable to risk a repulse, but have secured my post as advantageously as possible; the enemy think Bennington their only resource, as the country around depends on its fate, I therefore will wait your excellency’s instructions.

I have read your excellency’s orders, relative to the cattle, carts, wagons, flour, wheat, &c. to Colonel Skene; he is so good as to take this department to himself; and to his honour, has been very active and zealous on this head and in every other respect equally so.

I have communicated to the gentleman commanding the Canadians and Savages, your desire relative to the horses, which they will take particular care to comply with. I have the hounour to be most respectfully, your excellency’s most obedient and humble servant,

F. Baum

This instant I received a note from Sir Francis, acquainting me that your excellency has been so good to order Lieutenant Colonel Brieman’s corps to join.

Mr. Forster [Pfister], with about ninety volunteers have come in armed, except about thirty; this gentleman is from Hosak.

I beg to repeat your excellency that the Canadians and Savages want ammunition; and the other volunteers equally want arms.

The enemy have attempted to force our advanced post, but were repulsed on the firing the cannon; and at times are throwing up some works about half of a mile.117

On 15 August, Burgoyne, who had moved his forces to Fort Miller on 14 August, received Baum’s dispatch of 14 August from Sancoick “that 1500 to 1800 men [American militia] are in Bennington, but are supposed to leave it on our approach.” Though the influx of Loyalists had increased Baum’s command to approximately 1,100 to 1,200, Burgoyne decided to send an additional 650 troops and two 6-pound cannons. This detachment, under the command of Brunswick Lieutenant-Colonel Heinrich Christoph


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Breymann left Fort Miller on 15 August on the same route Baum had taken but the heavy rain greatly slowed down its march.

4.5 Enhancing Positions on 15 August

When Baum set out from Fort Miller on 11 August neither he nor Burgoyne were aware of the American forces assembled at Bennington. Following the fall of Fort Ticonderoga on 6 July, the Vermont Council of Safety on 15 July called on its neighbors in Massachusetts and New Hampshire for military assistance. On 18 July, Stark informed the Council of New Hampshire that there were about 3,000 enemy troops at Castleton and asked for militia. That same day, New Hampshire authorized levying three regiments of militia under Stark who however agreed to serve only under the authorization and command of the New Hampshire legislature and not as a member of the Continental Army. The next day Stark received his orders and rode to Fort No. 4, modern-day Charleston, where he set up his headquarters. Stark’s reputation was such that militia volunteers flocked to his standard by the hundreds: the first groups began to gather on 24 July and eventually they would add up to some 1,500 men, or 10 percent of the men enrolled in the New Hampshire militia.118 Once he had completed his preparations, Stark dispatched two companies to Cavendish in Vermont to guard the road to Crown Point and placed another company in Charleston. He retained about 1,100 men under his command. On 3 August, Stark left with 300 men to join Warner in Manchester whom he had already sent 250 men on 28 July and another 500 on 30 July. Following the Battle of Hubbardton on 7 July 1777, Colonel Seth Warner’s brigade consisted of his regiment, i.e. the Extra-Continental Regiment known as the Green Mountain Boys with Captain Thomas Lee’s Independent Ranger Company annexed to it,119 William Williams’ Vermont Militia, Captain Benjamin Whitcomb’s Independent companies of Rangers120 and militia from eastern Vermont from Colonel Joseph Marsh’s regiment. Also present at the meeting on 7 August were William Williams of the Vermont militia and General Benjamin Lincoln, who had been sent to New York to organize the militias. In what must have been a terse meeting Stark repeated his refusal to serve under Continental Army rules and to take orders from anyone other than the New Hampshire legislature. Lincoln was diplomat enough not to insist on rank and his instructions from Congress: the military situation was fraught with too much danger to risk a rift in the defense against Burgoyne.121 The next day, Stark with advance elements of his brigade began arriving in Bennington, a community of some 600 inhabitants.

118 Gabriel, Bennington, p. 20. In Candia 25 percent of the males required to serve in the militia joined Stark’s command, in Salisbury the numbers went as high as 36 percent.
119 The Green Mountain Boys, First and Second Canadian (Congresses’ Own) regiments and the German Battalion were the only units in the Continental Army directly under Congress.
121 On 4 October 1777, Congress passed a resolution thanking Stark and his officers and men for their service at Bennington and appointed him a Brigadier General in the Continental Army.
As Baum’s forces approached Bennington, the Massachusetts General Court on 9 August 1777, the same day Stark established his headquarters at Bennington, called out the militia from all counties for a three months’ term to defend the state. Only the militia in the southeastern part of the state was excluded since it was needed for service in Rhode Island. In addition, militia was also called out from York County in Maine (part of Massachusetts until 1820). As Massachusetts militia from Berkshire and Worcester counties joined him Stark’s troop strength rose to over 2,000 men. Concurrently the influx of loyalists had increased Baum’s numbers from around 750 to over 1,100.

4.6 AMERICAN REINFORCEMENTS AND RECONNOITERING

Stark had lined up his forces for an attack on 15 August but the rain made any large-scale combat activity impossible and he instead had to content himself with probing Baum’s lines and harassing his forces. Jacob Safford of Colonel Dyke’s Massachusetts Militia regiment, deposed in his pension application that “…he marched through Northampton to Bennington Vermont and remained there for a few days and was ordered to march to Stillwater N.Y. and after marching a few miles news was received that Col. Baum had been ordered to march to Bennington to destroy the Stores at that place and the troops returned to Bennington same night – This was on Thursday 14th August – On Friday [15 August], Gen Starks came to Capt. Joslyn and requested him to march his company down and fire upon Col Baum and draw him out if he could – the company marched and a part of them halted before they were near enough to fire on the enemy and a part went and fired, but could not draw them out – and we retired again to Bennington.” All day long American sharpshooters fired at Royal forces careless enough to expose themselves to enemy fire.

Baum, who knew that an attack was imminent, used the rain-delay on 15 August to strengthen and enhance his positions. From the top of the hill facing northwest the hillslope slopes down gently and lends itself much more to an assault than the southeast side toward the Walloomsac, which is much steeper. Here Baum built a strong redoubt ”...composed wholly of the trunks and branches of trees which were cut on the spot and rudely put together." This redoubt was defended by his dragoons and the rangers as well as one of his 3-lb cannon (Figure 20). His baggage remained just off the road he had taken and was under the guard of his grenadiers and Tories. The Indians reportedly encamped “in the woods on the hills to the read (west) of the Hessians [sic].”

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122 The composition of the militia, who these men were, why they fought &c based on a sample of 372 soldiers is analyzed in Michael P. Gabriel, “We were at the Bennington Battle” Walloomsack Review vol. 4 (September 2010) pp. 39-46.
123 Pension application of Jacob Safford, S 46071.
124 Jared Sparks Journal, visit to Bennington 13-14 October, 1826. Ms Sparks 141 e, Houghton Reading Room, Harvard University Library, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Sparks interviewed Judge Henry of Bennington, who was fifteen years old at the time of the battle, and Governor Gilasha. Henry's recollection of the battle was strong, and he had often traversed the grounds with other veterans.
At the edge of the steep hill just off the road just north of the bridge he ordered another larger redoubt built and two smaller ones on either side of the bridge across the river (Figure 21). The larger redoubt at the edge of the hill held Baum’s other 3-lb cannon and was defended by his grenadiers. Described in 1826, the artillery position was more than four hundred yards from the hilltop fortification "... on an elevated and commanding point near the foot of the hill where it could act upon the bridge below, and up the valley on the opposite side of the creek." The smaller fortifications defending the bridge were manned by his Rangers and Canadians, who also occupied the outlying buildings on the road from Bennington.

Lastly, Baum ordered a fifth protective earth-work re-enforced with logs to be built across the river on the summit of a small hill (Figure 22). In this position, more than a half-mile southeast of Baum's redoubt, he posted the Loyalist troops commanded by Colonel Francis Pfister. Pfister constructed a "... wooden breastwork on a portion of land, somewhat elevated above the bend of the creek, but much less so than the Hessian [sic] encampment." The position was "precipitous in their rear, but a little ascending in their front and right flank." This breastwork has come to be known as the Tory Redoubt since it was defended by Loyalists.

Baum had laid out his defensive positions in a clear and professional manner. He had placed a small force on either side of the access route from Bennington and a stronger fortification with artillery to protect the bridge across the Walloomsac. He had placed an earthwork, the Tory Redoubt, onto the height across the river to defend against enemy forces coming across the plain. He had located his command post in a central location near the bridge, and on the highest point he erected a log breastwork (the misnamed "Hessian Redoubt") to defend the gentle slope which attackers would use to gain the hilltop. But it still was a weak position. His perimeter was huge: more than a mile from the hilltop to the Tory Redoubt, and a half-mile to the bridge. The manpower available to him was not only much too small to defend such a large area, it was also unreliable. Baum did not trust the Indians to fight vigorously against an attack and the events of 16 August proved him correct: once it became obvious that the battle was lost they disappeared into the forest. If Sparks' 1826 mapping is correct, the Indian encampment area was situated in the direct path of the assaulting columns of Herrick and Nichols. Baum's Canadians and Tories proved equally unreliable and quickly folded once Stark’s frontal assault on the Tory Redoubt began. Furthermore, unlike many of the militia facing him, Baum was thoroughly unfamiliar with the surrounding countryside; he could neither anticipate nor prepare for the plan of attack Stark had laid out for 16 August. Lastly, Baum had provided his opponent with a huge intelligence advantage. Throughout the day Americans had entered his encampment claiming to be Loyalists seeking the protection of the Crown (and if possible some arms to go along with it). When they departed they carried a piece of paper with the word “Protection” written on it on their hats and intimate knowledge of the strength and condition of Baum’s forces and of his defensive preparations. A fair number of the men seeking protection were spies working for Stark, and it did not take long before this information reached the New Hampshire general.127

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125 Jared Sparks Journal, visit to Bennington 13-14 October, 1826. Ms Sparks 141e, Houghton Reading Room, Harvard University Library, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
126 Sparks Journal, visit to Bennington 13-14 October, 1826. Ms Sparks 141e, Houghton Reading Room, Harvard University Library, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
127 Gabriel, Soldiers and Civilians, p. 48.
Figure 21. Detail showing the Walloomsac River positions, from Desmaretz Durnford, “Position of the detachment under Lieut' Col. Baum & attacks of the enemy on the 16th August at Walmscock near Benington, 1777.” [1777] Library of Congress https://lccn.loc.gov/gm71000658

Figure 22. Detail showing the Tory Redoubt position, from Desmaretz Durnford, “Position of the detachment under Lieut' Col. Baum & attacks of the enemy on the 16th August at Walmscock near Benington, 1777.” [1777] Library of Congress https://lccn.loc.gov/gm71000658
During the evening of 15 August while Baum and his men settled in for an uneasy night and throughout 16 August, Vermont militia and Berkshire County Massachusetts militia arrived at Stark’s camp, increasing the advantage of the American troops to about 2 to 1. Men arrived in organized units of various sizes, in groups or even as individuals and were integrated into existing units that organized themselves around officers the men had elected, sometimes they simply joined units, especially if an acquaintance already served in that unit. Having heard of Baum’s march on Bennington, William Gilmore who was living in White Creek, New York, less than 10 miles north of Walloomsac, but considered himself part of the New Hampshire militia, on 13 August 1777, “went to Bennington and there volunteered and fell into Captain Isaac Clarks company of that place – that there was not much ceremony about the organization of the volunteers – that he with said company marched that afternoon back to Cambridge and encamped in the woods that night about two miles from the camp of Col Baum – The next day they retreated before the enemy to or near to the Bennington battle ground and there met general Stark with his forces. That on the [15 August] they were all drawn out and formed for action but there came on a rain and the attack was deferred to the sixteenth.”¹²⁸ Fourteen-year-old John Ralston stated in his pension application that “Soon after the detachment to which deponent belonged joined the Vermont Militia within the hour the battle commenced between the British & Americans & deponent was engaged in the Same. The British were defeated & many of them taken prisoners.”¹²⁹

Additional supplies were ordered as well. On 15 August, the Council of Safety in Bennington sent out a circular to all local authorities in surrounding communities asking them to forward lead for bullets:

“Sir -

You are hereby desired to forward to this place, by express, all the lead you can possibly collect in your vicinity; as it is expected, every minute, an action will commence between our troops and the enemies', within four or five miles of this place, and the lead will be positively wanted.

By order of Council, PAUL SPOONER, D. Sec’y”

A similarly request went to

“The Chairman of the Committee of Safety, Williamstown.

The same request sent to the Chairman of the Committee, Lanesboro, the same date sent by Jedediah Reed, Paulett.

Madam—Please to send by the bearer, Jedediah Reed, 6 or 7 lbs. of lead, by Col. Simonds' order.

By order of Council, PAUL SPOONER, D. Sec’y”¹³⁰

¹²⁸ Pension Application of William Gilmore, S 8571
¹²⁹ Pension Application of John Ralston, R 8568. Ralston was born on 27 November 1762
¹³⁰ Slade, Vermont State Papers, p. 197. These are also the earliest surviving entries of the journal of the Council of Safety.
As Stark ordered Warner with the Green Mountain Boys to join him from Manchester, the New Hampshire Council of Safety recalled Colonel Cushen’s Militia Regiment from Gates’ army near Saratoga to strengthen the defensive line around Bennington. Alexander Watson was called out “about the tenth of July” and marched via Bennington to:

Halfmoon now Waterford in the county of Saratoga and State of New York where the regiment encamped for about two weeks when said regiment was ordered back to Bennington aforesaid in said state of Vermont to assist in stopping the progress of colonel Baum whom General Burgoyne had detached from his army at Batten Kill with a strong corps against the said town of Bennington where the Americans had depots of provisions and other munitions of War for the use of the northern army opposed to the British army under said general Burgoyne. That the said regiment marched from Halfmoon aforesaid for Bennington aforesaid which latter place it reached just after the defeat of the said colonel Baum and the capture of his corps.131

The militiamen’s equipment was as varied as their ages and backgrounds. An anonymous eyewitness to the departure of Captain Stephen Parker’s company, called out on 18 July from New Ipswich, remembered the scene:

To a man, they wore small-clothes, coming down and fastening just below the knee, and long stockings with cowhide shoes ornamented by large buckles, while not a pair of boots graced the company. The coats and waistcoats were loose and of huge dimensions, with colours [sic] as various as the barks of oak, sumac and other trees of our hills and swamps, could make them, and their shirts were all made of flax, and like every other part of the dress, were homespun. On their heads was worn a large round top and broad brimmed hat. Their arms were as various as their costume; here a soldier carried a heavy Queen’s Arm, with which he had done service at the conquest of Canada twenty years previous, while by his side walked a stripling boy with a Spanish fuzee not half its weight or caliber, which his grandfather may have taken at the [siege] of Havanna, while not a few had old French pieces that dated back to the reduction of Louisburg. Instead of the cartridge box, a large powder horn was slung under the arm, and occasionally a bayonet might be seen bristling in the ranks. Some of the swords of our officers had been made by our Province blacksmiths, perhaps from some farming utensil; they looked servicable but heavy and uncouth. Such was the appearance of the Contientals [militia] to whom a well-appointed army was soon to lay down their arms.

After a little exercise on the old Common, and performing the then popular exploit of “whipping the snake,” they briskly filed off up the road, by the foot of the Kidder Mountain, and through the Spafford Gap toward Peterboro’, to the tune of Over the Hills and Far Away.132

131 Pension application of Alexander Watson, S 23472. Born 4 November 1760, Watson served his first militia tour as a 15-year-old in Southbury on 1 July 1776, fought in the Battle of White Plains and was three months shy of his 17th birthday when he fights in the Battle of Bennington.

On 16 August, this odd assortment of men was ready to instead “whip the Hessians” and their Loyalist friends.
5. **FIRST PHASE OF THE BATTLE**

5.1 **KOCOA CONSIDERATIONS**

“Understanding the historic terrain of a battlefield as it was at the time of the action is critical to the understanding of any battle”. KOCOA analyses are temporary, albeit seminal events fought on cultural landscapes that had a variety of cultural actions – transportation routes, agricultural development, settlement patterns, population change – already occurring before the battle, and that continued to exert influences on the field after the battle. Field patterns and farmlands were changed and subsequently are replaced by subdivisions or industry, road are altered, vacated, rerouted or widened, and woodlands are reduced or removed from the landscape.

Military-historical research is integral to the battlefield interpretive process developed by the American Battlefield Protection Program, in which surveyors apply the precepts of KOCOA military terrain analysis. The KOCOA acronym stands for the analytical concepts of Key Terrain/Decisive Terrain, Observation and Fields of Fire, Cover and Concealment, Obstacles, and Avenues of Approach and Withdrawal. KOCOA elements were defined using a variety of sources including historical documentation, previous battlefield surveys, maps, and the extant natural landscape. The interpretation of these features was conducted using the quantitative capabilities of the GIS in conjunction with the knowledge of team historians and other experts.

With reference to a given battle location, analysis of these aspects of military movement, position and combat as they apply to that land area combines documentary research and field survey, and enables identification of the battlefield’s **Defining Features** and thus its appropriate boundary. The research examines and analyzes primary sources for the battle such as participants’ letters, journals, and memoirs, and early post-battle accounts based on direct experience of the terrain, to discern locational references for KOCOA elements. The KOCOA process, and the supporting research, is directly applicable to archaeological investigation at battle locations, providing documentation for the military actions that took place at those locations.

The KOCOA analysis is applied to all ABPP projects. KOCOA terrain analysis is applied to the study of historic battlefields to help identify the historic battlefield in the modern landscape in order to understand the course of a military engagement and how a given landscape influenced the course of a battle.

As stated above, the acronym KOCOA stands for: Key Terrain, Observation and Fields of Fire, Cover and Concealment, Obstacles, Avenues of Approach. These terms form the foundation for military terrain

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analyses to describe the layout of a battlefield environment and to analyze the significance of the terrain. Terrain features, be they manmade such as roads or buildings or natural such as ridges or forests, mean different things to different people. A painter looks at forests, hills, waterways or meadows for their artistic value. A farmer considers them with a view toward producing foodstuffs or generating income. A soldier looks at them for their military value, how he could integrate them into offensive or defensive positions, how they fit into his plans for offensive or defensive action. This is not only important for understanding why a commander would (or would not) position infantry or artillery or cavalry at a certain place on the terrain at a certain point during the engagement (why faulty positioning would occasionally have disastrous consequences), but also helps to interpret the authenticity of battlefield maps. Furthermore, evaluation of terrain from a military point of view can help to provide reasonable explanations to "fill in" gaps in our knowledge of events caused by a scarcity of primary sources, e.g., in the case of troop movements. "Military usage" of terrain would demand that forces be re-deployed under cover of ridges or through low-lying ravines outside the view of the enemy. Similarly depending on the task assigned to a force during any stage of the engagement, troops might be redeployed via a causeway or road if speed is of the essence or through a forest or circuitously if the element of surprise is paramount. Taking these, and similar military aspects into consideration, the terrain becomes an integral part of the reconstruction of a battle as the stage on which the action unfolds. All of these factors must be analyzed in light of the mission of the unit, the type of operation, the level of command, the composition of forces involved, and the weapons and equipment expected to be encountered.

To understand and interpret actions on a battlefield, a detailed familiarity with the topography and conditions on the ground, and a critical reading of a wide range of primary sources must be combined with a military analysis of the battlefield. We also applied the principle of "Inherent Military Probability" to the study of the two phases of the Battle of Bennington. As initially developed by the German military historian Hans Delbrück and further refined by British historian Alfred H. Burne, this principle holds that when accounts of a particular battle are found to be impossible given the constraints of terrain, timing, and other factors, the researcher needs to consider what a soldier of the period was likely to have done in the circumstances. It is also important for the researcher to understand relevant historical military practices which were in force at the time of the engagement, so that, as English archeologist Glenn Foard suggests, the principle should be termed Inherent Historical Military Probability. The manuals available at the time of the American War of Independence provide specifics regarding the spacing between and among formations, rates of marching, and the specific methods applied to deploy companies, battalions, and other maneuvering or firing formations. These manuals provide a framework of the “limits of the possible” that governed the actions of commanders in the field, keeping in mind that variations to the manuals were always

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139 Foard, p. 141.
possible, and most likely probable, given opportunities arising from such factors as terrain, visibility, and other battlefield conditions. Indeed, as one scholar put it, “Soldiers, not manuals, fight and win battles”.

The KOCOA process is founded on the principle that terrain has a direct impact on selecting objectives, the location, movement, and control of forces, on the effectiveness of weapons and other systems, and defensive measures. In the following section of this report, each of the key defining features is presented, along with their relevance to the battle, their KOCOA analysis, and their location/status. A critical tenant of KOCOA analyses is that multiple analytical concepts may apply to a single defining feature of the battlefield.

5.1.1. Key or Decisive Terrain

Some terrain features (natural or manmade) which, if controlled, will give a marked advantage to whoever controls them. Often Key Terrain is selected for use as battle line positions or battle objectives. Key Terrain is echelon of command-, mission-, enemy-, and situation-dependent.

To designate terrain as decisive is to recognize that the mission depends on seizing or retaining it. Key or decisive terrain must be controlled, not necessarily occupied. It may be controlled by either fire or maneuver. At Bennington, for example, the bridge over the Walloomsac River provided access to the opposite shore without requiring an assault crossing.

5.1.2. Observation and Fields of Fire

The evaluation of observation and fields of fire allows you to, 1) Identify potential engagement areas; 2) Identify defensible terrain and weapons system positions; and 3) Identify where maneuvering forces are most vulnerable to observation and fires.

Observation

Observation is the ability to see over a particular area to acquire targets. It is the ability to see friendly and enemy forces and key aspects of the terrain in order to judge strength, prevent surprise, and respond to threats. Examples include fortifications sited on high points with a cleared field of fire, and lookout towers. Some of the variables that can have an effect on observation are topography, vegetation, urban development, and the effects of the battle on conditions.

"Visibility" is weather-dependent or is a temporary phenomenon. Observation, on the other hand, is terrain dependent and is relatively permanent. Generally, the best observation is obtained from the highest terrain in an area.

Fields of Fire

Fields of Fire are the area(s) that weapons can cover effectively from a given point. Fires can be of two basic types; 1) Direct fire weapons like rifles, muskets and cannon which require direct line of sight to their targets; and 2) Indirect fire weapons such as mortars and some artillery.

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Observation and fields of fire are not the same. A soldier may be able to see 25 kilometers, but if they are armed with a rifle only, then their field of fire will be limited to less than 500 meters. A unit’s field of fire is directly related to Observation. Examples include open land with a clear view within the firing range of available weaponry. The field of fire is related to emplacement suitability, lines of fire for direct-fire weapons, lines of fire for mortar, and the ranges of the weaponry employed.

Generally in warfare during the eighteenth century, fields of fire were areas with a direct line of sight that weapons were able to cover/fire upon effectively from a given position. Some weapons, such as howitzers and mortars, could be used without a direct line of sight, but most often a direct line of sight was required in the era of the American Revolution. At the Battle of Bennington, direct line of sight was the norm. Dead Space is the land within range of weapons that cannot be observed or fired upon.

5.1.3. Cover and Concealment

Cover

Cover is the protection provided from the effects of direct- and/or indirect-fire weapons. Examples include ditches, river banks, buildings, walls, and entrenchments.

Concealment

Concealment provides protection from observation. Common forms of terrain-based concealment include: forests, dense vegetation, built-up areas, ravines, and reverse slopes.

Remember that cover can be used to protect a force from the effects of direct and indirect fires. Also, it can, in some cases, be used to protect a force from observation. Cover can be used as concealment but cover and concealment do not always equate.

Though commonly associated with surprise attacks, concealment is not exclusively used for attack. It is frequently used to hide, maneuver, and redeploy forces without the enemy’s knowledge. Defending forces will attempt to limit concealment and cover available to the attacking force.

Defending forces seek to defend in an area which offers both concealment and cover to themselves but which does not provide covered approaches for the threat.

Concealment is protection from enemy observation and surveillance, including features that protect both horizontally and vertically. Examples include forests, ravines, dense vegetation, and reverse slopes.

5.1.4. Obstacles

Obstacles are natural or manmade terrain features that prevent, restrict, divert, or delay military movement. There are two categories of obstacles: existing and reinforcing. The presence and difficulty of obstacles determine whether terrain is unrestricted, restricted, or severely restricted. Examples include vegetation, topography, fences, stone walls, fortification features such as parapets and ditches, battle events, urban areas, drainage characteristics (natural and man-made), micro-relief, surface materials (wet and dry), abatis, ravines, and bluffs. The hindrance level of obstacles can be analyzed as “go,” “slow-go,” or “no-go.”
Existing Obstacles are already present on the battlefield. Natural examples include swamps, woods, and rivers. Cultural examples include towns, railroads, bridges, and fences.

Reinforcing Obstacles are placed on the battlefield through military effort to slow, stop, or control.

5.1.5. Avenues of Approach (AoA)

An AoA is a ground route of an attacking force of a given size leading to its objective or to key terrain in its path. AoA also takes into consideration the avenues of withdrawal used by a force to exit the battlefield.

5.2 KOCOA Analysis of the First Phase of the Battle of Bennington

Applied to the Battle of Bennington on 16 August 1777 and based on the 1989 landscape study by Philip Lord the KOCOA analysis identified these seven defining features of the battlefield of the First Phase of the Battle of Bennington (Table 4; Figure 23). Each of the defining features is described below. The archeological data that formed the basis for our interpretation are presented in Appendix A.

Table 4. Defining Features of the Bennington Battlefield – First Phase

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Defining Feature</th>
<th>Battle Phase</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Sancoick Mill bridge</td>
<td>Prelude</td>
<td>Key terrain, choke point on avenues of advance and withdrawal. Walloomsac River (1a) is an associated obstacle. Because of the obstacle and lack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Final retreat from 2nd Phase</td>
<td>of alternate bridges nearby, terrain is considered severely restricted at this location.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Knoll ESE of Tory Redoubt</td>
<td>Prelude</td>
<td>Key terrain, vital for providing observation for Rebels during planning of attacks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1st Phase</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Tory Redoubt ridge</td>
<td>1st Phase</td>
<td>Key terrain. Wrongly thought to provide Tories observation and concealment. In reality, observation was fatally limited, and concealment was rendered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>non-existent when position flanked.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Bridgehead</td>
<td>1st Phase</td>
<td>Key terrain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Walloomsac River Ford</td>
<td>1st Phase</td>
<td>Became avenue of withdrawal (Tories) and avenue of advance (Rebels). Once retreating Tories</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 5. First Battle

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Defining Feature</th>
<th>Battle Phase</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>revealed location, Rebels had yet another front to advance on the river bottoms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) &quot;Hessian&quot; Redoubt (hereafter German) hill top (6a), slopes (6b), and saddle (6c)</td>
<td>1(^{st}) Phase</td>
<td>Key terrain. Strong values for observation. Failure to adequately clear field of fire created extensive dead space. Woods provided concealment and cover to Rebels, and redoubt provided concealment and cover to Rebels. Slopes defined avenues of approach and funneled Rebels into saddle. No suitable avenue of withdrawal for artillery and baggage train once redoubt fell.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) Walloomsac River bottoms</td>
<td>1(^{st}) Phase</td>
<td>In heart of battlefield. River and steep slopes were related obstacles. Bridgehead and ford provided avenues of advance. Houses/outbuildings provided very limited dead space and only concealment/cover available for the Rebels.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure removed in accordance with the Archaeological Resources Protection Act.
For the multi-national Royal forces composed of Germans, Canadians, Native Americans, and Loyalists, the mission at the onset of actions near the Bennington Battlefield was to advance to Bennington, Vermont, and capture stores of vital supplies. The Royal forces then were to return with those supplies to the main corps of the Burgoyne campaign. This mission evolved when the Royal forces recognized that there were significant numbers of Rebels willing to block their movement to Bennington. The short-term goal changed from brushing aside the Rebel forces and proceeding to Bennington, to digging in, defending their position, and hopefully inflicting significant losses on the Rebels. Had that been accomplished, Baum’s forces could then return to their original mission.

The Rebels sought first and foremost to prevent the Royal forces from reaching Bennington. As the Rebels surveyed the Royal forces positions on 15 August 1777, it became clear that there might be an opportunity to do more, to inflict significant losses on Baum's command. Stark’s planning, accordingly, was not simply to drive off the Royal forces, but rather to inflict heavy losses and capture significant personnel and equipment.

### 5.2.1 Prelude

On 14 August 1777, the **key terrain** was the Walloomsac River crossing at the Sancoick mill. The Walloomsac River was an **obstacle**, and the bridge was the only effective means of proceeding with wagons and artillery down the road toward Bennington. If the Rebels had controlled the bridge, the Royal forces would have had to find an alternative route. If the Royal forces quickly took the bridge, they were free to continue their advance on the supply depot in Bennington. The fact that the Rebels were able to control the **key terrain** for some time (with small arms fire and the burning of the bridge) had ramifications for both the First and Second Phases of the battle. The delay at the bridge kept the Royal forces from moving to Bennington that day, and allowed for Rebel forces to gather in defense of Bennington. Based on the evidence supplied by the Hiland Hall map (Figure 24), the actual Sancoick Mill was situated on the south side of the Walloomsac River.

The rise east-southeast of the Tory Redoubt was **key terrain** for the Rebels in that it allowed them to gain an overview and topographic understanding of the multi-national Royal forces positions (**observation**). From this rise the Rebels could view the Tory Redoubt (and its weaknesses), the bridgehead, and the so-called "Hessian" Redoubt (more accurately German Redoubt which is the term used herein). Although the archival record does not so specify, it is likely that Stark and his key commanders spent considerable time on this rise on 15 August 1777.

### 5.2.2 First Phase of the Battle

The Tory Redoubt was **key terrain** and a defining feature of the battlefield. The Royal forces wrongly viewed this as a strong position that would serve as one anchor of their defenses. In actuality, the poor lines-of-sight and the misplacement of the redoubt on the landform limited the functionality of the Tory Redoubt in controlling the immediate area. The ridge became **key terrain** for the Rebels when they recognized they could approach virtually unseen on the front (through the corn) and side (through the wooded gully) of the redoubt, to rout the Tories. The landform that was unsuited for defense, became a great location for Rebel attack. In addition, those Tories that fled from the redoubt ridge inadvertently revealed the Walloomsac River ford, which provided the Rebels a second avenue across the river. The Tory Redoubt provided
concealment and cover to the Tories, until the Rebels exited the wooded gully and opened an enfilading, small arms fire. The redoubt, in theory, would also have served as an obstacle to forces attempting a frontal attack (Figure 24).

The bridge was both an avenue of approach and a choke point. The Royal forces would not be able to move their artillery and baggage train toward Bennington if they lost the bridge, nor would they be able to return from Bennington with captured supplies. Early in the first battle, the bridge was seen as the key to advancing Rebel troops across the river, and one of the talons closing on the Royal forces. The bridge provided a fast and easy means of quickly and dryly moving large numbers of troops across the river. The river was not necessarily an obstacle for the movement of single soldiers, but would have slowed considerably mass movements of troops and equipment (until the ford was recognized).

The river bottoms south-southwest of the bridge became critical ground as the Royal Forces were routed on several fronts. The bottoms were central to the battlefield, and in theory should have allowed the Royal forces to shift troops to address developing weaknesses. However, the loss of the Tory Redoubt, the loss of the German Redoubt, and the subsequent loss of the bridgehead and its associated field piece reduced the river bottoms to a highly dynamic rallying point, where the Royal forces made a series of defensive stands anchored on standing buildings, before ultimately fleeing or surrendering. The planned avenue of withdrawal for the Royal forces collapsed when the Rebels came rushing downslope after taking the German Redoubt. The related obstacles were the river and the slopes to the west and north. The Rebels had excellent positions – relative to observation – on the slopes and on the Tory Redoubt ridge. The Royal forces had very minimal cover provided by the few buildings present in the bottoms.

The hill top where the German Redoubt was constructed and its surrounding side slopes were key terrain. If the Royal forces held this landform, they could have repulsed the Rebel attacks and possibly counter-attacked. The elevation provided good views (observation) of the expected main Rebel approach (the bridge), and the steep slope would slow any frontal attack. The redoubt furnished cover and concealment for the Royal forces. However, the failure to clear the woods to the north, northwest, and northeast of the redoubt limited sight lines and the field of fire by providing natural concealment and cover for the Rebels.

The saddle north of the German Redoubt was also key terrain. The terrain allowed the Rebels to advance up the steepest side slopes and into the saddle while still under the cover and concealment of the forest. When it came time to rush the German Redoubt, the Rebels were faced only with relatively gentle slopes and approximately 70 meters of open ground to traverse. The vegetation and contours of the saddle made it relatively easy to charge the redoubt after the first German volley, and to clear the redoubt before the defenders could reload. If the Rebels had tried to attack directly from the east and west of the redoubt (instead of using the saddle to the north) the extreme slopes would have represented obstacles. The presence of the saddle rendered this landscape somewhat restricted rather than severely restricted.

The vegetation and severe slopes of the landform also allowed the Native American warriors to escape the impending Rebel attack. When the Native Americans became aware that the Rebels were closing in from both sides of the saddle, the Native Americans quietly slipped into the dense woods of the side-slopes, making best use of the cover and concealment. Although they likely passed within musket range of
Figure removed in accordance with the Archaeological Resources Protection Act.
certain of the Rebel fighters, the wooded side-slope was a large dead space for all participants. The rainy conditions on 15 August 1777 had provided the Native Americans ample time to reconnoiter the local landscape, and to plan their contingencies.

The slope above the bridge was also an excellent artillery platform providing an unobstructed view of the approaches to the bridge (observation). A limitation of this artillery position was that its effective field of fire using caseshot (or grapeshot) was not sufficient to provide assistance or protection to the Tories. The position was also problematic because retreat was not possible once the German redoubt fell. There was apparently no contingency plan.

The standard map and basis for the interpretation of the Battle of Bennington is Desmaretz Durnford’s, “Position of the detachment under Lieut' Col. Baum & attacks of the enemy on the 16th August at Walmscock near Benington, 1777.” Durnford was a trained engineer and mapmaker as well as a participant in the battle where he was made prisoner. As the fiftieth anniversary of the battle approached, however, Jared Sparks also visited the site of the battle, had local historian Hiland Hall show him the site and draw a battle-map (Figures 25 and 26).

The map carried the note: “Drawn by Mr. Hiland Hall, Bennington Oct 13, 1826 (very accurate) Ground examined by myself at the time. J. Sparks.” It identifies a number of sites crucial for understanding the course of the battle:

No. 1: “Place of commencement of 2d action”
No. 2: “Hill where a stand was attempted”
No. 3: “Americans reinforced by Warner’s regiment”
No. 4: “Cannon posted in first Battle”
No. 5: “Stark’s advance”

A tabulation at the bottom of the map provides distances gives these distances:

From Judge Henry’s to encampment about 1 m

“ Encampment “ place of Baum’s burial about ¾ m
“ place of B.b. “ brick House …………………. ½ m
“ brick House “ first fordway …………………. ½ m
“ first Fordway “ second “ Barnetts ……… ½ m

“ No. 3 …………………………………… ¾ m
“ No. 2 …………………………………… ½ m
“ No. 1 …………………………………… 1 ½ m
Figure 25. Map of the “Battle of Bennington, Aug. 16, 1777” drawn by Hiland Hall for Jared Sparks on 15 October 1826. Library of Congress. https://www.loc.gov/item/gm71005309/

Figure 26. Detail of the map “Battle of Bennington, Aug. 16, 1777” drawn by Hiland Hall for Jared Sparks on 15 October 1826. Library of Congress. https://www.loc.gov/item/gm71005309/
Based on the compilation of distances on Sparks’ map the men under Stark’s immediate command on 14 August 1777 marched that day approximately 8.5 miles from their camp at [redacted] to the encounter with Baum’s forces just past the battlefield of 16 August. From there they retreated about three miles to their camp on [redacted] for a total march of close to 12 miles that day.

Following a day of “rest” in pouring rain on 15 August, the troops on 16 August marched about 5 miles from their encampment before they encountered Breymann’s detachment close to Rensselaer’s Mill, retreated about 2 miles to No. 3 when Warner’s men joined them and drove them back those 2 miles toward Rensselaer’s Mill again. Since they returned to the vicinity of the battlefield after Stark had called off the battle, another 2.5 to 3 miles, Stark’s command marched again around 12 miles that day under a very hot sun, much of that under enemy fire. Herrick’s and Nichols’ detachments marched even greater distances (Figure 27). Note how Herrick’s Rangers departed directly from Stark’s encampment along [redacted] marching due west across even today road-less fields.

Colonel Nichols’ men accompanied Stark for a while before continuing straight north possibly on what is today’s [redacted] going east until its intersection with [redacted] which took them south and into the rear of Baum’s forces (Figure 28).

Stark continued on [redacted] until shortly before the bridge where [redacted] crosses the Walloomsac River where he turned straight west toward the Tory Redoubt (Figures 29, 30 and 31). Note the very different position and orientation of the “Tory breastwork” on Jared’s map as compared with its position on the Durnford map. Sparks’ breastwork faces east while its left flank is in a straight line to the point where [redacted] crosses the Walloomsac River. Durnford’s breastwork is oriented to the southwest and is open toward the bridge.

5.3 ORDER OF BATTLE – AMERICAN FORCES

Establishing firm numbers of participants, or even units, on the American side is almost impossible: men arrived individually, in groups, or in units established ad hoc at their point of departure up to the moment the battle began; some joined even while the battle was in progress. “The total number of Whig soldiers at Bennington remains conjectural and somewhat disputed,” writes Michael P. Gabriel, the most knowledgeable historian of the Battle of Bennington. Based on extensive research Gabriel gives the strength of Stark’s three regiments of New Hampshire militia at 1,460 and strength of the two militia companies from Stark’s regiment sent to Cavendish plus the one company left behind at Fort Number 4 as 157, leaving Stark, once the sick, detached &c are subtracted, with about 1,100 men.142 “Massachusetts militia from Berkshire and Worcester Counties fought at the battle,” Gabriel writes, “but many of their muster rolls are nearly illegible. Furthermore, some companies arrived the day after the battle, thereby

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142 The organizational structure of the New Hampshire militia into two brigades of nine regiments each under Brigadier William Whipple and Brigadier John Stark, respectively, and their deployment in the summer of 1777 during the time of the Battle of Bennington was set by the New Hampshire Committee of Safety on 16 July 1777. New Hampshire State Papers vol. VIII. p. 635.
Figure 27. Aerial image showing the approximate march route for Herrick’s Rangers based on Sparks’ map.
Figure 28. Aerial image showing the approximate march route for Col. Nichols’ detachment based on Sparks’ map.

Figure 29. Aerial image showing the approximate march route for General Stark’s detachment based on Sparks’ map. Adapted from/based on a Google Earth map.
Figure 30. Detail of the map “Battle of Bennington, Aug. 16, 1777” drawn by Hiland Hall for Jared Sparks on 15 October 1826. Library of Congress. https://www.loc.gov/item/gm71005309/

Figure 31. Detail from Desmaretz Durnford, “Position of the detachment under Lieut' Col. Baum & attacks of the enemy on the 16th August at Walmscock near Benington, 1777.” [1777] Library of Congress. https://lccn.loc.gov/gm71000658
making it extremely difficult to determine an exact number. Still, 850 seems to be a reasonable estimate.”143
Also participating in the fight were between 150 and 200 militia from New York whose presence was not reported by Stark in his reports and whose contributions were resurrected primarily through the research of Gabriel who ventures to say that “Perhaps this reflects the traditional tension between ‘Yankees’ and ‘Yorkers.’ More likely, Stark did not know the identity of all the officers and units that descended on the town in response to Baum’s approach.”144

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Formation</th>
<th>Commanding Officer</th>
<th>Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stark’s Division</td>
<td>Brigadier General John Stark</td>
<td>~1,100+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Hampshire Militia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fifth New Hampshire Militia (10 companies)</td>
<td>Colonel Moses Nichols</td>
<td>~ 550-600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eleventh New Hampshire Militia (8 companies)</td>
<td>Colonel Thomas Stickney</td>
<td>~ 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twelfth New Hampshire Militia (4 companies)</td>
<td>Colonel David Hobart</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Langdon’s Company of Light Horse Volunteers145</td>
<td></td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts Militia</td>
<td></td>
<td>~ 850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Berkshire Militia146</td>
<td>Colonel Benjamin Simmonds</td>
<td>~ 250-300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Volunteers147</td>
<td>Colonel Joab/Jacob Stafford</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

143 Gabriel, “Incident”, p. 91, fn2. Mid-afternoon as the beginning of the battle is taken from Gabriel, Soldiers and Civilians, p. 25, though many participants put the starting time before noon.

A bronze sculpture erected in 1932 commemorating the participation of the Berkshire militia “is located in a small town cemetery on Route 8 in Cheshire, MA”. It reads:

THIS BAS-RELIEF, THE ORIGINAL OF WHICH WAS ERECTED ON THE BENNINGTON BATTLEFIELD ON WALLOOMASAC HEIGHTS IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK BY THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, WAS DEDICATED BY EUGENE BUCKLIN BOWEN TO THE MEMORY OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND MORE VOLUNTEER PATRIOTS OF BERKSHIRE COUNTY, ABOUT ONE HUNDRED OF WHOM, UNDER THE COMMAND OF COL. JOAB STAFFORD, COL. SAMUEL LOW AND CAPT. DANIEL BROWN OF CHERSHIRE, PARTICIPATED IN THE BATTLE OF BENNINGTON, AUG 16, 1777; AND TO HIS REVOLUTIONARY WAR ANCESTORS. [...] WASHINGTON BI-CENTENNIAL YEAR, 1932.


145 Langdon’s Company of Light Horse Volunteers was formed on 21 July 1777 at Portsmouth, New Hampshire for service with Stark but as yet unmounted.

146 Most of Colonel Simmonds’ regiment arrived in the morning of 16 August only viz. Ellen M., Emma L. Raynor and Peticlerc, History of the Town of Cheshire, Berkshire County, Mass. (Holyoke: Bryan & Co., 1885), p. 44 provides the names of 22 men in Capt. Samuel Low’s company of Col. Simmond’s regiment from Berkshire County who served from 14 to 19 August at Bennington. Another 22 men from Berkshire incl. their Lieutenant William Ford marched to Bennington on 16 August and served until 23 August. Among them were the “Fighting Parson” Rev. Thomas Allen and Jeffrey Hazard. Another 22 men under Lieutenant James Hubbard left for Bennington on 17 August. History of Pittsfield, pp. 492/93.

On pp. 49-51 Raynor and Peticlerc provide an account of the Battle of Bennington as told by Richard Stafford, son of Joab, who had heard the story from his father. It also includes an account by a loyalist from inside the Tory Redoubt.

147 History of Cheshire p. 206 gives the strength of Col. Joab Stafford Independent Company of Berkshire Volunteers at Bennington as 31 men (p. 206 has their names) but for unknown reasons changed the strength to 41 men on p. 44. The Volunteers marched for Bennington on 14 August where Stafford’s men lead attack on Tory Redoubt.
5. FIRST BATTLE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regiment</th>
<th>Commander</th>
<th>Troops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Worcester County Militia</td>
<td>Colonel Job Cushing</td>
<td>~ 550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vermont Militia</td>
<td></td>
<td>~ 400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herrick’s Rangers (4 companies)</td>
<td>Colonel Samuel Herrick</td>
<td>~ 150-200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vermont Militia</td>
<td>Lt. Colonel Nathaniel Brush</td>
<td>~ 150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vermont Militia</td>
<td>Colonel William Williams</td>
<td>~ 50-100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York Militia</td>
<td></td>
<td>~ 150-200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>~2,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Frank W. Coburn lists the three regiments under Stark when first established: Colonel Hobart’s five companies under Captains Elliot, Handy, Post, Walker and Weber (one of them stationed in Charleston); Colonel Nichols’ ten companies commanded by Captains Bradford, Carlton, Ford Goss, Mack, Parker, Reynolds, Stone, J. Wilson and Wright; and Colonel Stickney’s ten companies under the command of Captains Bayley, Clark, Dearborn, Gilman, Kimball, McConnell, Sias, Taylor, Webster and N. Wilson (two of them detached to Cavendish). All together Stark’s strength was a total of 1,488 men, roughly 1,100 or 1,200 of whom fought in the Battle of Bennington. To this must be added the Massachusetts (Berkshire and Worcester) militia, the Vermont militia and the New Yorkers. The total American strength at the beginning of the Battle of Bennington in mid-afternoon of 16 August 1777 may have reached around 2,100; Philip Lord gives Stark’s final strength at around 2,500.

Though they still appear even in the most recent literature such as Luzader’s otherwise outstanding Saratoga of 2008, Stockbridge Indians did not participate in the battle. The earliest mention of Stockbridge fighting on the side of the Americans dates to the centennial of the battle of Bennington in 1877, where Albert Tyler wrote that “Among the Berkshire troops there was a company of civilized Indians...”

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148 Two of Brush’ companies under Captains Elijah Dewey and Samuel Robinson (77 men) were from Bennington.
149 These numbers are at the upper end of estimates represent a compilation of various sources such [https://jdglasco.files.wordpress.com/2014/05/bennington-aug-1777.pdf](https://jdglasco.files.wordpress.com/2014/05/bennington-aug-1777.pdf) and the bibliography.
151 Gabriel in *Soldiers and Civilians*, p. 24, writes: “By August 15, Stark probably had over two thousand men under his command, with more on the way.”

“As war approached, both the Mahican and Wappinger (now virtually the same tribe) sent wampum belts to other tribes advising neutrality. However, after a meeting with the Patriots at Boston in April, 1774, Captain Hendrick Aupamut changed his mind and decided to throw in with the rebels, and Nimham's Wappinger followed suit. The Stockbridge were one of the few tribes to support the American cause during the war. They participated in the siege of Boston and fought at Bunker Hill that June; saw service at White Plains in 1776; served as scouts for the army of Horatio Gates at Saratoga and fought as a company-sized unit at the Battle of Bennington in 1777; and were at barren Hill in 1778. Nimham was killed at the battle of Kingsbridge in August, 1778. For their service, the Stockbridge received a land grant in Vermont (later sold). Unfortunately, the Stockbridge also paid a terrible price for their patriotism ... the war cost them almost half of their adult male population.”
Stockbridge Indians, who were among the most valuable of Stark’s scouts.”

A few years earlier in 2005, Daniel R. Mandell wrote "While the Indian communities in Bristol and Plymouth counties were relatively small, many of their men served in the American army. From the Dartmouth area in Bristol County came Benjamin Obadiah (who legend tells in 1779 marched many miles to enlist in the patriot army), Peter Pons, John Solomon (one of Dartmouth’s minutemen), and Benjamin and Cain Abel (Ricketson 1848, 381-83; Smith undated). Benjamin Abel served at the Battle of Bennington, and was reported killed on December 30, 1777. The extant enlistment rolls from Plymouth County show a total of nineteen men from eight different towns specifically identified as ‘Indian’ in various recruiting documents.”

Page 381 in Daniel Ricketson’s The history of New Bedford, Bristol County, Massachusetts: including a history of the old township of Dartmouth and the present townships of Westport, Dartmouth, and Fairhaven, from their settlement to the present time (New Bedford, 1858, not: 1848 as in Mandell) gives a list of men from Dartmouth “who served in the Revolutionary army”, among them “Benjamin Abel, (Indian,) 1775.” Since other militiamen are listed as having served for more than one term and/or year this entry indicates that Abel served in 1775 only. It seems questionable to deduce from there that Abel served at Bennington in 1777, especially since the Militia Law in effect in the summer of 1777 explicitly excluded Indians from militia service though an exception seems to have been made for Christian Indians.

Though they had wanted to join the fight, the Stockbridge arrived too late at Bennington. On 26 August 1777, ten days after the battle, Timothy Edwards informed Gates from Stockbridge that

Agreeable to your request by Mr. Kirkland, I convened the Indians of this town on Friday last [i.e. 22 August, which means that the Indians returned to Stockbridge on 21 August, five days after the Battle of Bennington], being the day after their return from Bennington, for which place they set out too late, to reap any of the glory of our late victory there – After four days usual delay, about fourteen or fifteen propose to go with this to wait upon you, and receive your directions – Twelve or fourteen others from this town are in the Continental Army in your Department.

Should you want them for any particular service, Capt. Yukon Motohksin the head of this party, can point out to you the Regiments to which they belong. –

154 Albert Tyler, Bennington: the Battles, 1777. Centennial Celebration, 1877 (Worcester: Tyler & Seagrave, 1878), p. 17: “Among the Berkshire troops there was a company of the civilized Stockbridge Indians, who were among the most valuable of Stark’s scouts.” See also Frank W. Coburn, The Centennial History of the Battle of Bennington; compiled from the most reliable sources, and fully illustrated with original documents and entertaining anecdotes, Col. Seth Warner’s identity in the first action completely established (Boston: George E. Littlefield, 1877) and Henry B. Dawson, “The Battle of Bennington” The Historical Magazine vol. VII 2d series No. 5 (May 1870), pp. 289-305. The story of Stockbridge Indians in the South Berkshire Militia Regiment may have originated in an anecdote of an encounter by a militiaman named Linus Parker from Pittsfield with “Capt. Solomon, a Stockbridge chief” just prior to the battle. J.E.A. Smith, The History of Pittsfield, (Berkshire County,) Massachusetts, from the year 1734 to the year 1800 (Boston: Lee and Shepard, 1869), p. 296.

I presume Capt. Yokon will do well as long as he remains unconnected with Banns (?) — Abraham Nimham (who will join them soon) is viewed as the next. On him you may depend for he forms all such connections yet there is danger of giving offence thereby to the others.

I have furnished them with provisions to carry them to Albany and some ammunition — I am dear Sir with much affection your most hum[ble] Serv[aant]

Timothy Edwards

Gen'l Gates

N.B. Some of these Indians have no arms

There is no doubt that Indians served on the side of the Americans during the summer and fall of 1777; for example, on 19 August 1777 Benjamin Lincoln wrote to General Schuyler from Bennington “of the friendly disposition of the Onida Indians.” The next day, Schuyler informed Washington from Albany that General Arnold “…advises me that some Oneida Indians were waiting his Arrival at the German Flatts, in order to Join him, if the Siege of Fort Schuyler should be raise’d, I hope to be able to produce two or three Hundred Indians to Join the Army.” But those were Oneida, not Stockbridge. The first time we hear of Stockbridge Indians offering to serve in the Continental Army that year is in a petition by “Abraham Nimham & his Companions in behalf of the Stockbridge Indians” dated 1 October 1777 and read in Congress on 4 October. The group wanted “to be employed in the Service of the United States” and was told to report to Gates. On 25 October, the Committee on Indian Affairs resolved that Ninham’s application “In behalf of the Stockbridge Indians” be forwarded to Gates. It also recommended that Ninham and his group join Gates.

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156 Edwards letter is in Horatio Gates Papers, 5:258. Edwards was Commissioner of Indian Affairs. “Yokon” is most likely Jehoiakim Mtohksiin, born ca. 1751. Chief Solomon Uhhaunaauwaumut, 2d Lieutenants Jehoiakim Mtohksiin and Abraham Nimham, 1st Sergeant Timothy Yokon, 2nd Sergeant Thomas Hikamon and 32 other Mohikans fought at Lexington in April 1775. Chief Solomon died just before Burgoyne’s surrender in October 1777 and Mtohksiin sent the small unit that was created for Gates’ army to Saratoga even though Burgoyne had already surrendered. See Bernard A. Drew, *Henry Knox and the Revolutionary War Trail in Western Massachusetts* (Jefferson, NC, 2012), p. 98 and p. 139-140 and Patrick Frazier, *The Mohicans of Stockbridge* (Lincoln, NE, 1992), pp. 214-217.

On 10 August 1776, Washington wrote to Edwards: “This will be delivered to you by Samuel and John, two of our friends of the Stockbridge Indians, who have been here, and expressed the desire of their people to become part of the Army of the United States. Having written to you fully on the 7th instant, and transmitted a copy of the resolution of Congress upon this subject, (which I presume will have reached you before this comes to hand,) I have referred them to you for information, in the instance of their application, and have only to request the favour of your early attention to what I then recommended to your care and direction.” Congress had permitted the enlistment of Indians and in his letter of 7 August 1777, Washington told Edwards to “engage in the Service, as great a number of them as you possibly can” for service either in the Main Army under Washington or in New York. Quoted from the on-line edition of the Washington Papers in the Library of Congress.

and that Nimham and “his companions” receive $200.00 “as an acknowledgement for his Zeal in the Cause of the United States.” By the time they reached Gates Burgoyne had long since surrendered.\textsuperscript{158}

At least one African-American also fought in American ranks at Bennington. In his \textit{History of Pittsfield} Smith reports that in 1779 “Jeffrey Hazzard, "mulatto follow," enlisted out of Col. Chapin's regiment of levies; but he had fought in the Pittsfield company at Bennington” on 16 August 1777.\textsuperscript{159} Under the Massachusetts militia laws Hazzard would not have been eligible for militia service. On 20 May 1775, the Massachusetts Committee of Safety directed that only free blacks could serve in the militia: “That it is the opinion of this Committee, as the contest now between Great Britain and the Colonies respects the liberties and privileges of the latter, which the Colonies are determined to maintain, that the admission of any persons as Soldiers into the Army now raising, but only such as are Freemen, will be inconsistent with the principles that are to be supported, and reflect dishonour on this Colony; and that no Slaves be admitted into this Army upon any consideration whatever.” Five months later on 23 October 1775, the “Minutes of a Conference of the Delegates of the Honorable Continental Congress, the Deputy Governours of Connecticut & Rhode Island, the Committee of Council of Massachusetts Bay with General Washington begun at Head Quarters Cambridge October 18th 1775 & continued to the 22d of the same Month”\textsuperscript{160} show that the question was discussed again with the same decision: “7. Ought not Negroes to be excluded from the new Inlistment [sic] especially such as are Slaves - all were thought improper by the Council of Officers? Agreed. that they be rejected altogether.”

Based on these decisions the Massachusetts militia law in effect when the Battle of Bennington was fought on 16 August 1777, \textit{An Act For Forming and Regulating the Militia within the Colony of the Massachusetts Bay, In New England, and for repealing all the Laws heretofore made for that Purpose of 22 January 1776}, defined the militia of the state as:

all the male persons from sixteen years of age to sixty-five, not included in that part of the militia called the training-band, and exempted by the first section of this act from common and ordinary training, shall constitute an alarm list in the colony (excepting ...) negroes, Indians and molatoes.\textsuperscript{161}

But not only was Hazard African-American, he was also most likely enslaved. That statement is based on our knowledge that his 1779 enlistment bonus was to be paid to Nathaniel Robbins. That was standard procedure when enslaved persons enlisted, were enlisted, or “volunteered” by their masters for military service. When Pittsfield was required on 30 June 1779 to procure seven recruits for nine months’ service in the Continental Army one of the men reported on 2 July 1779 as having been enlisted was

Jeffrey Hazzard (colored), £200 Continental money, and nine pounds worth of merchantable wheat at 4s., 6d. per bushel, to be paid to Nathan Robbins by December 1\textsuperscript{st}, 1779, provided Hazzard passes muster.

\textsuperscript{158} The petition to be allowed to serve in the Continental Army is Papers of the Continental Congress vol. 8 p. 757; was read before Congress on 4 October (vol. 9, p. 1770).
\textsuperscript{159} Smith, \textit{Pittsfield}, p. 496.
\textsuperscript{160} The meeting in fact continued until 24 October 1775.
\textsuperscript{161} Smith, \textit{Pittsfield}, p. 226.
Hazzard did pass muster but never served the nine months for which he had enlisted. Jonathan Morey, who had enlisted to serve for nine months on 16 July 1779, served as his substitute. Nathaniel Robbins may well have been Hazzard’s owner. Robbins (1708-1783) was one of the wealthiest men in Pittsfield. When his son, Richard, died of smallpox in 1783 shortly after his father’s death in 1783 (also from smallpox), his estate was valued at £ 2,038. In 1791, their son/grandson Nathaniel paid £ 5 5s 6d in real-estate tax which placed him on No. 6, right behind Hannah Williams, the widow of Col. William Williams, who paid £ 5 6s 10d. The two wealthiest taxpayers, Charles Goodrich and James D. Colt, who owned 1000+ acres each, paid £ 10. 10s. 2. and £ 9. 15s. 6 d. respectively.

The wording in the History of the Town of Pittsfield, “Aug. 16, 1777, Lieut. William Ford, who marched to Bennington, and was dismissed Aug. 23” is somewhat misleading. It suggests that he arrived too late to fight: it is about 40 miles from Pittsfield to the battlefield, too far to cover in a day. News of Baum’s approach reached Pittsfield on 14 August, and after a powerful sermon by Rev. Thomas Allen this detachment, which included the "Fighting Parson," departed on 15 August and reached the battlefield just in time to join the fight.

5.4 ORDER OF BATTLE – ROYAL FORCES

Table 6. Order of Battle – Brunswick Forces – First Battle

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Formation</th>
<th>Commanding Officer</th>
<th>Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baum’s Brigade</td>
<td>Lt. Colonel Frederick Baum</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brunswick Dragoons (three troops)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brunswick Grenadiers</td>
<td></td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Company, von Barner Light Battalion</td>
<td>Captain Thomae</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brunswick Line Infantry</td>
<td>Captain Gleisenberg</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry Regiment Riedesel</td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry Regiment von Rhetz</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry Regiment von Specht</td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brunswick Jäger (from Barner’s Light Infantry Battalion)</td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hesse-Hanau artillery with two 3-lb cannon</td>
<td>Lieutenant Johann Michael Bach</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batmen, servants &amp;c</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>~ 460</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The point of departure for these figures is again Glasco, but to his statistics must be added Captain Alexander Fraser’s around 60 British Marksmen and Captain August Friedrich Dommes’ 50 chasseurs

164 Smith, Pittsfield, p. 437.
165 Smith, Pittsfield, p. 492.
166 https://jdglasco.files.wordpress.com/2014/05/bennington-aug-1777.pdf.
for a total of around 550 regular troops plus up to 200 Loyalists. But just as in the case of the Americans it is difficult to arrive at reliable figures for Royal forces in the Battle of Bennington. Wasmus described Baum’s command as consisting “of our Dragoon Regiment, not quite 200 men strong; 100 Tories, 100 Savage Mohawks, 100 Canadians and 50 Englishmen from Powell’s brigade.” While encamped on the Hudson on 12 August, 50 chasseurs under Captain August Friedrich Dommes joined Baum for a total of about 600 men. Barker in *Braunschweigers*, Part 1, p. 24 gives the strength of Baum’s detachment as “374 Braunschweig foot, mainly Baum’s own dismounted dragoons but also a few troops detached,” fifty to sixty troops from Major Ferdinand Albrecht von Barner’s Light Infantry Battalion, fourteen artillerymen “plus roustabouts and batmen” which adds up to about 440 to 450 troops. Baxter estimates a “final total of perhaps as many as 770 Provincialis” (p. 26) which would give Baum’s command on the eve of the battle around 1,200 troops though on p. 24 he estimates the total strength of Baum’s detachment as “perhaps some 1,500 fighters.”

Gabriel gives Baum’s strength at departure as “approximately 760 men: 434 German dragoons and infantry, 200 Loyalists, 50 British marksmen, 60 Canadians and 14 artillerymen with two three-pounder cannons (Figure 32). Around 150 Indians also accompanied the expedition”. 168 He estimates that the arrival of 350 to 400 Loyalists as late as the day of the battle increased Baum’s strength “to approximately 1,100“. 169

Table 7. Order of Battle – Provincialis -- First Phase of the Battle

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Formation</th>
<th>Commanding Officer</th>
<th>Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peters’ Brigade</td>
<td>John Peters</td>
<td>291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Queens Loyal Rangers</td>
<td>John Peters</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Queens Loyal Rangers who join Peters’ Brigade on 13 (?) August</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loyal Volunteers (join Peters’ Brigade on 14 August)</td>
<td>Francis Pfister</td>
<td>~ 90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anderson’s Loyalists</td>
<td></td>
<td>~ 40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruiter’s Loyalists</td>
<td></td>
<td>~ 60 = 477170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadians 171</td>
<td></td>
<td>~ 60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indians</td>
<td></td>
<td>~ 100-150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>~ 700-750</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The point of departure for the figures in Table 4 is again Glasco; 172 the addition of Tables 6 and 7, i.e. 450 men + 750 men, gives an approximate total strength of Baum’s forces of 1,150 to 1,200 on the day of the battle.

Totals: 318+452+200+50+447 = 1467 (possibly?)

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169 Ibid., p. 22.
170 Barker in “Braunschweiger” p. 23, gives the strength of loyalists under Peters’ command as 452.
171 The Canadians and Indians were commanded by Captain Charles-Louis Tarieu de la Lanaudière (1743-1811) and his father-in-law the Chevalier (Saint) Luc de la Corne (1711-1784).

---

88
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Loyalists</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pfister</td>
<td>Peters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Acc. to Macomb (British memorial)</td>
<td>b) Acc. to Leake (on 4 August 1777)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>318</td>
<td>200 plus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>318 (?)</td>
<td>200 plus (?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>318 (?)</td>
<td>200 plus (?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>318+452+200+50+447 = 1467 (possibly?)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Casualties:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pfister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>106-120</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 298 casualties under Peters contradict Peters’ own statement: in a memorial of 2 July 1778 to Sir Guy Carleton Peters claimed “That at the action at Bennington the 16 of August Lost Kill’d Taken & missing 200 out of 270 out of his Core that were with him there.”\textsuperscript{173} In “A Narrative of John Peters Lieutenant Colonel of the Queen’s Loyal Rangers in Canada, drawn by himself in a Letter to a Friend in London” composed in the late 1780s, he wrote that at Bennington he “had 291 Men of my Regiment with me, and I lost above half of them in that Engagement.”\textsuperscript{174} The 298 casualty figure is taken from “A monthly return of the Queen's Loyal Rangers commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel John Peters, Zadock Wright, Major, Justus Sherwood, Jeremiah French, David McFall, captains— made Aug. 7, 1777, shows 262 men. After this return Simeon Covil, Andrew Palmitier, Francis Hogeland and James Pennock, captains, with above 190 men, many of whom, however, according to Lieutenant-Colonel Peters, were not mustered for lack of time, joined the regiment and were in the battle of Bennington. After the battle the monthly return of Oct. 2d 1777, was 154 remaining of the 452, consequently 298 men were killed, wounded and made prisoners, or deserted.”\textsuperscript{175}

Besides the Brunswick officers a total of five British officers also fought at Bennington:

1) Captain Alexander Fraser of the 34th Regiment of Foot serving with Fraser's Rangers; he escaped.
2) Lieutenant James Wright of the 9th Regiment of Foot serving with Fraser's Rangers; he was killed.
3) Ensign Alexandre, Baron de Salans of the 9th Regiment of Foot serving with Fraser's Rangers; he was captured.\textsuperscript{176}
4) Sub Engineer/Lieutenant Desmaretz Durnford of the Corps of Engineers; he was captured.
5) Ensign William Johnson of the 29th Regiment of Foot serving with the Quebec Indian Department; he was captured.

The most controversial component of Baum’s detachment was the Native Americans accompanying his column. Many British and Brunswick officers and other ranks alike considered the Indians a questionable asset at best and, as the case of Jane McCrea shows, often downright detrimental to the British cause. Their often indiscriminate plundering and burning drove many settlers in the path of Burgoyne’s army into the rebel cause. John Ralston, born on 27 November 1762 in New York City thus barely 14 ½ years old in the summer of 1777, marched with his unit in June to the “west part of the County of Washington” where “the Indians like Wolves were constantly prowling about murdering the inhabitants & burning their property.”\textsuperscript{177}

\textsuperscript{173} New-York Historical Society, John Peters Papers.
\textsuperscript{175} Hadden, “Journal” Appendix 14, pp. 479/80.
\textsuperscript{176} This list was compiled with the assistance of Eric Schnitzer, Saratoga NHP. Baron de Salans was French nobleman who fought with the British Crown throughout the war. He was exchanged on 24 October 1777 in Albany and in 1782 he served as a captain with the 85th Regt of Foot in Jamaica. The Family Laborey de Salans originates in the Franche-Conté and was ennobled by Charles V in 1521. The Service Historique de la défense in Vincennes, France does not have any information on him. E-mail from Josse Bodinier of 25 October 2015. On Salans’ future career see http://www.jamaicanfamilysearch.com/Members/a1782_04.htm . Salans had been attached to Fraser's Rangers on 13 August 1777. Burgoyne Orderly Book p. 72. A second French nobleman in Burgoyne’s army, Louis Joseph, comte D’Anterroches (1753-1814) who served as an ensign in the 62nd Regiment of Foot. He was taken prisoner at Freeman's Farm on 19 September. See http://www.62ndregiment.org/dAnterroches.htm
\textsuperscript{177} Pension Application of John Ralston, R 8568.
Baum’s detachment included a group of ca. 150 Indians, supposedly Caughnawaga Mohawks. During the Battle of Bennington they withdrew from the engagement as they realized that the battle was lost.

5.5 THE FIRST PHASE OF THE BATTLE

Stark had spent 15 August devising an elaborate and ambitious plan of attack that would have been very demanding to carry out successfully even for well-trained and experienced troops, much less militia. The attack was to take place simultaneously on three sides. One detachment under Colonel Moses Nichols with 350 soldiers was to march around the hill on which Baum had established his post from the north and attack from the rear while a second detachment under Colonel Samuel Herrick with 300 mostly Vermonters was to march around on the south side and attack from there. Once these two detachments were in place and ready for action Colonels Thomas Stickney and David Hobart would lead the assault on the Tory Redoubt while Stark with 200 men would launch a frontal attack toward the bridge across the Walloomsac. Before Stark’s forces lined up for the attack in the morning of 16 August, Stark reorganized his force based on age and physical abilities. In the 1840s Samuel Younglove recorded that his brother David Younglove, born 1754, had told him that

Stark examined his men and their arms and found he had about 800 effective men and about that number of old men and boys. Stark divided his 800 young men into two battalions. He placed 400 under the command of Col. Stafford to surround the enemy on the south, and 400 under Col. Herrick to surround them on the north. They were to meet at a given place in the rear of the enemy and march on and begin the attack. The old men and boys were to march over an open meadow and attack the British in front of their breastworks.

In view of the difficult terrain Stafford’s and Herrick’s detachments would have to cover to get into the rear of Baum’s forces and the ad-hoc composition of Stark’s units such an arrangement made sense: physical stamina took precedence over unit cohesion. David Holbrook of Colonel Simmond’s Massachusetts Militia Regiment is one of many who confirms Younglove when he writes

the next day being the 16th of August Captain Enos Parker Lieutenants Kilborn and Cook of the Massachusetts Militia belonging to Col Simons Regiment Selected a Company of 60 or 70 men from the men who had promiscuously came together of which this declarer was one and marched them across the river by a Circuitous route of 5 or 6 miles mostly through woods with all possible silence and brought them up in a piece of woods at the Enemies rear where a line was formed and the Company aforesaid formed on the right and there pursuant to orders sat in silence until a Signal (the firing of 2 Muskets) was given

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179 Samuel Younglove, *Revolutionary War Experiences of the Sons of Isaiah Younglove* Jacqueline Baker Humphrey, ed., (Cocoa Beach, 1988), pp. 29-34, p. 31. John Younglove confirms this division of men based on age and physical ability. Samuel Younglove, born 15 April 1763 and thus barely 14 years old, was forced by his older brothers to remain behind watching the wagons and baggage: “my Brothers John & David Younglove who were in the Battle were opposed to my going in to the engagement in consequence of my tender years.” Pension Application Samuel Younglove S 14910.
when the American army upon three sides of the British Encampment made a Simultaneous attack.\(^{180}\)

John Younglove also provides an interesting detail when he told his brother that “For a cockade, they wore a green bush.”\(^{181}\) Though the attack that would not begin until later in the day since it took the enfilading columns a few hours to reach their positions behind Baum, “The young men started a little before daybreak on the 16th of August. The old men and boys began their march about sunrise.”\(^{182}\) On 16 August, twilight at Bennington starts around 05:30 a.m., sunrise around 30 minutes later.

As they were waiting for the signal to attack - Musket fire by Nichols’ forces - General Stark encouraged his troops, though whether he actually spoke the famous word of Molly Stark possibly ending the day as a widow is not proven: “There, boys, are our enemies – the Red Coats. We whip them today, my brave men; or Mollie Stark sleeps a widow to-night.”\(^{183}\)

Numerous pension applications confirm the battle arrangements. Solomon Parker of Captain Burton’s Company of Colonel Samuel Herrick’s Vermont Regiment of Rangers deposed that “the last of June [sic] or first of August Herricks Regiment were rangers & we moved on to Pawlet Vt & when Col. Baum led out the Hessians to take the Stores at Bennington we went there to (illeg.) them & Attacked him & his Indians from the west while Stark attacked them from the East & Col. Nichols on the north & we took them all except the Indians who broke through between Nichols Regiment & ours & fled leaving several dead.”\(^{184}\)

Charles Crook was among the New Hampshire militiamen who remembered the division of American forces into three columns on 16 August 1777 when “our army attacked Col. Baum in his entrenchments and carried the entrenchments and took or killd most of his men in preparing for the attack on Col Baum our army was divided into three parts, two hundred and fifty on each wing and the remainder in the center division and he this deponent was under the immediate Command of Col. Nicholas White in the engagement and thinks that there was about 300 Hessians [sic] taken Prisoners”\(^{185}\). Thomas Galusha of Captain John Warner’s company in Colonel Samuel Herrick’s Vermont Regiment of Rangers “was sent across

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180 Pension application of David Holbrook, S 23709.
181 Younglove, p. 25.
182 Younglove, p. 31.
183 In one of many different versions Stark called out: "Tonight our flag floats over yonder hill or Molly Stark sleeps a widow." Gabriel, Soldiers and Civilians, p. 24. Since Mrs. Starks' first name was Elizabeth, which would be abbreviated as Betsy, he would have exclaimed that "Betsy Stark sleeps a widow" – if he exclaimed anything at all. His son Caleb reported his father having exclaimed: "There, my boys, are your enemies, the red-coats and Tories; you must beat them, or my wife sleeps a widow to-night." Stark, Memoir, p. 60.
184 Pension Application of Solomon Parker S 11183. For an account of the battle from the Indians' point of view see At War with the Americans. The Journal of Claude-Nicholas-Guillaume de Lorimier. Peter Aichinger transl. and ed. (Victoria, B.C.: Press Porcepic, 1980?), p. 64-66. See also the letter by de la Corne to Burgoyne dated 23 October 1778 in which he accuses Burgoyne of "indifference towards the Indians also, who had served in the affair at Bennington, who amounted to 150, disgusted them; many of whom, with their grand Chief, were killed, and of 61 Canadians only 41 remained." James Murray Hadden, Hadden's journal and orderly books. A journal kept in Canada and upon Burgoyne's campaign in 1776 and 1777, by Lieut. James M. Hadden, Roy. art. Also orders kept by him and issued by Sir Guy Carleton, Lieut. General John Burgoyne, and Major General William Phillips, in 1776, 1777, and 1778. With an explanatory chapter and notes by Horatio Rogers. (Albany: J. Munsell's Sons, 1884), App. 17, pp. 530/31.
185 Pension application of Charles Crook, S 17902.
5. First Battle

Bennington river in the rear of Col Baum’s Regiment who was sent there by gen Burgoyne to cut off the retreat and they first commenced and attacked Col Baum in his intrenchments and he was soon drove from his intrenchment and they were made Prisoners and killed the Most of them that Col Baum was wounded and died.”

186 Rufus Bates in the company of Captain Ebenezer Allen of Colonel Herrick’s Vermont Rangers deposed that “with four or five other companies were ordered to take the rear of the British for the purpose of Surrounding them in their entrenchments and to attack the Indiens & tories That there was a General battle and Col Baum and his men were principally [sic] all Made prisoners of war [.] That there were a few who made their escape then he followed them.”

187 The times for the commencement of hostilities vary in the eyewitness accounts. Amasa Ives in Captain Parker’s company of Colonel Symonds Berkshire Militia remembered that “the battle was fought the third day after he left home, that he was in the heat of the action which commenced according to his recollection about 11 Oclock AM and continued till night”. 188 Erastus Hathaway also thought that “the first action commenced in the fore noon against the breast-work and troops commanded by Col. Baum – the 2d was in the afternoon of that day against a re-inforcement of the enemy, under the command of Gov. Skeen.”

189 Though these accounts argue that the first musket fire could be heard before noon, most place it later in the afternoon: Eli Griffith in Captain George Galushka’s company of Colonel Moses Robinson’s Regiment of Vermont Militia deposed that

General Stark planned his attack for Friday but rain prevented. On Saturday about two o’clock in the afternoon the action commenced. Stark in person led on the attack in front intending to cross the stream, march up the hill and drive the British back – he had sent Colonel Allen with one division of the American troops north and Lieutenant Colonel Nathaniel Brush [of Vermont militia from Bennington] west, to march around and he in the British as they retreated. He hastened the attack because the British expected reinforcements. The British retreated, but Colonel Brush missed his track – Starks plan failed, the British were not intercepted but marched about two miles where they met their reinforcements. In this action the British General was killed.

190 Thomas Mellen recorded that “Between two and three o’clock the battle began” as did Nathan Mason, who wrote that

on Sixteenth day of August before the Sun rose he was marched to the top of the hill in Sight of the enemy remained there a Short time and was marched back to camp and eat his breakfast with all the men and after breakfast Col Herrick he thinks came in front of his Regiment and requested three hundred Volunteers who turned out and Marched away Soon after Col Stickney he thinks came also in front of his Regiment and requested three

186 Pension application of Thomas Galusha S 23648.
187 Pension Application of Rufus Bates S 22634.
188 Pension Application of Amasa Ives, S 23277.
189 Pension application of Erastus Hatheway W 19741
190 Pension Application of Eli Griffith R 4324.
191 James Davie Butler and George Frederick Houghton, Addresses on the Battle of Bennington, and the Life and Services of Col. Seth Warner; Delivered before the Legislature of Vermont, in Montpelier, October 20, 1848 (Burlington: Free Press, 1849), p. 27.
hundred Volunteers who turned out and likewise Marched away during the time Gen Starke Marched past with his Brigade – he this declarant was then marched by Major Stratton and Adjutant Stone to the top of the hill and there were a few Scattered shots exchanged and the enemy fired upon them with their Artillery during this time this declarant has reason to believe that the Americans were making necessary arrangements to attack the enemy in the rear for at 3 O’Clock in the afternoon the main action commenced on the left wing of Baum’s intrenchments and in his rear at which time he was marched in the front of baum’s Troops and commenced a fire upon the enemy and they were killed and taken prisoners.192

Stark in his report on the battle to the New Hampshire legislature gave the time when the first muskets were fired as “precisely at 3 o’CLOCK”193 while the Rev. Thomas Allen reported that “Divine Providence blessing us with good weather, between three and four o’clock, P.M., he attacked them in front and flank, in three or four different places at the same instant.”194

The movement of American forces in the morning of 16 August did not go unnoticed by Baum’s detachment but much to their surprise did not seem to disquiet their commanding officers. Brunswick Surgeon Julius Friedrich Wasmus recorded that in the late morning a

2nd patrol then had been sent out from our left wing brought the news that some of the enemy has appeared not far from us in the woods and in the brush. This was immediately reported to our commander. He sent Capt. O’Connell to reconnoiter, who indeed saw men in front of our line in the brush. After he had gone, it became increasingly lively in the brush in front of our line, [a fact] which was also reported by our Major von Meibom. A cannon was therefore requested, which was sent with the reminder: one should not consider a few individuals to be a line or a regiment. The strangest of all was that our commander did not know where we were standing. He had not visited us in these last 3 days. […] The enemy is marching in force against our right wing and it appears that they want to encircle us. There is also some shooting on our right wing.

But it was too late. By the time another patrol was sent out “[a]fter 12 o’clock” it “was driven off by the enemy, who fired at them. Half an hour later, a violent volley of fire erupted against the entrenchment that was occupied by 35 dragoons”195 while a bit later he entered into his diary that he “had continually been under fire since 1 o’clock, that is 3 hours.”196

William Boutelle’s account suggests the answer to these discrepancies. Boutelle wrote that in the morning of 16 August,

192 Pension Application Nathan Mason S 9000.
193 Gabriel, Soldiers and Civilians, p. 35.
194 Allen’s “Account of the Battle of Bennington” is quoted from J.E.A. Smith, The History of Pittsfield, (Berkshire County, Massachusetts, from the year 1734 to the year 1800 (Boston: Lee and Shepard, 1869), pp. 499-501, p. 500. It was originally published in the Connecticut Courant of 25 August 1777.
195 Wasmus, p. 71.
196 Wasmus, p. 72.
We marched down near the bridge and halted, two parties marched off one to the right and the other to the left. A little after noon they began to fire on both sides. Our party stayed this side of the bridge till after the middle of the afternoon and then marched over the bridge and through the woods and came round to the other bridge by the enemy’s breastwork. They were retreated from their ground and we followed them till we came up with them, and we had a smart engagement, till after sunset, and then we came off, taking their field pieces.\textsuperscript{197}

This suggests that the battle may not have begun concurrently but in stages with the attack on the Tory Redoubt beginning last. If this is what happened it may have been a ruse on the part of Stark since a number of accounts suggest that the defenders in the Tory Redoubt were confused as to who was approaching them in broad daylight. The Loyalists could be forgiven: Thomas Mellen, “sent, with twelve others, to lie in ambush on a knoll a little [to the] North, and watch for tories on their way to join Baum. Presently we saw six coming toward us, who, mistaking us for tories, came too near us to escape. We disarmed them and sent them, under a guard of three, to Stark.”\textsuperscript{198} Captain James Lincoln wrote that

the provinchels [sic] that were with Baum, were overjoyed and informed their Col\textsuperscript{o} that a great number of Loylist were Coming armed to joyn him, but they Soon found their mistake. they ware Severly attacked, their entrenchment forced, their Artellry taken most of the Indians and Some of the proventials [sic] made their Escape in the woods. the Col\textsuperscript{o} was wounded, and with the Germans, and many more maid prisoners.\textsuperscript{199}

John Younglove remembered that “the old men and boys were to cross the large meadows and attack the enemy in front, or at least to make a show of doing so.” By late morning “the old men and boys got to the large meadow. It was a beautiful morning and having all their flags displayed, with martial music playing in full choir, made quite a respectable and martial appearance.”\textsuperscript{200} Since no other account mentions flags and music it seems that Younglove’s imaginative memory may have gotten the better of him here.

All accounts agree that Nichols’ forces initiated the battle from the left with their attack on the German (“Hessian”) Redoubt. John Austin, a twenty-three-year old soldier of Colonel Thomas Stickney’s New Hampshire Militia Regiment recalled fighting in the detachment of Colonel Moses Nichols, a possible confirmation of Youngblood’s claim that Herrick’s and Nichols’ detachment had been carefully selected, had been “ordered to fire which should be the signal for this action to begin with our main body we affected our motion in the rear of the British detachment and first sent forward several scouts which each returned bringing in little squads of tories who were going in to the British having pieces of white paper of the size of a card stuck on their hats having wrote ‘Protection’. We then advanced and fired. the main army in a

\textsuperscript{197} Michael P. Gabriel, "William Boutelle’s Diary of the Bennington Expedition" Walloomsack Review vol. 17 (Spring 2016), pp. 22-31
\textsuperscript{198} Addresses on the Battle of Bennington, p. 26.
\textsuperscript{199} James Minor Lincoln, The Papers of Captain Rufus Lincoln of Wareham, Mass. (Privately printed, 1904), pp. 16/17.
\textsuperscript{200} Younglove, p. 27.
moment fired also, we rushed on, drove the British detachment from their entrenchments and went in upon the main body – we drove the enemy till in their retreat they met a reinforcement.”

Colonel Herrick joined in almost immediately. Jesse Field of Captain Dewey's company of Herrick’s regiment

crossed the river over against the camp, went over the hills, forded the river again below the enemy, and came up on their rear. When we came in sight of the enemy's works we halted, and it seemed that the rear of our party had been detained for some cause. We stood but a short time when the firing commenced from the party on the north. I recollect hearing Lieut. -------- exclaim, 'My God, what are we doing? They are killing our brothers; why are we not ordered to fire? In a moment our adjutant came up and ordered us to advance. We pressed forward, and as the Hessians rose above their works to fire, we discharged our pieces at them, we kept advancing & about the 2nd fire they left their works & ran down the hill to the south or S. East.

American fire hit its targets. “Our dragoons fired up volleys on the enemy in cold blood and with much courage, and it did not take them long to load their carbines behind the breastworks. But as soon as they rose up to take aim, bullets went through their heads. They fell backwards and no longer moved a finger. Thus, in a short time, our tallest and best dragoons were sent into eternity.” Silas Walbridge in Captain John Warner's company of Herrick's regiment remembered in 1828 that from the encampment he marched

west across the river (the Walloomsac flows northerly past the place of encampment, then curves westward, and soon takes a southerly direction past Baum's hill, and onward a short distance curves again westward, and so passes by Sancoik), crossed it again below Sickle's Mills (brick factory, now Austin & Patchin's paper mill, a mile and a half westward from Baum’s Hill, on Sancoik road), and came in on the rear of the Hessian redoubt. Just before we arrived at the redoubt we came in sight of a party of Indians, and fired on them. They retreated to the north west, leaving two killed. Our men came within ten or twelve rods of the redoubt, and began firing from behind logs and trees, and continued firing and advancing until the Hessians retreated out of their works and down the hill to the south. We followed on down the hill to the level land on the river, and some pursued on further.

As the dragoons retreated from their fortifications they became an easy prey for the militia. Jesse Field recalled how “we followed them over their works & pursued down the hill. The day was very warm, they were in full dress & very heavy armed, & we in our shirts & trowsers & thus had much the advantage in the pursuit. Some were killed in their works – Many killed & taken in going down the hill, & others on the flat upon the river.”

201 Quoted in Gabriel, Soldiers and Civilians, p. 48.
202 Jennings, Memorials, p. 172.
203 Wasmus, p. 71.
204 Jennings, Memorials, pp. 171/72.
Once the firing had started behind Baum the frontal attack on the Tory Redoubt led by colonels Hobart and Stickney began. It was here that American forces suffered the highest casualties. Enos Wood of Captain Elijah Dewey’s company of Colonel Brush’ Vermont militia was among the youngest participants in the battle. Born in Norwich, Connecticut, on 23 February 1761, he had moved to Bennington with his family later that year and on 10 or 11 July 1777 enlisted as a 16-year-old “to serve as a private in the said Company till after the battle of Bennington on the 16th of August 1777 and was engaged in that Battle in the said Company and assisted in forcing the Breast work & capturing the Hessians under Col Baum at which time General Stark commanded the American troops.”

John Caldwell in Colonel Nichols’ New Hampshire Militia Regiment which had arrived from Brattleborough in the evening of 15 August took part in the assault as well. Early on he saw his company commander –“Captain McCleary … kill’d together with 18 non-commissioned officers and privates of our company – After Captain McCleary fell the command of the company devolved upon this deponent and although severely wounded in the right arm by a Bayonet in Storming a breast work of the enemy he discharged the duties as commanding officer of the company to the best of his ability during the remainder of the campaign.”

The most vivid description of the attack on the Tory Redoubt, besides that provided by Colonel Stafford, comes from Lieutenant John Orr. He recalled that

> About 4 o’clock, P.M., Nichols began, and the cracking of the muskets was such, that imagination could see men falling by the dozens. We arose and with shouts marched rapidly to the attack. […] when we had passed through the wood and cornfield, we came in sight of the enemy, at about fifteen rods distance. They commenced firing with muskets, at an alarming rate, so that it seemed wonderful that any of the attacking party should escape.

Orr did not escape but was wounded and helped off the field by a soldier.

At this point Stark moved toward the bridge at the center of Baum’s position to deliver the coup de grace. In his pension application Nathan Mason of Colonel Simonds Regiment deposed that he

> was then marched by Major Stratton and Adjutant Stone to the top of the hill and there were a few Scattering shots exchanged and the enemy fired upon them with their Artillery during this time this declarant has reason to believe that the Americans were making necessary arrangements to attack the enemy in the rear for at 3 OClk in the afternoon the main action commenced on the left wing of Baum’s intrenchments and in his rear at which time he was marched in the front of Baum’s Troops and commenced a fire upon the enemy and they were killed and taken prisoners. That Col Baum was wounded and died of his wound and that Col Fister [Pfister] who commanded the Indians and Tories was also wounded and died and he this declarant see Fister [Pfister] expire.”

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205 Pension application of Enos Wood, S 11863.
206 Pension application of John Caldwell, W 10301
207 Quoted in Gabriel, *Soldiers and Civilians*, p. 55.
208 Pension Application Nathan Mason S 9000.
In the emotionally charged assault and the subsequent melee Stark and his officers quickly lost command and control over their men as the

American Army made a rush upon the British intrenchments which being received by the British with boldness the battle became general and desperate immediately and continued about two hours. Close Combat without form or regularity. Each American fighting according to his own discretion, until the Entrenchments were completed routed and those who had not been killed and had not escaped surrendered at discretion. 209

Thomas Mellen of the New Hampshire remembered that

Between two and three o'clock the battle began. The Germans fired by platoons, and were soon hidden by smoke. Our men fired each on his own hook, aiming wherever they saw a flash. Few on our side had either bayonets or cartridges. At last I stole away from my post, and ran down to the battle. The first time I fired I put three balls into my gun. Before I had time to fire many rounds, our men rushed over the breastwork, but I and many others chased straggling Hessians [sic] in the woods. 210

The battle disintegrated into “private” engagements among individuals. Nathaniel Wallace from Pownal recalled that he, along

…with a few companions took up their station upon a pile of chips in front of the enemies' line. He afterwards described their works as being formed of stakes and pieces of timber set close together at the bottom, so as to be impenetrable to bullets, while the tops diverged, thus leaving a space for the soldiers to direct their fire. Upon the inside at the foot of the upright timbers, was thrown up a platform of logs and earth which was high enough to enable the combatants to bring their faces up to the aperture. Here they discharged their guns, stepped down from this elevation, and no longer exposed to danger, re-loaded their pieces.

At one of these apertures, Wallace had noticed a young man, wearing a white neck-tie, appear several times. Finally resolved upon his destruction, he arranged his rifle and awaited his re-appearance. After the usual interval of time for loading had expired, the opening was again filled by the same young looking face; but before he had marked his victim, Wallace pulled the trigger, and the space was once more empty. After the order to charge had been executed with perfect success, Wallace went to the position opposite the pile of chips, identified the body of the young man measured the distance to his former standing place, which proved to be 30 yards.

Forsburgh affirmed, after the battle, that young Hogle stood near him behind the breastwork, and wore a white neck-tie, and that when, at one time he was about to discharge his

209 Pension application of David Holbrook, S 23709.  
210 Addresses on the Battle of Bennington, p. 27.
piece, he saw instantly a bright blue spot appear in the centre of his forehead and Hogle fell back upon the ground a dead man.\textsuperscript{211}

The Rev. Allen, “when asked whether he actually killed any man at Bennington, he replied that he did not know; but that, observing a flash often repeated from a certain bush, and that it was generally followed by the fall of one of Stark’s men, he fired that way, and put the flash out.”\textsuperscript{212} Neither did the battle lack its more macabre moments:

Capt. [Thomas] Comstock [from Sunderland] appeared at the Battle of Bennington barefooted. On being asked why he so appeared, he replied that he would kill the first Hessian [sic] that fell in his way, and possess himself of his shoes. He soon found an opportunity, and killed a Hessian [sic]; but found his shoes too small: shortly after he succeeded in killing a second; and, while in the act of placing his feet in the shoes of his unfortunate and fallen enemy, a ball struck him, and he fell to rise no more; upon which a soldier of his company, by the name of Benjamin Griffis, remarked to Lieutenant Brownson, that Cobin had lost his shoes. — Upon another occasion, the battle still raging, and men falling on either side, Griffis, (no doubt moved by self interest, he having previously lost his better half) remarked to Lieutenant Brownson that widows would be plenty after the battle.\textsuperscript{213}

While the battle raged, Stark at some point must have dismounted from his horse. Left unguarded someone helped himself to the animal. On 11 September 1777, Stark advertised for the return of his mount:

TWENTY DOLLARS REWARD. Stole from me, the subscriber, from Wallumscoik, in the time of action, the 16th of August last, a Brown Mare, five years old, had a star in her forehead. Also, a doe skin-seated saddle, blue housing trimmed with white, and a curbed bridle. It is earnestly requested of all Committees of Safety, and others in authority, to exert themselves to recover said thief and Mare, so that he may be brought to justice, and the Mare brought to me; and the person, whoever he be, shall receive the above reward for both, and for the Mare alone, one half of that sum. — How scandalous, how disgraceful and ignominious, must it appear to all friendly and generous souls, to have such sly, artful, designing villains enter into the field of action, in order to pillage, pilfer, and plunder from their brethren when engaged in battle!

JOHN STARK, B. D. G. Bennington, 11th Sept., 1777.

Meanwhile the battle continued with great ferocity on the hillside. In a supporting deposition by Stephen Morse to the 1832 pension application of Daniel Collins of Stickney’s Regiment of the New Hampshire Militia, Captain Samuel McConnell’s company, Morse testified that “in the Battle at that Place under Gen\textsuperscript{1} Stark against the British under Col\textsuperscript{1} Baum & the said Collins & I fought side by side against the Hessian

\textsuperscript{211} The Vermont Historical Gazetteer: A magazine embracing a history of each town, civil, ecclesiastical, biographical and military Abby Maria Hemenway, ed. 3 vols. (Burlington, Hemenway, 1867-1877) vol. 1 (1867), p. 215.
\textsuperscript{212} Smith, History of Pittsfield, p. 475.
\textsuperscript{213} Hemenway, Gazetteer, p. 240.
First Battle

Breastwork & it was said that said Collins killed Seven Hessians & we fought until our Ammunition was all Expended & were obliged to retreat on that account.214 Then they used their bayonets or turned their muskets around to be used as clubs. The frequency with which veterans noted bayonet wounds in their pension applications is a clear indication of the close combat that pitted neighbor against neighbor. Many participants point out that few Americans had bayonets, but those who did used theirs: Caleb Olin in Captain Galusha’s company of Vermont Militia “was at the Battle of Bennington. Here an incident occurred worthy of notice. A British officer presented his sword and sued for mercy, complaining that he had been stabbed with a bayonet.”215 David Holbrook of Simonds Massachusetts Militia Regiment

in the scaling of the breast work of the Enemy in the first Engagement Put his right hand upon the top of the breast work & threw his feet over but his right leg was met by a British Bayonet which held it fast and he pitched head first into the Entrenchment and the soldier hit him a thump upon the head but he was dispatched by the next man that came up & this declarer was thereby relieved and in the heat of feeling forgot his wounds.216

The fact that many of the participants knew each other added to the ferocity of the battle, viz. the account by Peters of the storming of the Tory Redoubt:

a little before the Royalists gave way, the Rebels pushed with a Strong party on the Front of the Loyalists where I commanded, as they were coming up, I observed a Man fire at me, which I returned, he loaded again as he came up, & discharged again at me, and crying out Peters you Damned Tory I have got you, he rushed on me with his Bayonet, which entered Just below my left Breast, but was turned by the Bone, by this time I was loaded, and I saw that it was a Rebel Captain, [blank] an old Schoolfellow & Playmate, and a Couzin [sic] of my Wifes [sic]: Though his Bayonet was in my Body, I felt regret at being obliged to destroy him.217

Joseph Rudd, who served as a lieutenant in the company of Captain Elijah Dewey under Colonel Herrick informed his father on 20 August 1777 that

We marched right against their breastwork with our small arms, where they fired upon us every half minute, yet they never touched a man. We drove them out of their breastwork and took their fieldpieces and pursued and killed great numbers of them. We took four or five of our neighbors – two Sniders and two Hornbecks. The bigger part of Dutch Hoosick was in the battle against us. They went to the Reglers a day or two before the fight. Samuel Anderson was a captain amongst the Reglers, and was in the battle against us.218

Bayonet and musket ball wounds rarely kept the men out of the battle. Benjamin Clark of Captain Post’s company in Stark’s Regiment “received two bayonet wounds” yet continued fight and “was also in the

214 Pension Application of Daniel Collins (1818 application) S 29 716
216 Pension application of David Holbrook, S 23709.
218 Quoted in Gabriel, Soldiers and Civilians, p. 93.
engagement between the said troops & the reinforcements which had been sent to the aid of Col. Baum by Gen Burgoyne, which came up about the time of Baum’s defeat.” Chauncey Rice of Captain Barnes’ company remembered that during the battle he “fired his gun as he thinks nearly twenty times that his gun got so hot he was obliged to stop firing awhile that… [he] was wounded twice once on the side of the neck and the scar is to be seen to this day once on the right side the ball passing through his clothes and glancing off.” Colonel Stafford who was in the forefront of the attack and provided an account to his son:

He had observed some irregularity in the ground before them which he had thought might favor his approach, and he discovered that a small ravine, which they soon entered, would cover his determined little band from the shot of the enemy, and even from their observations, at least for some distance. He pursued its course, but was so far disappointed in his expectations that, instead of terminating at a distance from the enemy’s line, on emerging from it, and looking about to see where he was, he found the fresh embankment of the Tory fort just above him, and the heads of the Tories peeping over with their guns levelled at him. Turning to call on his men he was surprised to find himself flat on the ground without knowing why, for the enemy had fired and a ball had gone through his foot into the ground, cutting some of the sinews just as he was stepping on it so as to bring him down. At the same time the shock had deafened him to the report of the muskets. The foremost of the soldiers ran up to take him in their arms, believing him to be dead or mortally wounded, but he was too quick for them, and sprang on his feet, glad to find he was not seriously hurt, and was able to stand. He feared that his fall might check his followers, and as he caught the glimpse of a man in a red coat running across a distant field, he cried out, ‘Come on, my boys! they run! they run!’ So saying, he sprang up, and clambering to the top of the fort, while the enemy were hurrying their powder into the pans and the muzzles of their pieces, his men rushed on shouting and firing and jumping over the breastworks, and pushing upon the defenders so closely that they threw themselves over the opposite wall, and ran down the hill as fast as their legs could carry them.

The ravine used by Stafford and his men still exists. Stafford, though wounded, continued fighting until the redoubt was taken. An unidentified Loyalist fighting from inside the redoubt also described the attack:

When the Hessians [sic] were sent to take the stores at Bennington I went with them, and took my station with some of the other Loyalists in a redoubt or small fort in the line. We were all ready when we saw the Rebels coming to attack us, and were on such a hill, and behind such a bank that we felt perfectly safe, and thought we could kill any body of troops sent against us before they could reach the place upon which we stood. We had not expected, however, that they would approach us under cover, but supposed we should see them on the way. We did not know that a little gully which lay below us was long enough and deep enough to conceal them; but they knew the ground, and the first we saw of the party coming to attack us they made their appearance right under our guns. Your father

219 Pension application of Benjamin Clark, S 12502.
220 Pension Application of Chauncey Rice, S 15616.
221 History of Cheshire, pp. 49 /50.
222 History of Cheshire, p. 50.
was at the head of them. I was standing at the wall with my gun loaded in my hand, and several of us leveled our pieces at once. I took as fair aim at them as ever I did at a bird in my life, and thought I was sure of them although we had to point so much downward that it made a man a small mark. Your father and I fired together, and he fell I thought he was dead to a certainty, but to our surprise he was on his feet again in an instant, and they all came jumping in upon us with such a noise that we thought of nothing but getting out of the way of their muskets as fast as possible, and we scattered in all directions. I had a Sister living in that vicinity with whom I sought refuge.223

The anonymous Loyalist was fortunate enough, as casualties and prisoners among the redoubt’s defenders were high. Colonel Pfister, in command of the troops in the redoubt, was killed and some 150 Loyalists were taken prisoners.

 Civilians with property on the battlefield did not go unscathed. Gershom Gifford had moved to the neighborhood in 1776 and “his father's house, in Bennington, stood on the ground where the battle was fought, and the family sought shelter in the cellar from the bullets. The house took fire in the height of the battle, and they were obliged to leave.”224 Levy Beardsley, whose grandfather’s house stood within sight of the battle and whose 14-year-old father and younger brother had been captured by the Indians at the outset of the battle but were released by the interference of the Hessian [sic] officers, a short time before the battle, and with the rest of the family were shut up in the house. After the main force had been called away from the house, to man the works on the hill, a soldier came in and commenced pulling out the "chinking" between the logs, to enable him to fire out.

My grandfather remonstrated, and on the soldier persisting the old man seized his musket, and being a strong man wrenched it out of his hands and tossed it up into the chamber: then seizing him by the shoulders put him out by main force and fastened the door against him.

The battle was sharply contested, but the result is known; the Hessians [sic] were defeated and taken, and a large body of them, when they surrendered, came running down the hill near the house with as little order as so many sheep, and surrendered in plain sight, several being shot, after they had ceased firing. The Indians ran away early in the battle, when they were about to be surrounded; they were painted and were nearly naked, and when they left the hill, they ran through a field covered with briars, paying little regard to briars or thorns, naked as they were.225

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223 History of Cheshire, pp. 50/51.
224 The Vermont Historical Gazetteer: A magazine embracing a history of each town, civil, ecclesiastical, biographical and military Abby Maria Hemenway, ed., 3 vols. (Burlington, Hemenway, 1867-1877) vol. 3 (1877), p. 1199.
Levi Beardsley was locked up with his Grandfather; Thomas Dickison, however, got away. He was not going to miss the battle even if “I was too young to remember anything of consequence about the battle. I remember of climbing with another boy onto the hogpen to see the men fighting.”

Some residents were caught out in the open in the fields. “His [i.e. Jeremiah Clark from Shaftsbury] wife, my grandmother, as was rather common in those troublous times, with her domestics, and her female friends and neighbors (it bring harvest time) were at work in her harvest field, at the southwest corner of the farm, about 2 miles in direct line from the battle ground, at 3 o’clock, when it began. At this distance, one can hardly conceive the horror and anxiety that was felt in the company of wives, mothers and daughters. With one consent they came together, [illeg.] and held a prayer-meeting while [illeg.], and truly that field was a place of strong crying out tears, through the day, till at night fleet messengers from the field of carnage, brought news of the victory and safety of husbands, sons and brothers.”

5.6  **THE COLLAPSE OF BAUM’S FORCES AND PURSUIT**

As the battle raged on the hillside and the Tory Redoubt, Stark was attacking enemy forces stationed at the bridge. The Canadians quickly gave way but as they tried to scale the steep hill behind them they ran into Baum and his forces trying to escape Herrick’s and Nichol’s men who had overrun the hilltop redoubt. Seeing that the battle was lost, Baum gathered his remaining forces for a final attack down the hillside toward the bridge and the road back to Cambridge that he had taken two days earlier. He ran headlong into the Canadians who had been routed by Stark as well as Pfister’s loyalists retreating from the Tory Redoubt. Veering toward the banks of the Walloomsac Baum tried to make a last stand. When he fell to the ground, wounded by a musket ball, he gave the signal for surrender. It was about 4:00 p.m. The Reverend Allen reported that as the Americans stormed the Loyalist breastwork “the enemy at once deserted their cover, and ran; and in about five minutes their whole camp was in the utmost confusion and disorder.” Altogether the “action was extremely hot for between one and two hours.” Baum was a mortally wounded prisoner on the battlefield and his forces either dead, captured or fleeing westward along the Walloomsac with some of Stark’s men in hot pursuit.

The majority of Stark’s men, physically tired and emotionally exhausted after the battle, remained behind. There were wounded men to care for, prisoners to be gathered, and the battlefield to be cleaned of the material and human refuse of the battle. The carnage shocked Wasmus, who wrote “These scenes cannot really be described - reading this, the best will perhaps be moved, but it is actually not possible to feel the horror of these scenes. A thought that makes your flesh creep! To see a friend or fellow creature lie bleeding on the ground who has been cruelly wounded by the murderous lead and approaches his death shaking - crying for help, and then not be able, not be allowed to help him, is that not cruel?”

226 [http://www.lakestolocks.org/content/thomas-dickison-of-cambridge-at-bennington-1777/1lt5876BCF70155B3FD6](http://www.lakestolocks.org/content/thomas-dickison-of-cambridge-at-bennington-1777/1lt5876BCF70155B3FD6)


228 Wasmus, p. 72.
Many of the men wanted a “souvenir” as well. Bradley Gilbert “took some pompous Proclamation out of Col Baum’s pocket as he lay on the field of battle.” 229 Another militiaman rifled Wasmus’ pockets: “he now took my watch, looked at it, held it to his ear and put it away [in his pocket]. After this, he made a friendly face and was so human that he urged me to take a drink, from his wooden flask. He handed me over to his comrades, who started anew to search my pockets. One of them took nothing but my purse in which, however, were only 14 piasters (specie). He continued eagerly looking for money but then left, whereupon the third began searching my pockets. This one took all my small items as my knife, my paper, my lighter.” 230 Artillery Lieutenant Johann Michael Bach informed Count Wilhelm IX of Hanau on 3 October 1782 that he “was captured on the champs de bataille [field of battle], cruelly mistreated and completely plundered” of his possessions. That included his drawing instruments and his books, which meant that he could not finish the map of the battlefield at Bennington that he had promised the count. 231

But the day was not over yet. David Holbrook witnessed that

General Baum being wounded was among the prisoners about the time of the general route of the British army and some of them were running to Escape Col Herrick of the Green Mountain Rangers rode along near where this declarer was and cried out “Boys follow me” and this declarer with one other ran after him about two miles to Ramplers Mills [i.e. Rensselaer’s Mill] when he stopped his horse and drew up his piece and fired and then wheeled his horse and said there was a reinforcement of British Coming. 232

The outcome of the battle once again hung in the balance.

5.7 THE AMBUSH OF CAPTAIN STEPHEN PARKER’S DETACHMENT

While the battle was raging on the hill between Baum’s and Stark’s men, a company of New Hampshire militia under Captain Stephen Parker who were returning from Albany, having escorted cattle to the main army, ran into a British patrol. 233 Jeremiah Smith (29 November 1759-21 September 1842) from Exeter, New Hampshire, who served in Parker’s company, remembered that

...I got a place in the advanced guard, which consisted of six men, who kept some rods in advance of the main body. After marching some miles in the woods, on a very warm day, we came to a brook and a bridge over it; most of the company, and I among the rest, left the ranks and went to the brook to fill our canteens. A few moments only had passed, when we were startled by a sudden fire of musketry in our front, and saw the other five of the advanced guard (who had continued to proceed on) all cut down. The company was formed

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229 Pension Application Bradley Gilbert, R 21698.
230 Wasmus, p.72.
231 William van Vleck Lidgerwood Collection, Fiche 304-309, Letter U: Reports of the Hesse-Hanau Infantry Regiment von Gall, 1776-1782, fiche 305, Morristown National Historical Park, Morristown, NJ. Bach’s map is included in the appendix to this report.
232 Pension application of David Holbrook, S 23709.
in a moment, and a charge made across the bridge, and the enemy fled with great haste into the woods, leaving their provisions and baggage. It seemed the enemy, about an equal force to ours, were [sic] also upon a scout; they had noticed our approach and placed themselves in ambuscade. A heavy log fence on the left of the road reached from the bridge some distance, and they were concealed behind it, and were ordered to fire as soon as the front rank of our company should pass their left. The advanced guard, and the breaking of our ranks for water, which had not been foreseen, defeated the enemy’s plan, which they could not countermand without being discovered. Only the five men of the advance guard were in front of the ambuscade, and they all fell, riddled with balls. Four of them were instantly killed; the fifth, a Mr. Robb [sic] from Peterboro’, was very severely wounded, but ultimately recovered and lived many years….

Parker’s detachment was saved from the ambush when Samuel Cunningham called for some fifty, non-existent, reinforcements to join them. In their haste to get away Captain Parker had been forced to leave the dead where they had fallen. Later that day Nahum Parker of Colonel Job Cushing Massachusetts Militia who had gone “to Bennington, from there to Stillwater, in a day or two we were ordered back, as was said to fall on the back of Col. Baum’s command, but a detachment under Capt. Parker being waylaid on the Bennington road, we were hastened back on that road, arrived on the battle ground, picked up the dead, and marched to Bennington.” Alexander Watson of Captain Rice’s company in Colonel Joseph Cushing’s Massachusetts Militia (6th or Worcester County) Regiment also remembered the return to Bennington. He had been called out “about the tenth of July” and marched via Bennington to “Halfmoon now Waterford in the county of Saratoga and State of New York where the regiment encamped for about two weeks when said regiment was ordered back to Bennington aforesaid in said state of Vermont to assist in stopping the progress of colonel Baum whom General Burgoyne had detached from his army at Batten Kill with a strong corps against the said town of Bennington where the Americans had depots of provisions and other munitions of War for the use of the northern army opposed to the British army under said general Burgoyne. That the said regiment marched from Halfmoon aforesaid for Bennington aforesaid which latter place it reached just after the defeat of the said colonel Baum and the capture of his corps.”


236 Pension Application of Nahum Parker, S 11200, Massachusetts Militia Colonel Job Cushing’s Regiment, Captain Asa Rice’s company. Parker was born 4 March 1760 and thus 17½ years old at the time of the Battle of Bennington. Parker also kept a diary in five installments covering five of his six short-term terms: 1) 29 April – 10 July 1777, 2) 24 June – 19 October 1777, 3) 1 April – 31 June [sic] 1778, 4) 7 October – 25 December 1779, and 5) 3 July – 12 December 1780. The diary is included in his pension application; the installment from 24 June to 19 October 1777 covers the Battle of Bennington.

Baum and the majority of his troops had indeed been killed or captured, but some had scattered and were escaping toward Cambridge. It is likely that the Stark’s elaborate encirclement plan was too difficult to fully operationalize, and Colonel Brush’s Vermont militia seem to have not been in a position to prevent an escape and retreat. Rufus Bates who served in the company of Captain Ebenezer Allen of Colonel Herrick’s Vermont State Troops recalled that “with four or five other companies [we] were ordered to take the rear of the British [sic] for the purpose of Surrounding them in their entrenchments and to attack the Indians & tories [.] That there was a General battle and Col Baum and his men were principally [sic] all Made prisoners of war [.] That there were a few who made their escape then he followed them.”\textsuperscript{238} Bates was not the only one chasing these men. About two miles down the road they ran headlong into the forces of Lieutenant-Colonel Breymann.

\textsuperscript{238} Pension Application of Rufus Bates S 22634.
6. SECOND PHASE OF THE BATTLE

6.1 KO COA ANALYSIS OF THE SECOND PHASE OF THE BATTLE OF BENNINGTON

Applied to the Battle of Bennington on 16 August 1777 and based on the landscape study by Lord the KOCOA analysis identified these two defining features of the battlefield of the Second Battle of Bennington. (Table 8; Figure 33) The numbering continues from defining features of the First Battle. Each of the defining features is described below. Archeological data that formed the basis for our interpretation are presented in Appendix A.

Table 8. Defining Features of the Bennington Battlefield – Second Phase

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Defining Feature</th>
<th>Battle Phase</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8) Rocky face ridge</td>
<td>2nd Phase</td>
<td>Key terrain. Created choke point on road. Provided concealed position with cover from which Rebels began 2nd Phase. Elevation provided excellent observation. Upon Rebel retreat, created major dead space. Because ridge could not be traversed by wagons, horses, and artillery, terrain was severely restricted at this location.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9) Minor ridges and knolls along road</td>
<td>2nd Phase</td>
<td>Created dead spaces as the lines advanced and treated. Provided observation points and artillery positions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.1.1 Second Phase of the Battle

During the Second Phase of the battle, the steep ridge with the exposed rock faces was key terrain (Figure 34). This ridge and the river were major obstacles that funneled wagons and artillery onto the road, and which provided excellent, elevated firing positions on troops attempting to move down the road. This key terrain provided concealment and coverage to the Rebels in the opening moments of the Second Phase, and allowed the Rebels to resist the reinforced Germans even though outnumbered. Although the Royal forces under Breymann eventually drove the Rebels from this ridge line, the delay provided time for the Rebels to reorganize and for Rebel reinforcements to arrive.

The Royal forces were relying heavily on their 6-pounders during the Second Phase of the battle. Accordingly, their avenues of approach and withdrawal were limited to the main road. As well, the pace of troop movements was limited by the pace of the artillery train. Being consistently tethered to the road,
Figure removed in accordance with the Archaeological Resources Protection Act.
Figure removed in accordance with the Archaeological Resources Protection Act.
the Breymann’s forces were significantly limited in their tactical options. As the Second Phase progressed along the road, minor topographic rises were attractive as observation points and artillery positions. Such rises also provided concealment and dead space to their rear. As the Rebels fell back, there was dead space behind (on the eastern slope) of ridges and subtle knolls. Conversely, it was the western slopes of these landforms that were dead space as the Royal forces fell back.

In the waning moments of the Second Phase, the full circle was closed. The Royal forces returned to west of the Sancoick mill bridge, which again was key terrain as it hindered Rebel pursuit. The Sancoick mill bridgehead allowed the Royal forces to protect their retreat until they gained the concealment of darkness. The Royal forces used that concealment to retreat without further harassment.

### 6.2 The Arrival of Lieutenant Colonel Heinrich Christoph Breymann

By 4:00 p.m. in the afternoon, Baum’s expeditionary force was shattered with his men either dead, captured, or fleeing westward along the Walloomsac River pursued by Stark’s militiamen, and Baum himself a mortally wounded prisoner. Concurrently the first news of the battle reached the Vermont Council of Safety in Bennington. Hundreds of Royal forces had been taken prisoners but with “the Enemy being reinforced” and making “a second stand,” the outcome of the day once again hung in the balance. From Bennington, Jonas Fay, vice-president of the Council of Safety, issued an urgent appeal to the “Gentle[men] nearest commanding Reg[iments] in ye[se] States:”

Gentlemen —

Brig[adier] General Starks from the State of New Hampshire with his Brigade, together with the Militia & Companies of Rangers raised by this State with part of Col[onel] Symonds Regiment of the militia, are now in action with a number of the Enemies Troops assembled near this place, which has been for some time very severe: We have now in possession (taken from them this day) four Brass field pieces, Ordinance Stores &c.

And this moment four or five hundred Prisoners have arrived; we have taken the ground altho' fortified by Intrenchments &c. but after being drove about one mile and the Enemy being reinforced made a second stand & still continue the action; the loss on each side is doubtless considerable, but the numbers cannot ascertain.

You are therefore in the most pressing terms requested by Genl Starks & this Council to forward the whole of the Militia under your several commands to this place without one minutes loss of time: they will proceed on horse-back with all the ammunition that can be provided conveniently; on our present exertion depends the fate of thousands. ²³⁹

The reinforcement mentioned by Fay consisted of the roughly 650 men under Lt-Colonel Heinrich Breymann that Burgoyne had sent out in the morning of 15 August.

²³⁹ *NH State Papers* p. 669.
Table 9. Order of Battle, Breymann’s Column – Second Phase of the Battle

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Formation</th>
<th>Commanding Officer</th>
<th>Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Breymann’s Brigade</td>
<td>Lt. Colonel Heinrich Breymann</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brunswick Grenadiers</td>
<td></td>
<td>333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brunswick Chasseurs/Jäger (from Barner’s Light Infantry Battalion)</td>
<td></td>
<td>288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hesse-Hanau artillery with two 6-lb cannon</td>
<td>Lieutenant Carl Dietmar Spangenberg</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loyalists</td>
<td></td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batmen, servants &amp;c</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>642</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The formation strengths are based on Glasco and Barker. Total casualties for Royal forces in the Second Battle amounted to 231 men in killed, wounded and missing plus the loss of both cannon. Gadue in Fatal Pique provides the same numbers as Glasco for Baum: von Breymann Grenadier Battalion (333), von Barner Light Infantry Battalion (288) (incl. 2nd Company of Jaegers), Hesse Hanau Artillery (2 guns: 6-pdr – 21 men) for the same total of 642 men. Gabriel in Boutelle’s Diary gives the strength of Breymann’s relief expedition as 664 men as does Doblin in her translation of the Specht Journal.

Burgoyne had sent out Breymann’s reinforcement in the morning of 15 August already but he reached the battlefield in late afternoon of 16 August. There are numerous explanations for why it took Breymann nearly two days to make it to the battlefield ranging from a personal pique against Baum - Breymann did not want to come to Baum’s rescue too soon to make sure he had been badly beaten and suffered a blow to his reputation - to the bad weather to Breymann being unaware that there was a battle going on. Breymann himself admitted to Burgoyne that he had “Scarce made 1/2 English mile in an hour” but blamed the “Number of Hills, excessive bad roads, & a continued rain.”

The intentional slowing down, a charge leveled by contemporaries, was recently rejected by battlefield historian Michael P. Gabriel. Gabriel offers a convincing case that Breymann was indeed unaware of the battle raging a few short miles ahead of him. As Breymann himself explained, “At 1/2 past 4 OClock in the afternoon, I reached the Mill, & found the advanced Guard in possession of it, & all quiet. I must positively declare, that neither during the march, not even after I reached the Mill, did I hear a Single Shot fired either

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243 Gadue, 'Fatal Pique.'
from Small arms or Canon.” 

Contemporaries often rejected that argument - artillery fire can be heard for 10 miles or more and the distance from Stephen van Rensellaer’s mill to the battlefield with its 3,000+ combatants is barely three miles, but under the right circumstances the sound travelled barely a mile. Not knowing that Baum’s men were fighting for their lives, Breymann declined to push his exhausted men and horses forward through roads that had become well-nigh impassible after 24 hours of incessant rain.

Breymann did not become aware of the battle until alerted by Skene, who had sent two men to him at “about 2 OClock desiring an officer & 20 men to take possession of the Mill at Saint Cork [St Coyk] which the Rebels intended possessing themselves of. Instead of the Detachment which he asked for, I sent Captain Gleisenberg, with the advanced Guard consisting of 60 Grenadiers & Chasseurs & 20 Riflemen [Jäger].”

Around 4:30 p.m. Skene met Breymann at the mill and informed him “that the Corps of Lt. Col. Baum, was not above 2 miles from me, I imagined I could not do better, than push on to his Support. Col. Skene was of the same opinion, & we marched on, over the bridge near the mill, endeavouring to reach Col. Baum as soon as possible. At this time I knew nothing of his engagement being over. If Col. Skene knew it, I cannot conceive what his reasons were for concealing it from me. If I had known it, I certainly Should not have engaged the enemy.” Skene must have been aware of Baum’s desperate situation and told Breymann so, in which case Breymann’s report to Burgoyne contains more than a grain of self-defense on Breymann’s part.

Though unstated in Jonas Fay’s letter quoted above, there was another reason for his anxiety besides the arrival of Breymann and his troops near the battlefield. The haphazard pursuit of the remnants of Baum’s forces and disintegration of Stark’s forces who considered the battle over and won could jeopardize the victory. They were as surprised when they heard Breymann’s cannon roaring as Breymann was when he ran into Stark’s men. Militiaman Jesse Field remembered that

When the prisoners were collected, they were sent off under a guard to Bennington. Our men were scattered all over the field of battle, some resting them selves, some looking up the dead and wounded, and others in pursuit of plunder. An hour or two before sunset I heard the report of cannon, and news soon came that our men were attacked by a body of Hessians who had come to reinforce Baum. I with others went down on the side-hill north of the road. When we came in sight of the enemy, they were marching up the road this side the brick factory, their cannon in front clearing the way. Our men kept collecting in front and on the left The party I was with took post with others ’on the side-hill above the road, within from twenty to thirty rods of the enemy, and kept up a constant fire generally from behind trees. The road appeared full of men, and It was like firing into a flock of sheep. The enemy kept firing upon us, but we were greatly protected by the trees. The battle continued till about dark, when the enemy retreated and were not pursued far.

The battle over, Silas Walbridge

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246 Jennings, Memorials pp. 182-83.
went back with Captain Warner to where the action began, to look for the wounded, and while there we heard firing, the beginning of the second battle. We made all haste to the scene of action, and found things in much confusion. Some of the officers were ordering “forward” others saying “retreat.” Our men retreated for some time, finally made a stand, and after hard fighting till about night we drove the enemy and took their cannon. This battle lasted an hour and a half or two hours. Warner's regiment, I believe, kept in order on the retreat, and served as a rallying point for the other troops.\textsuperscript{247}

Those who did pursue the remnants of Baum’s fleeing detachment had no inkling of the approaching forces under Breymann and were completely surprised when they received fire. Rufus Bates remembered that

there were a few who made their escape then he followed them not expecting to meet with any other Opposition he soon met a reinforcement of about 700 Commanded by Col Brichman [Breymann] and in the afternoon we had a Second battle fortunately for us at this time Col Warner came up with his continental regiment and advanced upon them who at that time were driving us and we were retreating the Co Warner with his Regt Sustained us until the Militia could assemble the battle was kept up until it was dark when the enemy retired.\textsuperscript{248}

As Baum’s defense collapsed, Jesse Fields

ran down the hill to the south and south-east. We ran over and round their works after them, and continued the pursuit until they were all, or nearly all, killed, or taken. The day was very warm, the Hessians [sic] were in full dress, and very heavily armed, and we in our shirts and trousers, and without our knap sacks, and thus had greatly the advantage in the pursuit. After we passed the redoubt there was no regular battle, — all was confusion, — a party of our men would attack and kill, or take prisoners, another party of Hessians [sic]. Every man seemed to manage for himself, and, being attached by chance to some squad, either under some officer, or without any, would attack every party that came in their way. I should think I did not continue in the pursuit over half a mile, though some parties went further, — probably nearly down to Runsellan's Mills.\textsuperscript{249}

It was indeed near van Rensselaer’s Mill that the pursuers ran head-long into the relief force under Colonel Breymann. Nathan Mason deposed how

after the battle with Baum he with Some others pursued after those that had fled as he expected and come upon the reinforcements commanded by Col Brickman [Breymann] but did not discover them until they fired upon them or him with canister Shot which went over his head he then retreated he thinks half a mile when he met his Regiment and joined them and fought on the retreat until a line of battle was formed at which time Col. Warner came up with his continental Regiment and then the action was Sustained after which Col.

\textsuperscript{247}Jennings, \textit{Memorials} p. 183.
\textsuperscript{248}Pension Application Rufus Bates S 22634
\textsuperscript{249}Jennings, \textit{Memorials}, p. 177.
Brickman [Breymann] was compelled to retire the firing continued however until dark after which the Enemy went away under the cover of the night.  

Massachusetts militiaman David Holbrook provides one of the most vivid accounts of the Second Phase of the Battle from the point of view of one of Stark’s men. As some of Baum’s men were running to Escape Col Herrick of the Green Mountain Rangers rode along near where this declarer was and cried out “Boys follow me” and this declarer with one other ran after him about two miles to Ramplers Mills when he stopped his horse and drew up his piece and fired and then wheeled his horse and said there was a reinforcement of British Coming which was soon discovered to be from 9 to 1200 British soldiers with a 9 and 6 pounder and a band of Musick Col Herrick ran his horse to give intelligence to General Stark and this Declarant and his Companion having got out of breath ran behind a Hay Stack and rested till the British army Came alone and discharged their pieces at the Enemy and ran. The Enemy returned the fire by the discharge of a six pounder which gave general alarm. The Americans then ran together and formed about a Mile south westerly from the intrenchments which had been occupied by General Baum and headed [i.e. faced] the reinforcement which was under the Command of Col Breiman and Major Skeins of Skeinsborough but the Americans in pursuing those who Escaped from the intrenchments had got scattered and fatigued and but few assembled at first but kept falling in Continually until a line was formed along a fence on the North East side of the Meadow in which was the Hay Stack aforesaid in the Edge of a piece of woods and the British army formed a line in the Meadow and Extending across the road and the firing Commenced as soon as they came within Musket Shot but the Americans not being sufficiently strong to keep the ground retreated from tree to tree firing as they left the trees until they came to a ravine where was a log fence there made a halt and held the ground, the British came up within about 16 rods [= 264 feet or 88 yards] and stood the firing there Continued some time without Cessation.

Once again the outcome of the battle hung in the balance. On 14 August, Stark had ordered Warner’s men to join him but even during late afternoon of 16 August they were still no-where in sight. Upon receipt of Stark’s order late on 14 August to deploy to Bennington, Stafford decided to wait for the return “of a large scout under Captain John Chipman.” But “perhaps from some other causes” as well the about 150 men strong unit “did not march till the morning of the 15th” on modern Vermont Route 7 toward Bennington. “The day was rainy, but by marching till nearly midnight we arrived within about a mile of Bennington village and encamped.” Due to the horrid weather he did not march quite as far or fast as Stark had a few days earlier and encamped at Harwood Hill just north of Bennington. “We were drenched with rain,” Jacob Safford remembered in 1828, “and our arms and equipments having been all day exposed to the weather, it took a considerable part of the forenoon of the next day to fit ourselves for a march. We were also short of ammunition, which occasioned some delay, and so much time was employed in making the necessary preparations for battle, that it was about noon, or perhaps a little past, when the regiment marched from

250 Pension application Nathan Mason S 9000.
251 Pension application of David Holbrook, S 23709.
252 The following account is taken from Jennings, Memorials, pp. 183-185.
Bennington village" south following the route Stark had taken earlier in the week. Even though "[w]hile going down the Henderson hill [two miles from Bennington] a scattering fire of musketry was commenced in the direction of the battle-ground" Warner's men do not seem to have been in a hurry.

We halted a short time at Stark's encampment [four miles from Bennington]; left our coats and knapsacks; and a gill of rum with water was dealt to each man. The weather was extremely warm, and after crossing the first bridge [about five and three-quarter miles from Bennington] we were halted while the men drank at the river. Two sergeants were now requested to volunteer to head the line, and I with another went in front. About this time the firing, which had gradually increased, became very heavy, and a general attack seemed to be made. We now began to meet the wounded, and when we arrived at the second bridge," [three-quarters of a mile below the first], the Hessians were running down the hill, and the two pieces of cannon were taken. If we halted at all at this place, it was but for a very few minutes. Here I was put in command of the left flank guard, and the march was continued by the regiment down the road, and by myself and guard across the flat. There was also a flank guard on the right. We continued our march until we came to the top of the eminence next beyond where the brick factory now stands [one and a half miles below the second bridge], where I found the regiment had halted. On inquiring the cause, I was told that a reinforcement of the enemy was near. I mounted a fence, and saw the enemy's flank-guard beyond the next hill, say half a mile distant.

The timely arrival of Warner's men saved the retreating Americans. Holbrook remembered how at this critical juncture

Col Warner with the remains of his regiment Came up and some of his men understanding the Artillery Exercise took over one of the field pieces taken in the first engagement and formed on the right of the party in which was this declarer and about the same time an Old man with an old Queen Annes Iron sword and mounted upon an Old Black Mare with about 91 robust Men following him in files two deep Came up and filed in front of the Company Commanded by Captain Parker in which this declarant then was and just as the Old man had got his men to the spot and halted his mare fell & he jumped upon a large white oak stump and gave the Command Captain Parker seeing the Old Mans Company between him & the Enemy Ordered his men to file in between their files which were some distance apart & which was immediately done and the battle then became desperate and immediately this declarant heard a tremendous Crash up in the woods at the right wing of the American troops which was seconde(?) by a yell the most terrible that he ever heard then he heard the voice of Colonel Warner like thunder "Fix Bayonet – Charge" then the Old man on the stump cried out “Charge Boys” and jumped from the stump and ran towards the Enemy his men some with & some without bayonets followed suit & rushed upon the Enemy with all their might who seeing us Coming took to their heels and were Completely routed, as we came up to the Enemys [sic] line their field piece being Charged a Sergeant Luttendon knocked down the man with the port fire and Caught hold of the Limber and whirled about the piece and fired it at the Enemy and the blast (?) overtook them before

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they had got ten rods [= 165 feet] and mowed down a large number of them Those of the Americans who had not got too much fatigued surround and killed and took a number of the Enemy the Indians that survived the slaughter Escaped.253

Table 10. Order of Battle, Rebel Forces, Second Phase of the Battle

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Formation</th>
<th>Commanding Officer</th>
<th>Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Warner’s Division</td>
<td>Colonel Seth Warner</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green Mountain Boys (including Captain Thomas Lee’s Independent Ranger Company)</td>
<td>Lt. Colonel Samuel Stafford</td>
<td>~ 140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts Militia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worcester County militia</td>
<td>Major John Rand</td>
<td>~ 90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Hampshire Militia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eleventh New Hampshire Militia Regiment (2 companies)</td>
<td>Colonel Stickney</td>
<td>~ 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>~ 330</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Figures are based on Glasco at [https://jdglasco.files.wordpress.com/2014/05/bennington-aug-1777.pdf](https://jdglasco.files.wordpress.com/2014/05/bennington-aug-1777.pdf) and on information and comments provided by Michael Gabriel

Jacob Safford remembered: “We were then ordered to form a line for battle, by filing to the right; but, owing to the order not being understood in the rear, the line was formed by filing to the left, which brought many of our men into a sort of swamp, instead of on the hill above where we should have been. We, however, waited the approach of the enemy, and commenced firing as they came up; but owing, as I think, to the unfavorable nature of the ground, we soon began a retreat, which was continued slowly and in good order, firing constantly for about three-quarters of a mile, until we reached the high ground west of the run of water, where we made a stand. The enemy had two pieces of cannon in the road, and their line extended a considerable distance both below and above the road. A party of Hessians [Germans] undertook to outflank us on the right, and partly succeeded, but were finally repulsed and driven back. The action was warm and close for nearly two hours, when it being near dark the enemy were [sic] forced to retreat. One of their pieces of cannon was taken near the run, and the other a few rods below the brick factory.”254

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253 Since Holbrook had been wounded in the first battle, “when the Enemy fled in the second Engagement he found himself Exhausted and Could not pursue, the blow upon his head and the wound in his leg having Occasioned the loss of Considerable blood he found himself unable to walk and was put upon a horse and carried back to Bennington where he remained 10 or 12 days until he got sufficiently recovered from his wounds to march”. Pension application of David Holbrook, S 23709. Holbrook was born 30 July 1760 and barely 17 years old at the Battle of Bennington. The deposition is dated 19 September 1832; Holbrook died two months later on 29 November 1832.

254 Jennings, Memorials, pp. 184/85.
All participants agree that the second phase of the battle, which Boutelle vividly describes as the “grape shot and leaden balls as thick as hail whizzing about our ears,” was even more harrowing than the first (Figure 37). Thomas Mellen provides one of the best descriptions of the pursuit and subsequent battle, which participants described as the longest and fiercest action of the day, which “was kept up until it was dark [i.e. around 08:00 p.m.] when the enemy retired.”

Mellen recalled:

We pursued till we met Breymann with eight hundred fresh troops and larger cannon, which opened a fire of grape shot. Some of the grape shot riddled a Virginia fence near me, one struck a small white oak tree behind which I stood. Though it hit higher than my head, I fled from the tree, thinking it might be aimed at again. We skirmishers ran back till we met a large body of Stark's men, then faced about. I soon started for a brook I saw a few rods behind, for I had drank nothing all day, and should have died with thirst had I not chewed a bullet all the time. I had not gone a rod when I was stopped by an officer, sword in hand, and ready to cut me down as a runaway. On my complaining of thirst, he handed me his canteen, which was full of rum. I drank and forgot my thirst.

But the enemy outflanked us, and I said to a comrade: we must run or they will have us. He said: “I will have one more fire first.” At that moment a Major [John Rand of the Worcester County Militia] on a black horse rode along behind us, shouting: "Fight on, boys; reinforcements close by." While he was yet speaking, a grape shot went through his horse's head and knocked out two teeth. It bled a good deal, but the Major kept his seat and spurred on to encourage others. In five minutes we saw Warner's men hurrying to help us. They opened right and left of us, and half of them attacked each flank of the enemy, and beat back those who were just closing around us. Stark's men now took heart and stood their ground. My gun-barrel was by this time too hot to hold, so I seized the musket of a dead Hessian, in which my bullets went down easier than in my own. Right in front were the cannon, and seeing an officer on horseback waving his sword to the artillermen, I fired at him twice. His horse fell. He cut the traces of an artillery horse, mounted him and rode off. I afterwards heard that that officer was Major Skeene.

Soon the Germans ran and we followed. Many of them threw down their guns on the ground, or offered them to us, or kneeled, some in puddles of water. One said to me: *wir sind ein, bruder!* I pushed him behind me and rushed on. All those near me did so. The enemy beat a parley, minded to give up, but our men did not understand it. I came to one wounded man, flat on the ground, crying water, or quarter. I snatched his sword out of his scabbard and, while I ran on and fired, carried it in my mouth, thinking I might need it. The Germans fled by the road and in a wood each side of it. Many of their scabbards caught in the brush and held the fugitives till we seized them. We chased them till dark. Colonel Johnston, of Haverhill, wanted to chase them all night. Had we done so, we might have mastered them all, for they stopped within three miles of the battle-field. But Stark, saying he would run no risk of spoiling a good day's work, ordered a halt and return to quarters.

255 Boutelle, “Diary”, p. 22.
256 Pension Application of Rufus Bates, S 22634.
As I was coming back, when ordered by Stark himself, who knew me, as I had been one of his body guard in Canada, to help draw off a field piece. I told him I was worn out. His answer was: ‘Don't seem to disobey; take hold, and if you can't hold out, slip away in the dark.” Before we had dragged the gun far, Warner rode near us. Some one pointing to a dead man by the wayside, said to him: "Your brother is killed! "Is it Jesse?” asked Warner; and when the answer was, Yes, he jumped off his horse, stooped and gazed in the dead man's face, and then rode away without saying a word. On my way back I got the belt of the Hessian, whose sword I had taken in the pursuit. I also found a barber's pack, but was obliged to give up all my findings till the booty was divided. To the best of my remembrance, my share was four dollars and some odd cents. One Tory with his left eye shot out, was led by me mounted on a horse who had also lost his left eye. It seems cruel now-it did not then.

My company lay down and slept in a cornfield near where we had fought; each man having a hill of corn for a pillow. When I waked [sic] next morning I was so beaten out that I could not get up till I had rolled about in good while.257

Though Stark may have been aware of (or afraid of?) reinforcement for Baum being on the way, or just have used due diligence on the day of the battle when he sent out scouts “to reconnoiter the Enemy and ascertain their position and the Situation of their reinforcements which were to be Several Miles in rear of their advance of battle until after Baum had surrendered,” the battle had taken on a life of its own as his men sensed victory. Josiah Dunning of Capt. Samuel Robinson’s company of the Vermont militia who was on that scouting detachment placed Baum’s surrender “about the same time the British reinforcements arrived and formed a line of Battle and immediately within about one mile of the battle ground were met by the Americans upon which they forthwith retreated.”258

Retreat they did once Warner’s regiment had arrived on the scene, and though the Second Phase of the Battle was relatively short, it was hard fought and intense. One participant recalled that “Just at this critical time Colonel Warner arrived on the ground with his regiment and the action was very bloody for about thirty minutes.”259

There are only two eyewitness accounts from the point of view of the Royal forces: one by Johann Bense, a common grenadier in Breymann’s Grenadiers and the report by Breymann himself. Bense recorded in his diary that on 16 August 1777:

> Around 4 o'clock in the afternoon, we encountered the enemy; a skirmish ensued; our Dragoons had already been made prisoner. We ran into the fire at full speed. A man by the name of Christian [?] Genrecke [?] from Captain von Schick's Company, who was my good brother and cousin, had been taken prisoner together with the Dragoons [although he actually was a member] of the commando of the Grenadiers. The enemy at first withdrew but because they were as yet 4 to 5 times as strong as we and were also better acquainted

257 Mellen, pp. 27-29.
258 Pension Application of Josiah Dunning, S 23207.
259 Younglove, p. 27.
with this region, they encircled us, and our right wing had to withdraw. I have this as proof [?] because as the Rebels first time, I received a wound in the belly on the left side from the company were taken together with me to the Miller. Since very many of the company had been taken killed, I did not complain.  

In his report of 20 August 1777 to Burgoyne, Breymann reported that he had scarce passed the bridge [at van Rensellaer’s Mill] 1000 yards When I perceived a considerable number of armed people, some in Jackets [Camisolen] & Some in Shirts, who were endeavouring to gain a height, which was on my left flank. I Shewed these people to Col. Skene, who assured me they were Royalists, & rode up towards them, & called out, but received no other answer than a discharge of firearms. I immediately ordered Maj: Barner's Battallion to move off towards the height. The Riffle [Jäger] Company & Grenadiers moved towards the right, & thus began the attack & lasted till towards 8 o'clock. The Canon were posted on the road, where there was a blockhouse, which the Rebels left as soon as they began to fire upon it. Notwithstanding fresh Support was constantly coming in to them, they were driven from every height.

The troops did their duty, & everyone concerned did the Same. As all the ammunition was expended, & the Canon ceased firing, nothing was more natural than to expect the enemy to renew the attack, which in fact was the case. I hastened with a Number of men towards the Canon, in order to bring them off. On this occasion the men received the most dangerous wounds, particularly Lt. Spangenberg, some fireworkers, & some Artillery. The Horses were all killed & if everyone had been alive, it would not have been possible to have moved him. In order then, not to risqué [sic] everything, as I could not return the enemy's fire, as soon as it was dark, I retired over the bridge, which I broke down, brought off as many of the wounded as I could, & in company with Col. Skene, arrived about 12 o'Clock at Cambridge, where after taking the necessary precautions, I remained all night, & the next day the 17th [of August] arrived at the Camp.

This is the best account I can give of the whole affair. The loss of my Canon gives me the greatest concern. I did everything in my power to save them, but the want of ammunition prevented me, not only from returning the enemy's fire, but even of getting out of it. Many lost their lives & limbs, & could I have saved my Canon, I would with pleasure have Sacrificed my life to have effected it.”

Royal forces had indeed been “Defeated and put to the Rout”, as Loyalist George Rosenbarica put it in his claim report to the British Audit Office. But it was only in the coming days and weeks that the full extent

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261 Quoted in Gabriel, Soldiers and Civilians, p. 77.
of the damage done at Bennington, both in human lives as well as for Burgoyne’s plans of taking Albany, became apparent.
7. AFTERMATH

7.1 SCAVENGING

Numerous tasks awaited the victors in the immediate aftermath of the victory: taking care of the wounded on both sides, moving the prisoners of war and the captured Tories, and burying the dead. But in the waning minutes and immediate aftermath of the battle the soldiers first thought of something else. Stark had promised his men the plunder, the material spoils of the battle, as a reward, but that did not keep some of the men from collecting a personal “souvenir” of the battle for themselves. Jesse Field remembered that “When the prisoners were collected, they were sent off under a guard to Bennington. Our men were scattered all over the field of battle, some resting themselves, some looking up the dead and wounded, and others in pursuit of plunder.”

Both Wasmus as well as artillery Lieutenant Johann Michael Bach reported being robbed and plundered of their possessions and for days thereafter militiamen could be seen wearing captured gorgets, Brunswick grenadier caps, and other spoils of war. Lieutenant Thomas Jewett of Captain Dewey’s Company took the “sword and hat” from Colonel Baum. Stark was determined that his men should have their share and was opposed to sending wagons to pick up plunder even from officers who had helped themselves contrary to his orders. On 25 September the Vermont Council of Safety ordered five teams “for Cols. Brown and Herrick to bring plunder to this place (Bennington).” On 26 September 1777, Lieutenant Ebenezer Hide was “ordered to repair to Paulet for a load of plunder belonging to Col Brown, which load he is to Deliver safe to this Council.”

Some plunder got away nevertheless. Simon Nelson remembered that his “Father and John Law happened to be among a party of Tories when they were taken prisoner together. They were thus prevented from gathering any of the plunder on the battlefield in which work some of our neighbors were quite successful. […] Neighbor Simpson was quite diligent in gathering plunder. He moved his goods from home in an ox-

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262 Jennings, Memorials, pp. 182/83.
263 Jennings, Memorials, p. 286. The story of the sword following the battle is further related by Jennings: After the battle Jewett sold the sword to David Robinson, and “Robinson subsequently used the sword as a captain of cavalry and later as a field and general officer of the militia, and is still in the possession of his grandson, G. W. Robinson. Lieut. Jewett tore off the ornaments from the hat and wore it, as he had lost his own. It is now in the possession of descendants in Weybridge.”
264 See Manuscript Vermont State Papers Record Series: A-006, Vol. Stevens, Vol. 3, p. 599, 20 August 1777: “Colonel William Williams orders Captain Samuel Robinson to bring Alexander Gordon and his wife into court to answer to a charge of secreting plunder taken at the battle of Bennington and Williams' order to Captain Samuel Robinson at Bennington to search the house of Lieutenant Jacob Hide for plunder taken at the Battle of Bennington by the soldiers. Also to bring Alexander Gordon and wife, with any others found to have so taken plunder, before the Court.” Vermont State Archives, Montpelier, VT. John Wallace recorded in his diary for Tuesday, 19 August: “about 10 loads of Plunder Came today from the Lines.” Bennington Evening Banner 3 May 1932.
265 Records of New Hampshire, p. 182.
266 The letter to Gates is quoted in full in Primary Sources – American – Official Correspondence.
sled, but had three full loads to bring back—knapsacks, carts, wagons, et cetera.” What could be collected was sold and the funds distributed among the militia. Dan Kent remembered that he never received “any pay for his service except four dollars continental money, which they told him was his share of the plunder of the Battle of Bennington.”

Stark did not forget, however, to send trophies to the appropriate civil authorities to acknowledge their role in the victory. On 6 September, the “Honorable Council of the State of Vermont” acknowledged “that Brigadier General Stark has this day made a present of one Hessian Broad Sword … in order to be kept in said Council Chamber as a Memorial in Commemoration of the Glorious Action fought at Walloomsack August 16 1777 in which case the Exertions of the said Council was found to be Exceeding serviceable.” Probably around the same time in early September Stark made a similar present to the State of New Hampshire. The Council Minutes record that “General Stark presents his most respectful Compliments to the Honourable the Council and House of Representatives for the State of New Hampshire, & begs their Acceptance of a Hessian Dragoon Sword, Drum, Gun, Cartridge Box, Bayonet & Grenadier Cap:—The trophies of the Memorable Battle fought by their Militia in conjunction with the Militia, of the State of Vermont & Massachusetts Bay on the 16th August 1777, at Walloomscook, & desires they may be deposited in the State in memory of that glorious victory given them by the Divine Being who overpowers & Rules all things.” Today the collections of the New Hampshire Historical Society and the Massachusetts State Archives include Brunswick cartridge boxes, broad swords (or pallashes), brass drums, muskets, bayonets, and grenadier caps captured at Bennington.

The two most visible symbols of the victory at Bennington, however, are two cannon captured by Stark’s forces at Bennington. One is the so-called “Molly Stark” cannon. Cast in Paris in 1743 for the Compagnie des Indes, the 4-lb (French) cannon had been shipped to Canada prior to the French and Indian War and

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267 Their Own Voices, p. 65. On the controversy between Col. William Williams and the Rev. Samuel Ely concerning Ely’s supposed plundering of “A number of silk and worsted hose, one British officers coat, one gold diamond ring, one pair of shoes, a number of holland shirts, several pair of breeches, (some of which he sold to the prisoners for solid coin) one gold eppalet, one lawn apron, a considerable quantity of linnen, some engineers instruments, a pocket book, and many other articles too numerous to mention; all of which he knew to be in direct opposition to general orders” at Bennington see http://boston1775.blogspot.com/search/label/Samuel%20Ely

268 Pension Application of Dan Kent W 21510.

269 On 20 September 1777 “The Council beg leave to return their sincere thanks to the Hon$ble$ Brigadier General John Starkes for the Infinite Service he has been pleased to do them in defending them and their Constituents from the cruel & bloody rage of their unnatural Enemy who sought to destroy them on the 16 day of August last. They also return their grateful acknowledgments for the Honor the General has been pleased to do the Council by presenting them with a Hessian Gun with Bayonet, one Broad Sword, one Brass Berriled Drum, & one Granidiers Cap, Taken on the Memorable 16 of August aforesaid for the use of this State. The General may rely that they will be reserved for the use they were designed.” Records of VT, p. 173. Similarly Stark sent a musket, sword, grenadier cap and drum to the Massachusetts legislature. The legislature responded by sending him “a complete suit of clothes becoming his rank, together with a piece of linen, as a testimony of the high sense this court has of the great and important services rendered by that brave officer, to the United States of America.” Caleb Stark, Memoir and official Correspondence of Gen. John Stark (Concord: G.P. Lyon, 1860), pp. 141/42.


271 Illustrations of these battlefield artifacts can be found on the New Hampshire Historical Society webpage and are also shown in Don Troiani and James L. Kochan, Don Troiani’s Soldiers of the American Revolution. Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books, 2007), pp. 64-77.
was captured in the Battle of the Plains of Abraham outside Quebec in 1759. Recaptured at Bennington the cannon became the property of Stark and eventually ended up with the New Boston (New Hampshire) Artillery Company and is currently owned by the New Boston Historical Society.\textsuperscript{272} The other cannon, discovered by Henry Stevens in Washington, D.C. and returned to Vermont in 1848, stands today outside the Vermont State House.\textsuperscript{273}

\section*{7.2 Prisoners}

A counting of the dead and wounded showed the enormity of the defeat that Burgoyne’s forces had suffered at Bennington. General Benjamin Lincoln informed the Massachusetts Council that Stark had captured 37 British soldiers, 398 Germans, 38 Canadians, and 155 Loyalists, not including officers and the wounded.\textsuperscript{274} Brigadier John Nixon informed General William Heath on 25 August 1777 that Stark had taken “4 Brass Field Pieces, a Medicine Chest &ca. Taken, kill’d & wounded of the Enemy” were a total of 936 officers and men at minimal losses on the American side: 33 killed and 50 wounded.\textsuperscript{275} In his letter to General Horatio Gates of 22 August, Stark estimated “about seven hundred prisoners, two hundred and seven dead on the spot, the number of wounded is yet unknown….Our loss was inconsiderable; about forty wounded and thirty killed.”\textsuperscript{276} The official count of the losses of Baum’s detachment shows an even blunter story of disaster; of the 195 non-commissioned officers, drummers and dragoons, only six rejoined the colors, as did one of the 24 grenadiers and two of the 57 men of Barner’s Light Infantry battalion.\textsuperscript{277} Total casualties for the Royal forces in the second phase of the battle amounted to 231 men in killed, wounded and missing out of 642 men (36 percent losses) plus the loss of both cannon.\textsuperscript{278} The Loyalists and Canadians had suffered similarly high percentages in losses.

Throughout the day, as prisoners entered Bennington, the little village found itself completely overwhelmed by the influx of these men and their guards. The only place to put many of the Germans and Canadians was the Congregational Church, at least temporarily. Lemuel Clarke of Colonel Woodbridge’s Massachusetts Militia Regiment “with part of the Reg’ arrived at Bennington the day after Gen’ Starke took the Hessians [sic] under Col. Baum was appointed and served as Qr [quarter] Master – found the meeting house at Bennington well filled with Hessians [sic].”\textsuperscript{279} Some of the reinforcements such as the regiment under


Some historians have argued that the “Molly Stark”, being a French 4-lb gun, could not have been at Bennington since two of the cannon captured at Bennington were 6-lb guns but see the discussion on pp. 5/6 in the pdf.

\textsuperscript{273} Stark, \textit{Official Correspondence}, p. 136.

Engraved on them is the inscription: ‘Taken from the Germans at Bennington, August 16, 1777.’”

\textsuperscript{274} Benjamin Lincoln to the Massachusetts Council, August 18, 1777, in Caleb Stark, ed., \textit{Memoir and Official Correspondence of Gen. John Stark; also a Biography of Capt. Phineas Stevens and of Col. Robert Rogers} (Reprint, 1877; Bowie, MD: Heritage Books, Inc., 1999), 132-133.

\textsuperscript{275} Nixon’s letter is quoted in full in Primary Sources – American – Official Correspondence.

\textsuperscript{276} Stark’s letter is quoted in full in Primary Sources – American – Official Correspondence.

\textsuperscript{277} The compilation is reproduced in full in Primary Sources – Brunswick.


\textsuperscript{279} Pension Application of Lemuel Clarke, S 17343
Colonel Cushing that marched hurriedly from Half-Moon to Bennington on 16 August arrived too late to participate in the battle and instead “served in guarding the prisoners.”\footnote{Pension Application of Stephen Bellows, W 23577.} James Holcomb thought that “about seven Hundred prisoners were taken and that he believes the whole or a greater part of them were Germans having never found one of them able to converse in English.”\footnote{Pension Application James Holcomb, R 5128.} After having watched the burial of the dead on the battlefield, Thomas Mellen recalled that he “went to Bennington and saw the prisoners paraded. They were drawn up in one long line, the British foremost, then the Waldechers [sic], next the Indians, and hindmost the Tories.”\footnote{Mellen, p. 29.}

The 50x40-foot church building was hardly large enough for all of the prisoners, though Wasmus claimed that 480 prisoners packed the church. Sometime after dark on 17 August the prisoners crammed inside heard the sound of breaking wood. Not knowing the cause of the noise, many of the prisoners feared that the galleries might be collapsing and rushed for the doors. As the panicking men tried to break down the doors, the scared militia guards opened fire, killing a number of the prisoners. Pompey Woodward, a fifteen-year-old black youth serving with the Massachusetts militia as a waiter to the militia colonel, recalled that the prisoners “were fired upon by the sentries, while [still] in the meeting house.”\footnote{Pension Records, Pompey Woodward W4867, quoted in Michael P. Gabriel, “Incident at the Bennington Meeting House, August 17, 1777” Journal of the Johannes Schwalm Historical Association vol. 14 (2011), pp. 88-92.} Arriving the day after the battle, Nahum Parker entered into his diary that on “Sunday 17 I was on guard Last Night we marched into Bennington … and our men Beat and Took About 700 Prisoners [.] in the Evening the Prisoners got out And they Killed Five of them”.\footnote{Diary of Nahum Parker in his Pension Application S 11200.} John Wallace remembered that on 17 August, “Sabbath day…17 our men brought in 80 prisoners and one of our women Brought in with them who was taken by the Indians – the Prisoners in attempting to escape 6 [were] shot by the guards [.] 3 got [.] of which caused as to Keep a Stronger Guard [on] the British, hizions [Hessians] & other Prisoners.”\footnote{John Wallace diary as quoted in Bennington Evening Banner 3 May 1932.}

Eventually the prisoners were marched off to Rutland, Boston, Springfield or “the County of Berkshire, where they were billeted amongst the inhabitants.”\footnote{Pension Application James Holcomb, R 5128.} Nathan Mason recalled that on the Monday after the battle, he “…marched to the Village of Bennington where the Hessions [sic] were and he was detached as one of the Guard to take charge of them under the command of Major Stratton and the next day he was marched as a Guard with the Hessions [sic] through Lanesborough Pitsfield over the Green Mountain to Old Springfield where the Hessions [sic] were placed under the charge of Some troops that were there Stationed.”\footnote{Pension Application Nathan Mason, S 9000.}

### 7.3 Battlefield Burials

Concurrently the wounded had to be taken care of and the dead buried. Whenever possible, Americans took care to give their own dead decent burials. William Boutelle recorded that on 16 August “Night came on and [we] were forbidden to pursue the enemy. We continued to our quarters bringing with us the body of
Thomas Joslin who was killed in the first onset; he was tied up in a sheet and swung on a pole, and two of us had to carry him at a time and changed often.” A bit later on he recorded: “17th – Sabbath Day. I went and helped to make a coffin for Thomas Joslin, Dec’s’d, and went to the funeral ….The deceased was conveyed in a wagon to Bennington and decently buried in their burying ground, the minister of the town attended and went to pray at the grave; the whole company followed the corpse to the grave as mourners.”

Sometimes, a formal burial in consecrated ground does not seem to have been possible, even for officers. Thomas Mellen recalled how “Not more than a rod from where I fought, we found Captain McClary dead, and stripped naked. We scraped a hole with sticks and just covered him with earth.” On 17 August, while marching to Bennington, Nahum Parker and his detachment “found two dead men on our road.” It is likely that Parker did not leave the dead there but probably buried them by the side of the road.

Chauncey Rice in Capt. Barnes’ Company of Massachusetts Militia wrote that “the Lieutenat [sic] was killed and buried” where he had fallen “…at the foot of a tree.”

The most prominent casualty of the battle was undoubtedly Lieutenant Colonel Baum, who was mortally wounded in the engagement of 16 August (Figures 35 and 36). Stripped of his clothing and taken in a carriage to a house on the road to Bennington, he died two days later on 18 August as Benjamin Lincoln informed General Schuyler. Baum seems to have been buried without much fanfare or military protocol; not even his grave-site is known with certainty. Such lack of decorum for a high-ranking officer speaks volumes about the deep emotions if not hatred that the Vermonters, Yorkers, and New Hampshiremen felt for the invaders, particularly in comparison with the somber burial replete with full military honors, a gun salute, and stone marker given Hessian Lieutenant Colonel von Donop just a few months later after he was killed during the attack on Fort Red Bank in New Jersey.

The Vermont Historical Gazetteer wrote in 1867 that “Among those of the enemy who lost their lives in the action wore the commander of the expedition, Col. Baum, and the leader of the tories, Col. Pfister. They were both mortally wounded, and separately brought a mile and a half this side [towards Bennington] the battle-ground, to a house still standing opposite the paper-mill of Messrs. Hunter & Co. They both died within twenty-four hours, and were buried near the bank of the river, a few rods below the paper-mill — There is nothing to mark the spot, and the precise place of their interment is not known.”

While the exact location of Baum’s and Pfister’s (the ranking officers) graves are unknown, even less ado was made with the dead common Brunswick, British, and Loyalist soldiers. Following “breakfast” on the day after the battle, Thomas Mellen “went to see them bury the dead. I saw thirteen Tories, mostly shot through the head, buried in one hole.” In mid-August, when the heat could be a major factor, the urgency of getting the dead buried created local expedients. An anecdote told about Deacon Nathaniel Harmon gives an idea about the procedures:

289 Diary of Nahum Parker for Sunday, 17 August 1777, included in his pension application.
290 Pension Application of Chauncey Rice, S 15616.
292 Mellen, p. 29. Maybe they had been killed by “Leonard Robinson, whose aim was quick and deadly, declared that every time he shot he saw a man fall. "But," said he, "I prayed the Lord to have mercy on his soul; and then I took care of his body." Jennings, Memorials, p. 197.
Figure 35. House where Baum died, from William L. Stone, *Memoirs and Letters and Journals of Major General Riedesel, during his Residence in America* (Albany 1868), Frontispiece.

Figure 36. Marker commemorating the site of the house where Baum died.
It was a rude transaction, but the time was urgent. It was better that the dead bodies of the slain foe should be buried in any manner than left to breed pestilence upon the surface of the earth. There were two large excavations for wintering potatoes — left open in the summer time until another harvest — nearby; Mr. Harmon took his rope slip-noose halter from his horse's neck, and dragged the dead bodies of the slain enemy therewith into the excavations and covered them with earth. There were some sixty bodies thus buried in each of the two excavations. They were near where the Barnet house now stands; parts of the action of that eventful day were fought there.293

The Loyalists did not get away quite as easy. Nahum Parker recorded on Tuesday, 19 August, that “Last Night They Took Some Tories All Tied together Strong They had A fine Shout At them when they went off.” Other accounts speak of 155 captured Tories tied in pairs to long rope, a horse hitched to it and led away to jail.294 John Wallace also reported that on 19 August the Massachusetts “…Tories [were] sent home in order for trial,” and the following day “A number of Torys Sent W[est] in order for trial; about 40 Torys cleared they swearing allegiance [sic] to the United States.” Apparently not convinced that the oath would clear him, Wallace observed that five days later one “Tory Deserted from our guard in women’s Cloaths.”295 He was correct: swearing allegiance to the United States did not clear these men from the stain of having fought for their king. Nathaniel Wallace remembered how “Meetings of rejoicing were held at the south part of the town, and articles of proscription against the Tories were read and approved. And for many subsequent years, upon any public occasion, they were made the subject of reproach and ridicule. One was left hanging upon a stake by the leather waistband of his breeches…a spirit of hostility and contempt always existed towards them while they lived.”296

Figure 37. Tablet showing the names of sixteen Brunswickers buried in the cemetery of the Congregational Church in Bennington

293 Jennings, Memorials, p. 273.
294 History of Keene, p. 229.
295 John Wallace diary as quoted in Bennington Evening Banner 3 May 1932.
7.4 THE WOUNDED

That left the wounded. On his visit to the battlefield Mellen “saw many of the wounded who had lain out all night,” while on 18 August Parker recorded in his diary that “there is A Number of wounded in Every Barn.” Some of the wounded did not survive the journey to Bennington. Many people volunteered to move the wounded, among them Eleazer Hawks who recalled that one of his duties “…was to assist in conveying wounded from the battle-field into town, which he did on his father-in-law's ox-cart. Some died of their wounds on the way.”

Medical services, rudimentary as they were on the frontier, were overwhelmed. To address the shortfall the New Hampshire Committee of Safety on 23 August 1777 ordered Josiah Bartlett and Nathaniel Peabody to go immediately “to Bennington, and do everything in your power to assist the sick and wounded men of General Stark's Brigade of Militia of this State, and to consult with and advise General Stark with respect to any further operations, and to procure an exact Account of the late action of Gen. Stark's with the British troops: and you are Empowered to do and transact any matters and things with Respect to said Brigade that you may think necessary.” Bartlett left that same day and remained in Bennington for about one week, visited Gates at his headquarters until 4 September and was back in Kingston by 10 September as he informed his son Levi on the 22 September: “I returned from Bennington the 10th Inst: after one pretty fatigueing Jorney [sic]: after looking after the Sick & wounded at Bennington and observing the ground where the Battle was: I went to Hudsons River to see the army under General Gates at Half moon, and Saw Peter Abbot, Mr. Samuel Sweat & most of the men that went from this Town.”

Much of the militia was discharged following the victory. William Gilmore of the New Hampshire Militia “helped the next day to bury the dead and continued in said service in said company till the 27th of the same month [August] and was then dismissed to go home.” Others were dispatched to protect the frontier, such as Thomas Emery who wrote that “two days after the action we were ordered to march to the north and stationed upon the frontiers for the protection of the inhabitants.” The rest marched to Stillwater to join Gates. Remembered Benjamin Clark, “After remaining several days to bury the dead & secure the property &c taken in the battle, he marched with the said troops under Stark toward Saratoga to join Gen1 Gates.” And while the Americans celebrated, in the British camp the search for explanations for the defeat, the search for who was responsible for the disaster, began almost immediately.

It is unknown how many of the wounded – both American as well as Royal forces – died in Bennington though John Wallace recorded in his diary that on Wednesday, 27 August “Several of the wounded Hushens & Waldecker's dyed of there [sic] wounds.” These men may be among the Brunswick soldiers buried in the cemetery of the Congregational Church in Bennington whose names are recorded on a stone tablet there (Figure 40).

297 Jennings, Memorials, p. 287.
298 Josiah Bartlett was the second signer of the Declaration of Independence after John Hancock and second in political importance in New Hampshire only to Meshech Weare.
300 Pension Application of William Gilmore, S 8571.
301 Pension Application of Thomas Emery, W 21069.
302 Pension application of Benjamin Clark S 12502.
303 John Wallace diary as quoted in Bennington Evening Banner 3 May 1932.
7.5 REPERCUSSIONS

When news of the disaster reached the British camp over the next few days, Burgoyne tried hard to protect his troops from blame for the disaster at Bennington. He announced in his daily orders of 26 August 1777 “that he has no reason to be dissatisfied with the personal Spirit of the Officers and Troops in the Action; that on the contrary the Officers who commanded the different Corps acted with intrepidity.”

That included Baum, whom he characterized in a letter to Lord Germain of 20 August 1777 as “an officer well qualified for the undertaking.” If at all, the blame lay with Pfister and Skeene: “The failure of the Enterprise [sic] seems in the first Instance to have been owing to the Credulity of those who managed the Department of intelligence, suffered great numbers of the Rebel Soldiers to pass and repass, and perhaps count the numbers of the Detachment, and upon ill-founded confidence induced Lieut. Col. Baume to advance too far to have a secure retreat.” He repeated this charge in 1780 when he told Germain that too “many people professing themselves to be Loyalists” had been allowed into camp. He placed the blame on “A provincial gentleman of confidence “i.e. Skeene” who had been sent with the detachment, as knowing the country and the character of the inhabitants, was so incautious as to leave at liberty such as took the oath of allegiance. His credulity and their profligacy caused the first misfortune. Colonel Baume was induced to proceed without sufficient knowledge of the ground. His design was betrayed; the men who had taken the oaths were the first to fire upon him; he was attacked on all sides. He showed great personal courage, but was overpowered by numbers.”

Since he could not let Breymann get away free, he did mention the slow movement of the relief force under his command, softening the blow however by pointing out that this was caused primarily by “bad weather, bad Roads, tired horses and other impediments” rather than any ill-will on the part of Breymann toward Baum.

Though only one of the British officers who fought in the battle of Bennington left a record, all other British officers in their surviving private accounts also voiced their opinions. Following his escape from the Americans, Captain Alexander Fraser told a fellow officer in Brigadier General Simon Fraser’s Brigade that he had “frequently heard our officers say, that were in this Action, that had Col. Baume retreated four miles, and recrossed the River he passed the Day before, and taken post there, when he found by information that he could not proceed, and had wrote for reinforcements, he would have met Col. Breymen coming to his Assistance, and would not have risqué [sic] the loss of his Corps, which by his Instructions, were so strongly recommended, as not even to risk a considerable Loss.” Such a move would most certainly have saved Baum’s command and is also hinted at in Wasmus’ journal. Fraser’s fellow officers, however, did not see it that way. All of them place part of the blame for the defeat on Breymann being too slow in his

306 Burgoyne, Orderly Book, p. 84.
307 Ibid.
308 For Want of a Horse being A Journal of the Campaigns against the Americans in 1776 and 1777 conducted from Canada, by an officer who served with Lt. Gen. Burgoyne George F.G. Stanley, ed. (Sackville, Tribune Press, 1961), p. 133. The author of the journal was most likely Captain Alexander Fraser but his authorship remains uncertain.
advance toward Bennington. Lieutenant James M. Hadden initially recorded in his diary on 16 August 1777 that “Lt. Col. Baume was attacked, defeated, and taken, owing to the tardiness of Lt. Col. Breymann, who did not march a Mile an hour to his support”. As he learned more about the debacle he became even less generous toward the defeated allies. “As for Col. Skeene,” wrote Hadden, “with the best intentions in the world, he was a famous marplot, and Ministry were highly culpable in recommending him to the confidence of Gen'l Burgoyne which I hear is the case. He acted like a showing his powers to every Man who pretended to be friendly, among which number were many of the Rebel Soldiers, who to remove doubts took the Oath's of allegiance and were told to wear White Papers in their Hats, that, being the distinguishing mark of Friends, to crown the folly of this farce they were permitted immediately to return, in fact, to join their respective Corps in the Rebel Army.” As Baum did not speak English, he was unqualified to command the expedition and only received the appointment since Riedesel demanded it. And as far as their combat prowess was concerned, Hadden declared that “It does not appear that the Dragoons made any violent efforts, the Indians to a Man, and most of the Canadians Ran away at first and got safe in to us.”

Lieutenant William Digby squarely blamed the Germans and their Indian allies. Only Richard Pope of the 47th Regiment of Foot was more generous in his assessment when he wrote that “The Rebels made four separate attacks, on the Front, Flanks & Rear – The detachment supported itself with great valour, for some hours, but were overpowered by Numbers, left two pieces of Cannon, and were almost entirely cut the pieces. The German light Infantry and Grenadiers of 542 men under the Command of Lieut. Col: Breymann, who were sent to Support Col: Baum, did not arrive till after the action, which however they resumed, and forced the Enemy to retreat 3 Miles – But having expended all their ammunition, were now Obliged in their turn to retire, with the Loss of 2 Pieces of Cannon.” Captain Mackenzie in New York City opined that “Colonel Baum appears to have committed a great fault in venturing so far into the Country without support, and without having been thoroughly informed of the Enemy’s force in that neighborhood.” In December 1779, Richard Peters went even farther when he claimed that he “told the General that, he was ready to obey his Orders ‘but we Shall not return’ – Peters was the Guide to Bennington, but between the mountains the Rebels, secreted behind Rocks & Trees, killed in half an Hour above one thousand men – Peters returned to the royal Army at Saratoga with only 117 of his Regiment which contained 603”. The Indians had their own explanation, as Captain Carl von Tunderfeld informed
Riedesel from Québec on 15 September 1777. Tunderfeld had heard the Indians say “of the Germans that they were too brave and did not know how to make use of the trees and to hide behind them.”

The Braunschweigers around Baron Riedesel and the Hanauers refused to singly bear the responsibility for the loss. Since they could hardly blame Burgoyne, at least not publicly, they followed the lead suggested by their commanding officer and focused on Skene. The daily orders for the Hesse-Hanau Regiment Erbprinz on 17 August played down the extent of the defeat: “An effort has been made from the left wing of this expedition to obtain such a supply of cattle and provisions so that the line would be in a condition to continue the march. As this effort has failed because of the fortunes of war, therefore the troops must halt for a few days, to allow the movement of foodstuffs.” Baron Riedesel added that “Although this expedition was not as successful as was anticipated, there is no reason to be downcast, but we must wait for another opportunity to again recapture that which was lost.”

Neither did this answer the question of why the expedition had failed. An anonymous subaltern wrote that “it seems to me that Governor Skene had great influence regarding the [decision to] advance via South Bay and that General Burgoyne placed too much trust in his counsel, neglecting to give sufficient weight to this individual’s personal situation and self-interest…. The likelihood that this opinion of Governor Skeene is correct seems even greater when one considers the engagement at Bennington, the outcome of which was so unhappy for our army.” Lieutenant August Wilhelm Du Roi also attributed the defeat to the plan “which is said to have been proposed by him [Skene]….His intentions were most likely the same as above, to keep his property free from the incursions of the enemy and to draw part of the army to this part of the country. He also accompanied the unfortunate Lt. Col. Baum to Bennington, and one could almost say, directed the expedition, making, however, the bad mistake of letting all the people who came to him pretending to be good royalists, go without discrimination, supplying them with Gen. Bourgoyne’s proclamation with the expectation of gaining more followers. To be sure, this was done according to the order of the general, but the consequences were that the enemy received daily, I might say hourly, the most reliable news about the intentions, movements and exact strength of Colonel Baum’s corps, thus enabling the rebels to lure the same to the trap set….After Lieutenant-Colonel Baum’s corps had lost almost all light troops and the ammunition began to fail, Lieutenant-Colonel Baum decided to cut his way through with the rest of his dragoons. At this attempt, however, he had to surrender to the enemy.”

Riedesel only hinted at the slowness of Breymann’s approach when he extended “his highest praise to both battalions for their bravery, and declares that it was not their fault that they could not completely defeat the enemy, but that the time lapse between the two attacks, by the corps of Baum and Breymann, was the cause that both corps could not unite. Honor is always present for troops which conduct themselves well, and the general herewith thanks Lieutenant Colonel Breymann as much for his demonstrated fortitude, as for his

good dispositions, which allowed him to withdraw from the battle. The same applies to Major von Barner for the bravery, which he demonstrated during this opportunity.”

Corporal Johann Jakob Schmidt on Riedesel’s staff, an eyewitness to was less circumspect. An eyewitness to the events in Riedesel’s staff, claims that Riedesel tried to prevent the Bennington expedition. He “let the English know it was suicide to send the advance force out without reinforcements. The Englishman [Burgoyne] would not discuss the matter further and ordered the advance.” Seeing that Burgoyne would not be swayed, Riedesel sent Schmidt along as his eyes and ears and orders to “immediately report any difficulties.” Realizing in the evening of 15 August that Baum “with all his men had walked into a trap”, Schmidt “rode back with the news.” Over Riedesel’s vehement opposition – there was a “quarrel” - Burgoyne decided to send Colonel Breymann in support of Baum which the result that dozens more men were lost.

Schmidt may, or may not, have been an impartial observer, but even if he was, this version of events was not allowed to become publicly know. In the end everyone agreed that everyone had made mistakes. The Loyalists had not materialized and those who had, such as Skene, had primarily their own interest in mind. Americans, that “evil nation,” in the words of Colonel von Gall, pretending to be Loyalists, had committed perjury and stabbed Baum in the back. The Indians and Canadians had deserted Baum at the first opportunity while accidents, such as the unfortunate explosion of the ammunition wagon in Baum’s compound, and the horrible weather, which had caused the fateful delay of Breymann’s relief column, had done the rest. Ultimately only the fickle fortunes of war were to blame. But everyone had been brave, had done his best, against maybe just a few too many militiamen from the Hampshire Grants, members of that “most rebellious race on the Continent,” as Burgoyne called them.

Whether they had been “stimulated by the most laudable motives,” as General Lincoln had informed the Massachusetts Legislature, imbibed gin fortified with gunpowder, or just plain alcoholic beverages, the militia had won a resounding victory and could afford to be generous in their assessment. Captain Rufus Lincoln partly exonerated “Col” Brayman who it Seems had Received no intelligence of this action arrived on the Same ground about 4 o’Clock in the afternoon, and was Immediately Attacked on all Sides [] he made a good Defence, but was obliged at last to give way and make his Retreat as well as he Could which he Effected by the help of the night, but not with [out] loss of men and two pieces of Artillery.”

A grateful Congress promoted Stark Brigadier General in the Continental Army, the rank he had sought for so long, and the denial of which had caused him to resign his Colonel’s commission earlier that year. Even Philipp

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322 Burgoyne, A State of the Expedition, pp. xlv-xlxi.
323 In his old age Silas Robinson used to say that he “had heard,’ said he, ‘that these Robinsons were all cowards; and I rather thought, if any of them was, I was the man. But somebody told me that gunpowder was good for courage; so I took about a gill of gin, and thickened it up; and when I had drank that, I tell you, then I fought.” Jennings, Memorials, p. 197.
324 Wasmus thought most of the Americans were drunk and pension records confirm the consumption of large amounts of alcohol on the part of the militia.
326 Stark, Official Correspondence, pp. 138-140 has correspondence relation to Stark's promotion which was dated 4 October 1777.
7. Aftermath

Schuyler, one of those despised ‘Yorkers,’ felt compelled to congratulate Stark on 19 August, though Stark was probably seething when he read that Schuyler had sent one of his aides-de-camp to announce the victory to Congress and to Washington: “Dear Sir—I do myself the pleasure to congratulate you on the signal victory you have gained. Please accept my best thanks. The consequence of the severe stroke the enemy have [has] received cannot fail of producing the most salutary results. I have dispatched one of my aids-de-camp to announce your victory to Congress, and the commander-in-chief.”³²⁷

Only after the surrender at Saratoga did the long-term consequences of Bennington become apparent. Using almost identical words to assess the situation that Burgoyne would apply in his letter to Lord Germain on 20 August, Mackenzie argued that “if the defeat of Colonel Baum’s detachment has been as considerable as the Rebels give out, and Col’ S’ Leger has been obliged to raise the siege of Fort Stanwix, General Burgoyne’s difficulties in penetrating to Albany will be exceedingly increased, as his force is not only weakened, but his flanks are uncovered.”³²⁸ Additionally, Burgoyne finally had to admit to himself and his superiors in London that “The great bulk of the country is undoubtedly with the Congress in principle and zeal, and their measures are executed with a secrecy and dispatch that are not to be equaled.” The people of the Hampshire Grants are “the most rebellious race on the Continent and hang like a gathering storm upon my left.” The dream of a loyalist uprising never became reality and a good month later that storm would overwhelm Burgoyne and his forces at Saratoga. After the disaster at Bennington, General Burgoyne may have suspected such a fate for his army when he told Germain that he

> little foresaw that I was to be left to pursue my way through such a tract of country, and hosts of foes, without any co-operation from New-York; nor did I then think the garrison of Ticonderoga would fall to my share alone, a dangerous experiment would it be to leave that post in weakness, and too heavy a drain it is upon the life-blood of my force to give it due strength.

> I yet do not despond.—Should I succeed in forcing my way to Albany, and find that country in a state to subsist my army, I shall think no more of a retreat, but at the worst fortify there and await Sir W. Howe's operations.

> Whatever may be my fate, my Lord, I submit my actions to the breast of the King, and to the candid judgment of my profession, when all the motives become public; and I rest in the confidence, that whatever decision may be passed upon my conduct, my good intent will not be questioned. ³²⁹

These are not the words of a general confident in an ultimate victory and successful campaign. Others shared Burgoyne’s fears and premonitions. Lieutenant Colonel Wilhelm Rudolph von Gall von informed Count of Hanau on 16 March 1778 from Winterhill near Boston that “the 16th of August with the little affair at Bennington laid the first foundation for our future misfortune.” Gall, however, is one of the few observers

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³²⁷ Stark, *Official Correspondence*, p. 136. Schuyler’s letter of 18 August ibid. p. 129. Schuyler included a copy of a letter by Lincoln to the Massachusetts legislature announcing the victory which was published as a handbill in Boston on 22 August. The letter is ibid. pp. 132/33.
³²⁸ *The Diary of Frederick Mackenzie* vol. 1, pp. 178/79.
who recognized the huge psychological impact of the victory for the American side. “Thereafter the rebels in all regiments were completely convinced of the strength [i.e. weakness] of our little army and from that day on a completely different heart [i.e. courage] entered into the rebels and they completely maintained their decision until the very last hour of our ruin in which we now really are.”

Bennington destroyed the aura of “Hessian” or German invincibility and laid, in the words Rudolph von Gall, “the first foundation for our future misfortune” at Saratoga a good month later.

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American national identity and memory were born in the crucible of colonial wars. Marcus Cunliffe noted this when he wrote that “America’s national origin, and the first expressions of national character, were largely military in form.”

Twenty years later historian Sarah Purcell has echoed Cunliffe’s observation, writing that "military memory, especially memory of the Revolutionary War, is really at the heart of American national identity.”

The struggle for identity reached its highest national manifestation and significance through the experiences of the Revolution and the successful war to establish an independent nation. Nowhere was this truer than along the frontier in the New Hampshire grants, the future state of Vermont. During the crucial years of the settlement of the area in the 1760s and 1770s, Vermonters had to acquire and defend their property against both the Indians as well as neighboring New Yorkers. Vermont identity is inextricably connected with Ethan Allen and the Green Mountain Boys, with ideals expressed in the 1788 state motto "Freedom and Unity."

Vermont state identity, and after its admission to the Union on 4 March 1791 within American national identity, continued to evolve in the decades following independence, as Americans struggled to define what "being American" meant in times of peace. For a nation born in the crucible of war, military events, victories as well as defeats, were crucial in the formulation of this definition: victories were celebrated and defeats were commemorated, and both entered into the common memory of a nation.

Ironically, while the battle was fought on New York State soil, the battle of Bennington played a crucial role in the process of defining the state of Vermont. The battle was Vermont’s claim to membership in the United States of America. At Bennington in 1777, Vermonters had fought for, and successfully defended, their freedom and that of the nation as a whole, and had made their contribution to American Independence. At Bennington, Vermonters had acquired the right to join the new nation. Bennington had “laid the first foundation” for the victory at Saratoga. The victory constituted a pivotal event in the history of Vermont and the War of Independence to be celebrated and commemorated. Noah Smith gave a speech extolling the virtues of the men who had fought at Bennington, many of whom were probably present for the occasion.

Contemporaries were aware of the importance of the victory at Bennington. Following a string of American defeats and setbacks since June 1777, the victory at Bennington constituted a critical moment in rebuilding American morale. The commemoration of the battle grew out of three recurrent and persistent themes and broad national patterns of United States history: 1) the definition of Americans as virtuous soldiers, compassionate in victory and willing to sacrifice their lives for independence and freedom, 2) the conviction that Americans represented God’s chosen people, a strain particularly strong in Puritan New England, and 3) the realization that the victory at Bennington was a pivotal moment in the War of Independence.

334 Hanauer Journale und Briefe, p. 91.
3) the Jeffersonian concept of liberty as that of a virtuous citizen in opposition to what was perceived to be an over-reaching government. God’s grace and blessings, and military and civic virtues were inseparable in the minds of the founding generation in general and for New Englanders in particular.

The intertwining of these strains began almost immediately. Combining divine assistance with human resolve, the Reverend Israel Evans, “Chaplain to General Poor’s Brigade,” barely four months after the victory in *A Discourse, delivered, on the 18th Day of December, 1777, the Day of Public Thanksgiving* extolled the virtue of “the inhabitants and militia of Bennington, [who rose] with resolution to oppose the enemy, with such incredible bravery, and to kill and captivate so great, a number of them? Who inspired the garrison and militia to the westward to take so bold and resolute a defence, to defeat the enemy there, stop their incursions, and save that part of the country from savage barbarity?” The answer was of course: God. “Courage and resolution are as much the gifts of God, as any qualifications whatever; for without him the greatest natural courage may be turned to fear.”  

Similarly the Rev. Timothy Dwight praised the destruction of Baum’s detachment by “a body of militia under the command of General STARKS”, which “was cut off, almost to a man, in the neighbourhood of Bennington” as an act of divine providence. Comparing Burgoyne’s proclamation as he entered New York State with the threats issued by the Assyrian Rab Shakeh against the prophet Hezekiah and their “highest contempt for the military strength of their enemies, and the most unlimited confidence in their own”, both Burgoyne as well as Sennecharib earned their just reward for their “burning, butchering devastation and ruin.” That turned “The glorious and most beneficial victory of BENNINGTON” into “a prelude to succeeding misfortunes”, visited upon Burgoyne’s army “by the inhabitants of New-England and New-York”, God’s instruments on earth who were “determined to live, or die, like men.”

In this religious-military-political context it is hardly surprising that commemoration and celebration of the victory also began almost immediately. On the first anniversary of the battle, 16 August 1778, a large group of participants gathered, not in Bennington, but at the battle site to listen to a speech by Noah Smith and a *Poetical Essay* by Stephen Jacob extolling the virtues of the combatants (Figures 38 and 39). With this first celebration began an almost uninterrupted sequence of annual commemorative events stretching well into the nineteenth century. These celebrations were sufficiently important to be covered and recorded in newspapers along the East Coast (Figures 40- 45).

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335 Lancaster: Francis Bailey, 1778, p. 12.
336 Rabshakeh was the name given to the chief cup-bearer of the Assyrian court. Sennacherib used him as a messenger to Israel; his speech outside the walls of Jerusalem and Hezekiah’s refusal to submit in 2 Kings 18:17-37.
337 A Sermon preached at Stamford, in Connecticut, upon the General Thanksgiving, December 18th, 1777 (Hartford: Watson & Goodwin, 1779), p. 10/11.
338 For an overview of these early commemorative events see Hiland Hall, The Bennington Battle Monument and Centennial Celebration (Milford: Cook and Sons, 1877) as well as The Dedication of the Bennington Battle Monument, and Celebration of the Hundredth Anniversary of the Admission of Vermont as a State (Bennington, Banner Book and Job Printing House, 1892), pp. 9-29 with Smith’s *Speech* on pp. 12-16 and Jacob’s *Poem* on pp. 16-21. The commemorations, at least initially, were not confined to Vermont; see for example David S. Rowland, A Sermon, Preached at Providence, June 6, 1779. Wherein are represented, the remarkable Dispensations of Divine Providence to the People of these States, particularly in the Rise and Progress of the present War, between the CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA, and GREAT-BRITAIN (Providence: John Carter, 1779)
Figure 38. Title page of Stephen Jacob, *A Poetical Essay*, delivered at Bennington.
8. Commemoration

Figure 39. Title page of Noah Smith, *Speech delivered at Bennington on the Anniversary...* 1778.

Figure 40. Excerpt from *Maryland Journal* (Baltimore), 19 September 1780.
Commemorative events were not confined to divine services, speeches by dignitaries or military parades. In what must have been one of the earliest reenactments of a Revolutionary War battle, the *Pennsylvania Mercury, and Universal Advertiser* reported on 12 September 1789, how on 16 August 1777 “at the dawn of day a morning gun was fired by Captain Robinson’s artillery, at eleven o’clock the light-horse company, commanded by Captain David Robinson, the artillery commanded by Captain Moses Robinson, the light infantry commanded by Captain Safford and Captain Burnham, and two com -

![Panies of Rangers, commanded by Lieutenant Elsworth and Lieutenant Eldridge, together with the strangers attending and citizens of the town, walked in procession from the Court-house to the Meeting-house, where an oration suited to the occasion was delivered by Mr. Anthony Haswell, which gained the universal applause of the audience, after which the troops repaired to a convenient field, and went through a regular scene of action, with a degree of activity and soldiership that reflected honour upon them. Just after the commencement of the action, a party in the Indian dress, properly painted, issued from ambuscade, and attacked the rangers and light horse on the right flank, shifting their position and mode of attack occasionally, and by their agility, and apparent skill and cunning in skulking and evading the vigilance of the light horse, &c. added greatly to the beauty of the scene, and gave the highest satisfaction to a numerous audience.](https://example.com/image)

Figure 41. *Pennsylvania Mercury, and Universal Advertiser*, 12 September 1789

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339 At least one more sham fight complete with Indians occurred in 1802.

See also the *Vermont Gazette* of 4 September 1795, which points out that “in the great chain of events the battle of Bennington, was intimately connected, with the surrender of Burgoyne – the surrender of Burgoyne with the capture of Cornwallis, and the capture of Cornwallis with the eventual establishment of peace, on terms in the highest degree honorary to America” or Timothy Todd, *An Oration, delivered at Manchester, on the 17th day of August, 1795: in commemoration of Bennington Battle, fought on the 16th day of August, 1777*. (Rutland: J. Kirkaldie, 1795) or *Poetical Sketches on various Solemn Subjects; Composed by Deacon Nathaniel Harmon, late of Bennington, of pious memory: written a short time before his death*. (Bennington: Anthony Haswell, 1796).

On 23 August 1784, *The Vermont Gazette* even solicited subscribers to print “A Tragedy, Wrote in Commemoration of, the BATTLE of BENNINGTON, [Which happened on the 16th of August, in the year of our Lord 1777.]” which was completed and had already been shown to various readers. Solicitation was not confined to Vermont: the advertisement also appeared in the *Hampshire Herald* of 14 September 1784 and *Thomas's Massachusetts Spy: Or, Worcester Gazette* of 14 October 1784, but it is unknown whether the tragedy was ever printed.
Concurrently, however, Bennington and its battlefield began to fulfill in Revolutionary and later in pre-Civil War America the universal human need for a sacred locale, a place that satisfied the requirement to remember the heroes and martyrs of the American War of Independence. Their death symbolized the ultimate sacrifice for the ideals of the American Revolution and the indissoluble bonds forged in the crucible of that battle that laid the foundation for the victory at Saratoga and American Independence. That need and function is profoundly expressed in the much-repeated anecdote of the “good old gentleman who had five sons in the field at the celebrated action of Bennington, August 16, 1777,” one of whom died and whose corpse was brought to the proud father to prepare for burial. First told in the fall of 1777, it re-emerged repeatedly both during the war and persisted long after the war had ended.  

It is told in the 26 March 1782 issue of the Pennsylvania Packet under the heading “American PATRIOTISM and FORTITUDE exemplified,” in The New-York Journal, or the Weekly Register (New York), of 3 August 1786, the Boston Independent Ledger and the American Advertiser of 14 August 1786, and a variety of other news outlets.

Commemoration of the battle went beyond anniversary events: it also served political purposes. Until their admission to the Union in 1791, Vermonters did not fail to use the anniversary to underline the importance of the victory at the Walloomsac for the surrender of Burgoyne at Saratoga in October and the achievement of American Independence in 1783. Reporting from Bennington on the celebrations for the 9th anniversary of the battle on 16 August 1786, the Pennsylvania Packet told its readers that “The day was ushered in with fourteen discharges of cannon” – a very audible expression of Vermont’s claim to membership in the Union (as the fourteenth state). Lest the public forget about the importance of the victory, the papers also informed its readers that “a reflection on the event of the battle of Bennington, as a prelude to the establishment of our independence, and the train of successes, which followed, was foremost in every man’s mind.”

By the turn of the century Bennington had become important enough for Daniel Webster in 1800 to list it as one of the turning points of the war: “Trenton, Princeton, Bennington and Saratoga were the successive theatres of your [America’s] victories.” It is therefore not surprising that in the heated political atmosphere of the new nation, in the struggle between Federalists and Anti-Federalists, and the run-up to the War of 1812, both political factions tried to claim the Battle of Bennington and its memory to themselves. In the process, the victory was again strengthened within the collective memory of the American people. General Stark himself was enlisted in the battle for their hearts and minds. His 31 July 1809 letter to his “Friends and Fellow soldiers” in which he declined participating in that year’s events was not only printed in local newspapers such as the American Monitor in Plattsburgh, New York of 29 September 1809, but as far away as The Republican; And Savannah Evening Ledger of 14 September 1809, The Carolina Gazette (Charleston South Carolina) of 15 September 1809, the Augusta Chronicle (Georgia) of 16 September 1809, The Reporter (Lexington, Kentucky) of 19 September 1809, the Staunton Eagle (Staunton, Virginia) of 30 September 1809 or The Enquirer (Richmond, Virginia) on 1 September 1809.

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340 See Stephen Fay in the Appendix Primary Sources – Civilian.
341 For an account of the 1787 events see the New-York Journal, and Weekly Register of 6 September 1787.
342 Daniel Webster, An Oration Pronounced at Hanover, New-Hampshire, the 4th day of July, 1800 (Hanover, Moses Davis, 1800), p. 7. See also Anthony Haswell, An Oration, delivered at Bennington, Vermont, August 16th, 1799. In Commemoration of the Battle of Bennington (Bennington: Anthony Haswell, 1799) or Thomas Thompson, An Oration, pronounced the 4th day of July, 1799, at Salisbury, in the State of New-Hampshire (Concord: Geo[r]g Hough, 1799).
As these newspaper titles indicate, the Anti-Federalist Republicans, with their emphasis on states’ rights, had won that battle. In 1809 there were

Figure 42. Excerpt from *Weekly Wanderer* (Randolph, VT), 1 September 1809.

Under a banner that read: JEFFERSON & MADISON they listened to speeches assuring them “that our nation is the CHOSEN NATION OF GOD, and that, comparatively, so long as the chain of our union gathers strength and brightness, suffering humanity will here find a downy pillow, be as the forms of Heaven, drink nectarine prelibations of that happiness, that heaven, to which Pilgrim Man aspires.”

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343 *Vermont Republican* of 28 August 1809.
The next year the crowd at the anniversary had grown to between three and four thousand spectators; the anniversary after all provided an appropriate opportunity to remind New Englanders of the virtues of the men who, with the blessings of the Almighty, had fought at Bennington in the run-up to the War of 1812. The story of an old soldier who was in the action at the Battle of Bennington which was printed in newspapers such as the American Watchman and Delaware Republican of 9 May 1812 as far away as Wilmington, Delaware.  

Lastly, the announcement for the celebrations in 1815 drew a direct line from the victory at Bennington to victories in the War of 1812.  

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344 The story was also published for example in the American Advocate (Hallowell, Maine) of 12 May 1812, The Courier (Washington, DC) of 20 May 1812, The Shamrock, or Hibernian Chronicle (New York) of 23 May 1812 or The Alexandria Herald of 25 May 1812.  

345 The Green-Mountain Farmer, 14 August 1815. An account of the celebration of 16 August 1815 ibid. in the issue of 21 August 1815.
The story of an old soldier who was in the action.

"This was a proud day," he said, "for the poor Greenmountain boys, who were yet sore with the wounds they had so lately received in the retreat from Tyconderoga. They could not soon forget the slaughter of their brethren of Col. Warner's regiment, who were almost all cut off at Hubbardstown." The word came that the enemy's coming, the alarm swelled like wild fire—every man left his plough or axe, some even standing in the field, and determined to fight as well as some with only caps and some without—none was anxious who should be commanded or command—the main object was to find a good position, take sure aim, fire and load again.

Here he proceeded to describe the order of battle, but the most striking part was concerning a Colonel, who was ordered by Gen. Stark, to reinforce his regiment a part of one of the wings that had sustained a considerable part of the action, and suffered much. The Colonel marched at the instant, but with a certain step peculiar to himself, slow, firm and steady. The whole parish was in his regiment, and they laid brought with them their much loved person, without whose blessing they could scarcely think themselves in a way to prosper. The officer commanding the corps to be relieved, fearing every instant that his men, from fatigue and loss, would give way, sent to hasten the Colonel. "Tell 'em, said he, 'we're coming'" and kept pace steadily on. This gentleman was at home a deacon—wore an old fashioned long waistcoat with large pocket flaps and herring bone cuffs, and a three-cornered hat, the forerunners resembling the handle of a pickaxe, except that the extreme point of it might have endangered the eye of a musketeer, had his run unguardedly against it. A second express arrived, "Colonel, says God's sake hurry, my men are beginning to fall back," "that will make room for us—tell 'em we're coming," "keeping his still unalterable pace, and philo quiet and unconcerned.

A third message was treated just as coolly—When they emerged from behind a copse in full view of the enemy, and several balls passed over them—"halt said the Colonel, "form column and let us meet prayer." The chaplain was called and ordered with all due formality to attend to his duty, but during the solemnity an unlucky shot wounded one of the men. The Colonel now, for the first time, began to show some impatience, for no sooner had the person pronounced amen, than the men were ordered to march. But still the Colonel kept his steady measured pace, until he had taken the ground, in front of the poor fellows who were almost ready to leave the field, and but for the love of liberty, could not have kept it half so long. Give it to 'em (said the Colonel) give it to 'em boys" as he stepped along the rank with the same unalterable pace and philo, chewing his quid, which he now and then replaced, obliging those who stood near him with his box. "The Hessians are in front," said he, "our wives and children in the rear, Liberty's the price—we fight for liberty." This was enough—the most verbose eloquence of a Roman general himself could have done no more.

The enemy pressed, but pressed on only to their own destruction. We fought, we wounded, we conquered—and the narrator said he did not doubt— but could determined bravery of those few raw militia, had a principal share in deciding the fate of the day.

The BATTLE of BENNINGTON on the 16th of August, 1777, will be celebrated at Bennington, on Wednesday the 16th inst. A procession will be formed at the courthouse, at 12 o'clock, and proceed to the meeting house, where dinners and other refreshments will be provided by Mrs. Cashman.

The friends of America are universally invited to attend the commemoration of this great day of victory over the British, Hessians, and Indians; who had been specially ordered by their king to burn our buildings, and to kill and destroy us with our wives and little ones. The battle of Eiig, in the late war, on the 15th of August, 1814 (where the Brits and their hirds were so gloriously defeated by the brave American army, is also a day of great deliverance to our country, and will be commemorated and judged in this celebration.

Our present day is a day of trial to all those who believe that man by nature is, and ought to be free. The kings and emperors of the whole world, seem, in sympathy with the freedom and happiness of men, while we have the right and enjoy the secret privileges of keeping in remembrance the days of our deliverance, from slavery and the brutal abuses of monarchy and aristocracy, let us come together, to express our opinions and feelings on these great and important subjects, that our rising generation may inherit the spirit of their fathers.

By order of the committee of arrangements, 1815.

DAVID FAY, chairman.

August 8th, 1815.
Following a pattern established all along the East Coast, participation in defeats such as Paoli or victories such as the Battle of Bennington had by then begun to appear in obituary notices as particular badges of honor, viz. when Gershom Beach, “one of the first settlers of the town of Rutland”, died on 2 September 1805 near Niagara Falls in New York State, the Middlebury Mercury pointed out that Gershom, “with three of his sons” had fought “in the famous battle” at Bennington as a member of the Green Mountain Boys. By the time General Stark died in May 1822, he had long entered the pantheon of Revolutionary War heroes and the victory at the Walloomsac become part of the collective memory of the young United States. As the nation entered calmer waters and the Revolutionary War generation faded away in the 1830s and 1840s, Americans became aware of the need to preserve the sacred spaces connected with that war and to erect lasting monuments to the Generation of 1776.

In Bennington this new phase of commemoration began with the incorporation of the first “Bennington Battlefield Monument Association” in 1853. This association set itself the goal of building a battle monument but was unable to raise the necessary funds and disbanded after two years. The second “Bennington Battlefield Monument Association” incorporated in 1876 in the run-up to the centennial of the battle was more successful. On 23 May 1887 it informed the governors of New Hampshire, Massachusetts and Vermont that “There have been appropriated and raised, for the uses of this Association, the following sums of money, viz.

The Congress of the United States ..................... $ 40,000
State of Vermont ........................................... $ 15,000
State of New Hampshire ............................... $ 5,000
State of Massachusetts ................................. $ 10,000
Bennington Battle Monument Association ........ $ 10,000**

Over the next few years the association raised an additional $32,000 through private donations, and with $102,000 in the bank could begin to construct the memorial. In 1886, the Vermont Legislature authorized an additional $10,000 to purchase the property where the monument was to be built in Bennington. Once

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346 5 February 1806. Beach is mentioned as a charter member of the town of Eden in Vermont of 28 August 1781 in the pension application of John Steward, W 19090.
347 For an example of how Bennington was commemorated after the end of the War of 1812 see Young, Samuel B. An Oration, Pronounced at Bennington, August 16, 1819: In Commemoration of the Battle of Bennington, fought August 16, 1777. "Eternal vigilance is the price we pay for liberty." "Live free or die; death is better than slavery." (Bennington: Darius Clark, 1819). An overview of these celebrations from ca. 1815 up to 1853 in Dedication of the Bennington Battle Monument, pp. 27-29. As a further example of the politicization of the event: in 1818, the first toast was “General Stark: the Jackson of Walloonsack”. Ibid., p. 27.
See also Addresses on the Battle of Bennington, and The Life and Services of Col. Seth Warner; delivered before the Legislature of Vermont, in Montpelier, October 20, 1848, By James Davie Butler, (on the Battle of Bennington) and George Frederick Houghton, (on Col. Seth Warner.) Published by Order of the Legislature. (Burlington: Free Press Print. 1849).
348 The text of that bill in Dedication of the Bennington Battle Monument p. 30.
349 Ibid., p. 35.
the committee had decided on the design submitted by John Philipp Rinn, an architect from Boston and William Ward of Lowell, Massachusetts as contractor, the cornerstone could be laid on the 110th anniversary of the battle on 16 August 1887. A good two years later the copingstone completing the masonry work was laid on 25 November 1889. Dedication of the monument had to wait until the centennial of the admission of Vermont to the United States on 19 August 1891. At 306 feet 4 and 1/2 inches the Bennington Battle Monument is still the tallest structure in the State of Vermont. In 1952, the Bennington Monument Association transferred the ownership and operation of the Monument to the Vermont Board of Historic Sites, which later became the Vermont Division for Historic Preservation which still runs the monument.

Concurrently attempts proceeded to preserve the actual battlefield in New York State. In 1896, Nelson Gillespie organized the Hoosick Historical Society “with the avowed purpose of making the battleground a memorial park.” Despite the efforts of Gillespie no progress was made until 24 March 1911, when a public meeting in Hoosick voted to approach the State of New York for assistance. A first bill was introduced on 4 May 1911 but died in committee and Governor Dix vetoed a second bill in January 1912. A third bill, however, passed and was signed into law by the governor on 24 May 1913. On the basis of this law, which also appropriated $25,000 for the purchase and cleaning up of the land as well as preparing it for public use, title to the land where the battle was fought was transferred to the State of New York on 8 May 1915. Since then the Bennington Battlefield Historic Site expanded from its original 175 acres to 276 acres. It was declared a National Historic Landmark in 20 January 1961 and added to the National Register of Historic Places in 1966.

Since 1964, 16 August – Bennington Battle Day – is a State holiday in Vermont to commemorate the victory over Baum’s forces in 1777. At irregular intervals organizations such as the Brigade of the American Revolution conduct reenactments of the battle on the battlefield.

350 An account of the celebration ibid. pp. 69ff.
351 The background of the legislation is described in some detail in the Proceedings of the New York State Historical Association vol. 15 (1916), pp 32- 37; the boundaries of the original State Park are described ibid. p. 34.
9. **SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

### 9.1 SUMMARY

This study included creation of a research design, public meetings, detailed archival research and historical context, field survey using metal detecting and ground-penetrating radar (GPR), limit ground-truth excavations to examine the GPR anomalies, informant interviews, KOCA/military terrain analysis, artifact identification, and reporting. An interpretive plan is being prepared as a separate document.

Based on the historical, topographical, and archaeological study of the battlefield, the Core Area and Battlefield Boundary for the Bennington Battlefield can be recommended (Figure 46). Also included in this figure is the recommended potential National Register of Historic Places boundary. It is recommended that the current National Register nomination for the battlefield should be updated to include the new information generated as part of this study.

The historical and archaeological study of the Bennington Battlefield has been successful in the following ways:

1. The archival and cartographic research has greatly expanded our knowledge of the battles. More than 120 American primary military sources were compiled, along with a dozen British officer sources and an equal number of Loyalists, more than 20 Brunswick accounts, and eight civilian sources. In addition, several maps and archival sources were consulted for the first time, included the Jared Sparks map and journal, the Asa Fitch Letterbook, and the Hiland Hall Papers. The present project is the most comprehensive historical treatment of the battle to date.

2. The development of commemorative actions at the field began almost immediately after the battle. The first commemoration occurring in 1778 (one year after the fight) and continues nearly annually to the present. This is one of the earliest battlefields thus recognized, and contributes to the elevation of General Stark to hero of Vermont. The eventual “usurpation” of the commemorative activities to the town of Bennington, and thus out of the state of New York, is a secondary component to this story.

3. The archeological research has been successful in more completely modeling the location of the German redoubt and the actions thereabout, in locating the Tory Redoubt and reconstructing the actions there, in verifying the location of the rocky ridge (where the Rebels began the Second Phase of the battle), in identifying a formerly unknown ford across the river, and in modeling the actions that occurred in the bottomlands near [Redacted]. The archeological evidence points to a broad range of weapons available to the American militia forces, and also sheds light on the use of the German 3-pound gun positioned at the bridge as it attempted to stem the rebel attack on the Tory Redoubt.

4. The geophysical prospection using GPR proved highly effective in identifying two soil anomalies that are consistent with the documentary record that potato pits were used as mass graves. Additionally the GPR located two other anomalies that may be two possible graves.
Figure removed in accordance with the Archaeological Resources Protection Act.
5. The GPR located a soil anomaly that may prove to be the Tory Redoubt.

6. The GPR located anomalies consistent with the footprints of buildings that existed at the time of the battle.

7. KOCOA analysis reviewed the period battlefield maps and was able to further refine the prior work of Lord.352

8. The professional archaeologists and avocational detectorists collaborated successfully to collect important data.

9. The archaeologists and local landowners collaborated to expand our knowledge of the battle beyond the state park property.

10. The project staff provided public outreach and education opportunities for visitors to the parks and more than 300 students and interested public attended the open house day and the school day.

11. The archival research has compiled digital images of many of the primary sources, providing a digital resource base for the park.

12. The overall project greatly expanded the visibility of the battlefield as an important historical resource, and helped grow the local advocacy corps.

13. The project spawned ancillary studies such as the trial study of Luminol screening of Revolutionary War musket balls.

9.2 Future Research

9.2.1 Additional Metal Detector Survey

The current project identified a corps of avocational detectorists interested in assisting Bennington Battlefield with their research and interpretive efforts. Our findings from the avocational days have contributed important data in a time- and cost-effective manner, while engaging many of the public. It is recommended that NY Parks consider repeating this effort on a limited level, annually, over the next 5-10 years.

One concern arose during the present avocational days. It became clear that certain of the detectorists had formerly detected on state and private portions of the battlefield, and certain individuals were likely to continue such practices. It is recommended that NY Parks formally define a Bennington Research Corps. The group could function in a fashion similar to the BRAVO organization, initially formed over three decades ago to work at Monmouth Battlefield State Park in New Jersey. One condition of continued membership in such a corps would be a pledge that the individual would not detect without supervision of a professional archaeologist anywhere within the Bennington Battlefield, whether on state or privately-

352 Lord, War over Walloomscoick... (Albany, 1989)

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owned land. An ultimate goal of this volunteer organization would be to raise the awareness level of the total battlefield area, and to foster battlefield stewardship and reinforce the preservation ethos.

Figure 47 and Table 11: If land owner permission is granted, it is recommended that NY Parks archaeologists or consultant archaeologists work with 10-15 avocational detectorists for two days per year until these locations have been surveyed.

Table 11:

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It is recommended that the park also sponsor limited excavations for the public to observe, ideally in conjunction with annual commemorative events. A starting point could be the ground-truthing of the suspected remnant of the Tory Redoubt. The hand removal of plowzone from a 10 x 5-meter area should reveal if the GPR anomaly is a likely cultural feature. It is then recommended that a 1-meter-wide trench be excavated perpendicular to the anomaly to expose the profile of the anomaly and to recover a sample of artifacts. This work could be conducted in 2-3 days by a single professional archeologist working in conjunction with volunteers from the High School.

9.2.2 Fencing and Monitoring

The GPR survey identified four anomalies interpreted as two potential potato pits and two other possible expedient graves. None have been definitively verified to contain battle dead, but the anomalies exhibit the characteristics of possible burial features. It is recommended that the park consider these anomalies as potential burial features, and that this section of the lawn be demarcated with a period-appropriate fence to keep vehicles from inadvertently damaging these anomalies.
It is also recommended that park personnel conduct quarterly monitoring of these locations, with special attention paid to possible changes in the river alignment. If any of these four anomalies become imminently threatened, archeological excavation is recommended.

9.2.3 Portable XRF Study of Lead

The collection derived from the present project would be a good sample for the study of lead composition using a portable XRF unit (pXRF). There should be patterns of lead composition that relate to the sources of munitions for the opposing military forces. It would be an interesting study to examine the spatial distribution of dropped and fired balls of various compositional groups. This may lead to a recognition of which lead types were used by which units, allowing us to better unwrap the complexities of the battle actions.

Also, the project recovered 14 sections of cut lead pipe. Each of these is approximately six to nine inches in length. Avocationalists who have worked on camps of the Saratoga Campaign report that such finds are common. It is assumed that such pipe pieces were carried as raw material to be melted and cast as balls. It would be instructive to see if the compositional signature of the pipes matches any of the balls recovered.

Although such a study is not vital to the operation of the park, it would provide valuable data and would help maintain public interest in the park. With our present results already in GIS, the lead study results could easily be added to the database. The lead study would be an excellent opportunity for a graduate student or intern. Alternately, if a pXRF unit can be obtained on loan, the study might be of interest as a high school science project.
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